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Since the United States Coast Guard (USCG) reported in 1993 that human factors had 
essentially caused approximately 80% of maritime accidents and near misses, there has 
been an overwhelming understanding that human factors play a significant role in a 
considerable number of incidents or catastrophes by triggering chain events. 
The work has initially documented a literature review underlining human factors in 
maritime accidents, mental workload study and functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy 
(fNIRS) technique to imply how it can be studied for human factors in maritime 
transportation. It investigates how different risk factors generate an impact on different 
types of human-related maritime transportation accidents using a data-driven approach, 
and how mental workload influences neurophysiological activation and decision- making 
of seafarers by conducting an experimental study in bridge simulation.  
The results of the developed models formalise the causal interdependencies between the 
risk factors with human factors perspectives and highlight the implications through 
scenario analyses. On the other hand, the findings of the fNIRS experimental study 
revealed the role of the prefrontal cortex and functional connectivity in watchkeeping and 
collision avoidance during maritime operations. 
It is concluded that the understanding of risk factors contributing to human errors will 
help reduce the risk level or eliminate the potential hazards of ships, and provide the clue 
for accident investigation and generate insights for accident prevention. Also, the 
experimental study supports fNIRS as a valuable neuroimaging technique in realistic 
situations. It examines the mental workload and functional connectivity of seafarers, 
which helps generate insights for human performance and seafarers’ training. Finally, the 
inclusion of a broader range of human factors and experimental methods shows promise 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the research background that helps to understand 
the research necessity from a practical viewpoint. The research aims and objectives are 
stated to demonstrate the purpose of conducting this particular study, followed by the 
statement of the problem associated with human factors in the maritime transportation 
industry. Then, the thesis outline is provided to explain the logic of conducting human 
factors research within different perspectives, followed by both subjective and objective 
analyses. It is particularly innovative that the quantitative method is applied to model the 
risk factors contributing to human errors in maritime accidents. Besides, an experimental 
study integrated with neuroscience knowledge is conducted to simulate the scenario 
eliciting the neurophysiological changes of brain activities with the application of fNIRS 
and bridge simulation, which further investigates the individual factors – mental workload 
for seafarers. Meanwhile, the discussions and challenges in the research have been 
specified to demonstrate the deliverables to the knowledge and to indicate the 
achievements against the defined objectives. 
1.2 Research background 
95% of world trade by volume - raw materials, finished goods and energy supplies is 
transported by sea, and a significant amount of capital is invested in shipping (Trafford, 
2009). However, about 75-96% of marine accidents are caused, at least in part, by human 
errors (Hanzu-Pazara et al., 2008). Human error is widely accepted to cover a variety of 
unsafe acts, behaviours, omissions and hazardous conditions. Besides, the activities on 
board or off board related to seafarers or mariners are influenced by internal and external 




involving Greek-flagged ships, during 1993–2006, 57.1% of all accidents were attributed 
to the human element (Tzannatos, 2010). Among them, 75.8% of maritime accidents were 
detected on board, and 80.4% of the onboard human-induced accidents were linked to 
errors and violations by the ship’s master. As the ship’s master is responsible for decisions 
made on board, it is evident that the master’s errors or violations affect other crews’ 
working procedures, manoeuvring behaviours, and emergency responses, which 
illustrates the risks with respect to human and organisational factors in maritime 
transportation.  
The questionnaire survey (Safahani, 2015) emphasised some issues: 75% stated that the 
team leader should discuss the work plan with other teammates; 90% thought monitoring 
the task provides an essential contribution to effective team performance; almost 
everyone in the survey believed that communication was a significant factor, and teams 
not communicating effectively increase their risk of committing errors. It broadens the 
definitions and classifications of human factors in maritime transportation. Thus, more 
attention has been paid to these skills to better understand the human factors in maritime 
accidents.  
It is also agreed that there are numerous reasons for an individual making errors. These 
may include communication failure, ineffective training, memory lapse, inattention, 
poorly designed equipment, exhaustion or fatigue, ignorance, noisy working conditions, 
other personal and environmental factors. According to the annual report on marine 
casualties and incidents issued by European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA, 2017), 
from a total of 1,170 accidental events during the investigations, shipboard operations 
represented the main contributing factor at 71% of the total, compared to the shore 
management. These statistics suggest the significance of studying ship officers’ 
behaviours for navigation safety.  
Not only wrong or delayed technical operational skills prevent the seafarers from 




performance of seafarers. The seafarer in the ship bridge (deck officer) is required to 
obtain plenty of skills, especially non-technical skills, including defining problems, 
managing workload, maintaining the standards of the watchkeeping, implementing the 
best solution, responding to the changes of information, anticipating future events, 
sending information clearly and concisely, maintaining concentration, coping with 
stressors, etc. (O'Connor and Long, 2011). Therefore, they are supposed to deal with 
multi-tasks during navigation within various levels of workload over the time and 
combined tasks. NTSs of cooperation, leadership and management, situation awareness 
and decision-making, are also considered in the training and assessment in the maritime 
industry (Saeed et al., 2016). 
Also, crews working on board tend to be fewer owing to the automation revolution of 
vessels in the shipping industry. From this point of view, it is the advance in automation 
and reallocation of crew responsibility, as well as shore-based equipment and onboard 
devices, that permitted reductions in crew size (Council, 1990). In the late 1980s, 
European and Japanese governments supported greater automation, centralising 
navigation, engine control, communications, and administrative functions on the bridge 
to build the “ship operation centre”, as well as throughout the vessel. From this 
perspective, the fast pace of innovation and development in shipping is continuing 
worldwide.  
Although the automation could eliminate the trivial stuff among the high workload 
seafarers, actually it induces unknown problems, as demonstrated by the grounding of the 
Royal Majesty (the Panamanian passenger ship grounded on Rose and Crown Shoal, 
Massachusetts in 1995) and evidence from other research results (Lutzhoft and Dekker, 
2002). Automation has a prospecting expectation of human work and safety, which cannot 
merely replace human action thoroughly. Fewer crew numbers do not lead to less 
workload. There also exists an increased mental workload affecting situation awareness 




More concisely, the humans will still work on monitoring, remote control, and 
maintenance, even for the high seas unmanned ships where it has to coexist with manned 
ship systems (Porathe et al., 2014). In this regard, automation in the vessel creates new 
error pathways, especially resulting from human errors, deficiencies in mission shifts, and 
postpones chances to correct errors in the system further into the future.  
It is noteworthy that human error plays an essential role in exploring maritime 
transportation safety, no matter whether in the past or the future. Many cases of maritime 
accidents, as well as near-misses, reflect the risks and issues associated with maritime 
safety. With the revolution of advanced ships or even unmanned ships, there is an 
increasing number of research papers on inter-relationships between human factors to 
imply the potential measures taken for accident preventions, as well as introducing cross-
discipline knowledge into the traditional marine safety research for new findings. 
Moreover, the practical evaluation of seafarers’ mental workload will help understand the 
risks to which seafarers are exposed and improve navigation safety. Therefore, it is 
necessary to learn lessons from the past accidents with regards to human factors and 
explore the mental demands on duty for seafarers, which helps us to understand the risks 
in maritime transportation and introduce multi-discipline knowledge to human 
performance study in the maritime field.  
1.3 Research aims and objectives 
The primary purposes of this research are to investigate how human factors combined 
with common risk factors affect the safety of maritime transportation, and how an 
individual physiological factor - mental workload - influences neurophysiological 
activation, and decision making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers.  
From the perspectives of human factors in maritime transportation, it aims at investigating 
how different risk factors generate an impact on different types of human-related maritime 




human errors, it proposes a novel risk assessment of the human factors contributing to 
maritime accidents. Based on recorded maritime accident reports from maritime accident 
investigation organisations, a primary database for this study is developed. Moreover, a 
data-driven approach is used for modelling. In the developed models, it formalises the 
causal interdependencies between the risk factors. Furthermore, it highlights the 
implications through scenario analyses. The understanding of risk factors contributing to 
human errors will help reduce the risk level or eliminate the potential hazards of the novel 
ship in the future, and provide the clue for accident investigation and generate insights 
for accident prevention. 
From the above human factors research derived from accident reports and works of 
literature, there is insufficient evidence to study individual factors which do not exist or 
contain limited information in the raw database, but are associated with the mental 
workload for seafarers. This research has to find a way to obtain the evidence of the 
mental workload of seafarers to support the hypothesis of the study. Therefore, it 
investigates how the mental workload induced by scenarios in the ship bridge influences 
neurophysiological activation and whether there is a difference between experienced and 
inexperienced seafarers. In order to understand the neurophysiological activation of the 
brain and the relations to human performance, an experimental study is designed and 
conducted for mental workload research. The results support fNIRS as a valuable 
neuroimaging technique, which can be used in realistic situations and reveal the role of 
the prefrontal cortex in watchkeeping and decision-making mental workload analysis of 
deck officers on a ship bridge. It examines changes in functional connectivity in the brains 
of seafarers and helps understand the relations between workload and human performance, 
which helps generate insights for seafarers’ training and certification. 
In order to achieve the research aims, the objectives are addressed as follows: 
 To obtain the primary data representing frequencies of risk factors directly derived 




 To analyse the risk factors in maritime accidents. 
 To incorporate human factors into causational analyses to maritime accident types. 
 To develop a historical accident data-driven approach to train prior probabilities in 
the risk-based BN. 
 To conduct an empirical study to provide insights for the prevention of a particular 
type of accident involving human errors.  
 To design and conduct the experimental study aiming to study the mental workload 
of seafarers and the behavioural performance using fNIRS technology. 
 To explore the patterns of functional connectivity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) of experienced and inexperienced seafarers. 
1.4 The statement of the problem 
Ship accidents are caused by various types of failures, e.g. deck officer error (26%), 
equipment failure (9%), structural failure (9%), crew error (17%), mechanical failure 
(5%), among others. (Guedes Soares and Teixeira, 2001). Since the USCG reported in 
1993 that human factors had essentially caused approximately 80% of maritime accidents 
and near misses, there has been an overwhelming understanding that human factors play 
a significant role in a considerable number of incidents or catastrophes by triggering chain 
events. Also, Branch et al. (2004) disclosed that watchkeeping manning levels and 
individuals’ abilities to discharge duties were essential factors resulting in collisions and 
groundings. In order to study human factors in maritime transportation and analyse 
mental workload for seafarers in watchkeeping, the research questions are generated to 
ensure that the research objectives are met, and the methodological points are specified, 




 What are the common human factors in maritime transportation? 
 What are the most appropriate methods for analysing and evaluating the risk factors 
associated with human factors within the limited maritime transportation accidents, 
and how to implement the proposed methods? 
 How to obtain the raw data to generate the database for human factors analyses? 
 How to model the risk factors for human-related maritime transportation?  
 What is the mental workload of seafarers on board, and how to quantify them? 
 How mental workload influences neurophysiological activation? 
 How to design the experiment for the measurement of mental workload and 
neurophysiological activation? 
 How to reveal the decision-making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers in the 
experimental study within a ship bridge simulator? 
To analyse human factors, the maritime accident database is used as one of the most 
valuable sources to obtain the primary data, including the global database like Global 
Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) (Pristrom et al., 2016), and the historical 
accident data collected from local maritime administration (Zhang et al., 2016). However, 
such databases contain less detailed and comprehensive information than the extractions 
from maritime accident reports. From this perspective, previous studies relying mainly 
on the secondary database, e.g. GISIS, were unable to present primary information from 
accident reports. Unlike the secondary database, investigation reports from public 
accident investigation organisations provide the navigational circumstance, process of the 
failure chain, environmental information, direct or indirect causes of the accidents, and 




relations between various factors are demonstrated in some or part detail. However, few 
studies have utilised accident reports to obtain the raw data for risk factors and conduct 
human factors analyses due to the time-consuming process of extracting the context data 
from each report. Even studies utilising accident reports provided a small number of 
report sources and limited content of the risk factors, for example, 131 accident reports 
reviewed by Uğurlu et al. (2015b) and 27 collision reports reviewed by Chauvin et al. 
(2013).  
Secondly, human factors have complex causal relations with each other. Lema et al. (2014) 
applied a K-means clustering method to indicate that human factors coexist with the 
condition of a ship and other external factors. It was widely accepted that human factors 
were associated with a variety of unsafe actions, behaviours, omissions and hazardous 
conditions, and the human element was a critical factor in maritime accidents (Antão and 
Guedes Soares, 2008). The annual report on marine casualties and incidents issued by 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA, 2019) stated that, from a total of 4,104 
accident events analysed during the investigations, 65.8% were attributed to a human 
actions category and 20% to system/ equipment failures. These statistics suggest the 
significance of studying seafarers’ shipboard operations for navigation safety. Besides the 
operational skills, non-technical skills (NTS) of co-operation, leadership and 
management skills, situation awareness and decision-making, are also considered in the 
training and assessment in the maritime industry (Saeed et al., 2016). Much attention has 
been paid to the risk analysis of accidents’ causes related to human factors. Celik and 
Cebi (2009) proposed a Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
approach to identify human factors in shipping accidents. It revealed the hierarchy 
structure of human factors and the logic relations within the structure. Chen et al. (2013) 
modified the HFACS to make it more applicable to maritime accidents (i.e. HFACS-MA 
model), to comprehensively describe Human and Organisational Factors (HOFs) in the 
maritime sector. However, these given frameworks of HOFs illustrate several levels, but 




interdependencies between each factor. It calls for a methodology to incorporate human 
factors into maritime accident analysis, combined with common risk factors, and to 
generate new insights on critical human factors contributing to different types of accidents. 
Thirdly, studying the human factors from these accident experiences or accident reports 
probably omits significant individual factors, e.g. mental workload, fatigue, stress, which 
is highly related to the human performance but cannot be reflected in the report recording 
or be described and quantified appropriately by words. Moreover, the research on patterns 
of the neurophysiological activation and behavioural performance of seafarers remains in 
blank space. In order to understand how mental workload influences neurophysiological 
activation and decision-making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers, it is 
necessary to develop an experimental study to quantify and measure mental workload and 
neurophysiological activation. The practical evaluation of the seafarer’s workload will 
help understand the risk exposed to seafarers and improve navigation safety. 
1.5 Scope and outline of the thesis 
The research scope is set up to surround the core of the thesis, which offers integrated 
methods to identify the subjective and objective human factors, model the 
interdependency among Risk Influence Factors (RIFs), and proposes an experimental 
study on human factors using bridge simulation for maritime transportation. The proposed 
methods consider both subjective and objective ways concerning human factors and are 
combined with multi-discipline knowledge. Incorporating human factors into risk 
analysis for maritime accidents and applying fNIRS technology into seafarers’ mental 
workload study, are particularly innovative, when being used to support the methodology 
of analysing human factors in maritime accidents, compared to the traditional human 
reliability research primarily based on the experts’ knowledge or limited secondary data. 
This research provides a perspective to understand the inter-relationships among RIFs 




graphical flowchart is presented in Figure 1.1 for outlining the structure of the thesis 
followed with the identification of research gaps, development of research, experimental 
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Figure 1.1 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is compiled in ten chapters. Following the introduction of the research process 
as presented in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 offers the first attempt at broadly understanding the 
human factors in maritime accidents, and discussing the state-of-the-art human reliability 
and neurophysiological research. Thematic analyses are conducted to gather the 
fragmental information to provide a systematic description of the research. It reviews the 
human factors in maritime accidents, risk assessment of HOFs, decision making theories, 




is evident that the human factors in maritime transportation influence the performance of 
seafarers and affect transportation safety. Besides, it finds that practically conducting 
human reliability research within novelty methodology and neurophysiological 
knowledge in maritime transportation are a fertile area emerging from growing challenges. 
The distinctive gaps existing in current literature provide a future research agenda. 
In Chapter 3, the approaches adopted in the research are presented and discussed. It lays 
down the foundation for the study by indicating the main philosophical views behind the 
research methodologies. The multi-discipline knowledge is provided to reveal the overall 
plan and the priorities of the research. Furthermore, the chapter describes the 
methodologies of BN modelling and the neurophysiological methods, which are 
employed to identify, extract, quantify, and analyse human factors and seafarers’ mental 
workload. 
To identify the risk factors contributing to human errors in maritime transportation, 
Chapter 4 aims at analysing the human errors from the maritime accidents which 
happened from 2012 to 2017, and generating the contributing factors that influenced the 
human errors revealed in the reports and from the literature. From this perspective, it is 
evident that the common factors contributing to human errors existing in accident reports 
have valuable meaning for the shipping risk analysis and evaluation. Also, it will help 
reduce the risk level or eliminate the potential hazards of the novel ship in the future, and 
benefit the revolution of ship automation and innovation.  
Based on the risk factors screened from Chapter 4, Chapter 5 aims at investigating how 
different risk factors generate an impact on different types of maritime accidents in terms 
of likelihood. Manual case by case analysis of recorded maritime accidents from the 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and the Transportation Safety Board of 
Canada (TSB) that occurred from 2012 to 2017 is undertaken to develop a primary 
database to support this study, as they are among the most representative from the 




Network-based approach is proposed to analyse accident types in maritime transport. The 
results highlight the implications through scenario analyses. 
Besides, there is another BN model developed for the RIFs influencing maritime 
accidents in the perspective of human factors. Chapter 6 investigates how human factors 
combined with factors in Chapter 5 affect maritime accidents in the perspective of risk 
analysis. It proposes a novel risk assessment of the human factors contributing to 
maritime accidents. Based on recorded maritime accident reports in Chapter 5, a primary 
database is extended. Using the extended database, the Tree Augmented Network (TAN) 
model is developed to construct BN structure and train the data, so as to propose a data-
driven BN-based approach for accident analyses accounting for inter-relationships among 
RIFs. It highlights the implications by providing a plausible explanation for the observed 
conditions.  
From a neurophysiological perspective, an experimental study is conducted in Chapter 7 
to analyse the mental workload and neurophysiological activations of seafarers in the ship 
bridge. It is done with simulated watchkeeping tasks in a maritime bridge simulator and 
using fNIRS to measure neurophysiological activation. Research using this technique 
provides further support for the activation of the DLPFC as a result of mental workload. 
It investigates when and how the mental workload induced by scenarios in the ship bridge 
influences neurophysiological activation and whether there is a difference between 
experienced and inexperienced seafarers, which may generate insights for seafarers’ 
training and certification in the future. 
In Chapter 8, it further analyses the functional connectivity of the brain area by 
conducting an experimental study. The functional connection between pairs of brain 
regions demonstrates the temporal correlation of regional haemodynamic. Thus 
symmetric correlation matrices are obtained of all pairwise combinations of channels in 
Chapter 7, followed by a reasonable method on choosing the threshold applied to the 




visualisation. In this way, it is supposed to demonstrate the patterns of brain activity for 
the watchkeeping and decision-making process, and explore an association between 
measures of functional connectivity and performance outcomes in an applied, safety-
critical scenario. 
Chapter 9 discusses the contributions of the research to the field, and highlights the 
novelty of the findings of the above chapters by adopting approaches in Chapter 3. It 
corresponds to the research gaps in Chapter 2. Then it briefly summarises the research 
objectives achieved and suggests the future work opportunities arising from the proposed 
methods. It highlights the research findings on the human factors analyses, modelling of 
the risk factors contributing to human errors, and the neurophysiological knowledge from 
the experimental study in all previous chapters. The research findings have been 
disseminated through academic publications in research journals and at international 
conferences making contributions to academic and industrial areas for further research on 
human factors in maritime transportation.  
1.6 The novelty of the study 
The novelty of the study lies in: 
 It reveals new features including new primary data directly derived from maritime 
accident records by two major databanks, MAIB and TSB from 2012 to 2017; also, 
the quantification of the extent to which different combinations of the factors 
influence each accident type.  
 It proposes BN-based risk analysis approaches to analyse the risk factors influencing 
maritime transport accidents. The network modelling the interdependency among the 
risk factors is constructed, then validated by sensitivity analysis.  




accident types, and generates new insights on critical human factors contributing to 
different types of accidents using a historical accident data-driven approach. It also 
pioneers the analyses of various impacts of human factors on different maritime 
accident types.  
 It investigates how mental workload influences neurophysiological activation of 
seafarers, which has not been used in maritime scenarios. This was done with 
simulated watchkeeping tasks in a maritime bridge simulator, and using fNIRS 
technology to measure neurophysiological activation. It demonstrates the developed 
scenarios which distracted the ship officers at specific points, which is the common 
task requiring temporal mental workload in the real world.  
 It explores the decision-making mental workload analysis of deck officers on a ship 
bridge, which fulfils the blank space of application of the fNIRS technique in 
maritime transportation. And it reveals the patterns of brain activity of seafarers in 
different groups, which is evident to be one of the promising directions of multi-
discipline research related to human factors. 
1.7 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 Human error is widely accepted to cover a variety of unsafe acts, behaviours, 
omissions and hazardous conditions. Although the automation in the shipping 
industry leads to fewer crew on board by eliminating the trivial stuff among the high 
workload seafarers, it probably induces problems and issues associated with human 
factors. Therefore it is necessary to learn lessons from past accidents with regards to 




 Mental workload influences neurophysiological activation and decision-making of 
experienced and inexperienced seafarers. The practical evaluation of seafarers’ 
mental workload will help understand the risk to which seafarers are exposed and 
improve navigation safety. Therefore it is necessary to explore the mental demand on 
duty for seafarers, which helps explain human performance study in the maritime 
field using multi-discipline knowledge. With respect to individual factors and 
cognitive demands for seafarers during navigation, there is scanty research on mental 





Chapter 2 Literature review 
2.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter presents the process of carrying out a structured and comprehensive 
literature review in terms of human factors in maritime accidents, the evaluation of risk 
methods utilised in human reliability research, as well as new technologies derived from 
other transportation fields. The fragments of separate investigations are gathered within 
the research domain to provide critical insights into addressed human factors and mental 
workload. An emerging trend of using the technique - functional Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy - for brain activity in the transport field, is also reviewed in a relatively broad 
range of research fields, in order to facilitate its further application in human factors study. 
The identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of additional work, which are 
used to clarify the research conducted in the following chapters. 
2.2 Background information 
In the late 1980s, European and Japanese governments supported greater automation, 
centralising navigation, engine control, communications, and administrative functions on 
the bridge to build the “ship operation centre”, as well as throughout the vessel. From this 
perspective, the fast pace of innovation and development in shipping is continuing 
worldwide. It is the advance in automation and reallocation of crew responsibility, as well 
as shore-based equipment and onboard devices, that permitted reductions in crew size 
(Council, 1990). Although fewer crew are on board with the automation in the shipping 
industry, there are increasing risks and pathways for maritime accidents with human 
factor perspectives.  
Human factors in this work are risk factors derived from unsafe actions or omissions of 




only reflect interactions with human’s performance, response, and decision making, but 
also explain the pattern of failure chains and the clue of investigation on maritime 
accidents or near misses. 
The maritime system is a human-machine system, and about 75-96% of marine accidents 
are caused, at least in part, by human errors (Hanzu-Pazara et al., 2008). Human error is 
widely accepted to cover a variety of unsafe acts, behaviours, omissions and hazardous 
conditions. SAFETY-II perspectives see human as a necessary resource that provides 
solutions to the potential problems rather than a hazard or problem to be fixed in the 
systems, with the purposed of ensuring that “as many things as possible go right” rather 
than “as few things as possible go wrong” (Hollnagel et al., 2015). The SAFETY-II 
assumes that everyday performance variability provides the adaptations that respond to 
varying conditions, and hence is the reason why things go right. From these perspectives, 
SAFETY-II is based on the agreement that human factors behind the incidents and 
accidents are complex and correlated with each other, so as the adaptations from everyday 
performance variability work well (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2012). In this way, human 
factors spread into a large number of causative factors in accidents.  
From a study analysing the specific onboard duties and off-board entities involving 
Greek-flagged ships, during 1993–2006, 57.1% of all accidents were attributed to the 
human element (Tzannatos, 2010). The old view of human error treats it as a cause of 
accidents (Dekker, 2014). To explain the failure, it is important to find people’s mistakes 
and wrong decisions. However, the new view of human error sees it as a symptom of 
deeper trouble in the system. To explain the failure, it is necessary to find how people’s 
assessments and actions made sense at the time, instead of trying to find where people 
went wrong (Dekker, 2014). Woods (2010) emphasises that the enemy of the safety is not 
the human, but a complex story of how people succeed and sometimes fail in the way to 
get success. It cares human error after the fact. In addition, it is also agreed that there are 




failure, ineffective training, memory lapse, inattention, poorly designed equipment, 
exhaustion or fatigue, ignorance, noisy working conditions, other personal and 
environmental factors. The questionnaire survey (Safahani, 2015) emphasised these 
issues: 75% stated that the team leader should discuss the work plan with other teammates; 
90% thought monitoring the task provides an essential contribution to effective team 
performance; almost everyone in the survey believed that communication was a 
significant factor, and teams not communicating effectively increase their risk of 
committing errors. 
2.3 Human reliability in maritime field 
As one of the most significant factors causing maritime accidents, the elimination or 
minimisation of human error is vital in the process of navigation and operation on board. 
The naval system is a human-machine system. Various studies have been conducted on 
human errors and human factors in maritime transportation from different perspectives to 
illustrate the causal evolution from human errors to maritime accidents.  
For human errors research, there are Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods that 
focus on the quantification of human operations (Precondition of human and contexts 
error). HRA is developed from engineering risk analysis and aims to predict likely failure 
event sequences quantitatively to analyse human factors in maritime accidents; error 
frequency and expert opinion have been used to predict reasons behind such accidents 
(Kirwan, 1994).  
At the beginning, human reliability analysis methods assign a probability of failure of a 
human operator in performing tasks (Zio, 2009), including the Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain and Guttmann, 1983), Accident Sequence 
Evaluation Program (ASEP) (Swain, 1987) and Human Cognition Reliability (HCR) 
(Hannaman et al., 1985). However, none of these studies went beyond individual human 




approach has been developed further.  
Latterly, methods including the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998), considering the situational influences on human errors with 
local conditions and task-specific factors to categorise errors, and A Technique for Human 
Error Analysis (ATHEANA) (Cooper et al., 1996), try to model the relationship between 
the context and the probability of human failure (Zio, 2009). In this way, cognitive failures 
are traced back to the psychological and situational precursors with relatively fewer 
organisational conditions involved.  
In recent research of human errors in maritime transportation, Celik and Cebi (2009) 
generated a HFACS derived from the aviation field (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2017) based 
on a Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP), to identify human errors in shipping 
accidents. In line with the HFACS, as well as Reason's Swiss Cheese Model and Hawkins' 
SHEL model, Chen et al. (2013) proposed HFACS for a Maritime Accidents (HFACS-
MA) model to measure the HOFs. Some studies exist on human reliability to define 
human performance in accidents and estimate human failure probabilities (Yang et al., 
2013, Yoshimura et al., 2015, Yang and Wang, 2012). Soner et al. (2015) combined Fuzzy 
Cognitive Mapping (FCM) and HFACS to generate a proactive model in fire prevention 
modelling on board ships. Also, Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes 
(STAMP) was proposed by Leveson (2004) based on systems theory to help engineers to 
learn all the factors related to social and organizational structures. It provided a theoretical 
foundation for the introduction of new types of accident analysis, hazard analysis, 
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Figure 2.1 Human reliability analysis methods used in the maritime sector 
As the human error in maritime operations raised the public’s and industry’s concern, 
more attention has been paid to accidents’ causes related to human factors. John et al. 
(2014) proposed the methodology consisting of a FAHP, evidential reasoning (ER) 
approach, fuzzy set theory and expected utility to optimise performance effectiveness in 
seaport operation matters. It also reveals that human errors are a significant factor leading 
to the disruption of maritime operations with an enormous and long-term loss to the 
operator. Besides the concepts and theories of human errors research in naval operations, 
the investigation of human errors in maritime accident reports reveals more specific and 
realistic phenomena. There are frequent errors highlighted giving the practical human 
errors during the accidents.  
i. Firstly, it is common for seafarers or passengers not to be routinely wearing  
lifejackets or personal flotation devices (PFDs) in the process of manoeuvring or 
navigation activities. It contributes to the miss or lose of chance to survive in 
emergency. From the accident report MAIB 3-2017, the master’s intervention in 




be effective. Unlike the characteristics of transportation accidents that happen on 
the road, the reaction time left for the crew working on the ship during sailing is 
considerably more before the accidents. In many cases, the master has no choice if 
the chance of intervention in manoeuvring is missed, but waiting for when the 
collision or grounding comes. 
ii. Secondly, insufficient passage planning by the command team appears commonly 
in the investigation. From the report, MAIB 20-2016, the submarine’s command 
team misidentified Karen as a merchant ship primarily because no trawl noise had 
been heard on the same bearing. In this case, the submarine’s command team did 
not take avoiding action to keep clear of Karen. It was associated with 
communication and cooperation with teammates or crew on the other ships.  
iii. Thirdly, the loss of spatial awareness was proposed in maritime accident reports. 
Psychological effects of the relative motion illusion, for example, the cognitive 
costs of transferring from a different frame of reference, cannot be ignored during 
the navigation. Apart from the situation awareness proposed in the accident reports 
(MAIB 23-2017, TSBM16P0362), several psychological factors of individuals 
emerge in the maritime accidents, according to the higher workload from electronic 
navigation devices and automation application in the ship. Moreover, MAIB began 
to investigate and study the human factors in accidents associated with the use of 
advanced electronic navigation aids and the implementation of mandated 
navigation standards (MAIB 23-2017 reports). At the same time, the errors owing 
to the management team and organisation factors were revealed. It affects the 
violation and decision-making associated with the external and internal 
environment.  
To meet the demand for human reliability in the engineering, it is essential to solve real 
problem based on theoretical principles by problem based learning (PBL) (Shekar, 2014). 
There are applications of PBL to engineering design courses (Hasna, 2008). Tse and Chan 
(2003) designed a group project for the class to designe a calculator using microcontroller, 
which provided students with cooperative learning atmosphere. Gavin (2011) applied 
PBL into civil engineering to develop problem-solving, innovation, group-working and 
presentation skills desired by graduate employers. In maritime sector, a framework was 
proposed using PBL for the final-year design project unit at Australian Maritime College, 
which facilitated the maritime design engineering undergraduates to learn human factors 
concepts and apply in design process (Abeysiriwardhane et al., 2016). Luis et al. (2013) 




and devices used for measuring, manipulate or processing, and video contents explaining 
related information. It developed PBL program with mobile devices which offering a 
better and a more engaging experience for students in higher maritime education.  
2.4 Risk assessment in maritime systems and accidents 
Since the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (UK MCA) proposed the formal safety 
assessment (FSA) framework to the International Maritime Organization, maritime 
accident risk models have been fast developed because of the goal-setting risk regime. It 
takes into account ship conditions, organisational management, human operation, and 
hardware (Guedes Soares and Teixeira, 2001). To assess the risks in maritime systems, 
quantitative risk assessments have been conducted to analyse maritime accidents. Yip et 
al. (2015) applied the econometrics method to conclude that the number of passenger 
injuries is positively related to the number of crew injuries in ferry, ocean cruise and river 
cruise passenger vessel accidents. Talley and Ng (2016) proposed a logical approach to 
select quality-of-service measures for port cargo, vessel and vehicle services, which can 
be used as port performance indicators for evaluating the service performance of multi-
service ports. Ventikos and Psaraftis (2004) presented the relationship between an oil 
spill-assessing approach, namely the event-decision network (EDN) and the FSA to 
describe the spill-scenario analysis and to pinpoint its interconnections with the official 
instrument.  
Besides that, risk analysis of maritime accidents would benefit the decision-making 
systems onboard. Balmat et al. (2009) presented a fuzzy approach to automatically define 
an individual ship risk factor, which could be used in a decision-making system. Wu et al. 
(2018) integrated evidential reasoning and TOPSIS into group decision making for 
handling ships that are not under command. A fuzzy logic-based approach was proposed 
by Wu et al. (2019) for ship-bridge collision alert, considering ship particulars, bridge 




handling in the bridge waterway area.  
Moreover, the causation analysis and modelling of maritime risks have been conducted 
(Wang et al., 2019, Wan et al., 2019). Kum and Sahin (2015) used Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA) to clarify the causes and applied Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) for a 
recommendation to reduce the occurrence probabilities of maritime accidents. Also, 
Zhang et al. (2014a) estimated the navigational risk of the Yangtze River using the BN 
approach. Montewka et al. (2014) developed the risk framework using BN for the 
estimation of the risk model parameters.  
There are various risk methods developed for modelling in the maritime system, aiming 
at rational risk analyses. The interest in using BN as a tool in scientific risk analysis is 
continuously increasing, primarily related to its advantages in terms of learning and 
inference. According to the literature review by Weber et al. (2012), the number of 
academic papers on BN in risk analysis increased every year. Compared with other 
classical methods applied to dependability analysis, e.g. Markov Chains (MC) and Fault 
Trees (FT), BN sustains its advantages. Specifically, FT allows for calculating the 
probability by binary decision diagrams (BDD), which models the dependencies between 
events. However, it cannot represent the multiple state variables when multiple failures 
result in different consequences in a system. 
On the contrary, BN displays similar capabilities as the FT, but has additional ability to 
model a multi-state variable and several output variables. Khakzad et al. (2011) and 
Weber et al. (2012) presented a comparison of FT and BN approaches, while previous 
studies also explained how FT could be transformed into BN (Mahadevan et al., 2001, 
Bobbio et al., 2001, Trucco et al., 2008a), involving dynamic FT transformation (Montani 
et al., 2006). As far as MC is concerned, it analyses the exact probability of a failure event 
with the dependencies among variables and integrates the knowledge to represent multi-
state variables. However, system modelling tends to be sophisticated with increasing 




low number of parameters and a small-size conditional probability table (CPT).  
BN is widely utilised in maritime risk analysis, e.g. ship navigational risk assessment, 
port safety assessment, Arctic water transportation, inland waterway transportation, and 
collision assessment (Zhang et al., 2016) (Yang et al., 2018) (Fu et al., 2016) (Baksh et 
al., 2018) (Hanninen and Kujala, 2012, Liu et al., 2016a). It is proved to be powerful to 
model maritime accidents since it enables quantitative analysis of HOFs (Akhtar and Utne, 
2014, Castaldo et al., 2016, Thieme and Utne, 2017). It explicitly reveals probabilistic 
dependencies between factors and their causal relationships. Moreover, the feature that 
BN can take advantage of experts’ knowledge makes it suitable for maritime risk 
modelling, in cases where failure data in the relevant investigations are incomplete. 
Therefore, experts’ knowledge continues to be an essential data source for shipping 
accident modelling (Fu et al., 2016, Zhang and Thai, 2016), although it is subjectivity 
associated. 
2.5 Human factors in maritime accidents  
Since the USCG reported in 1993 that human factors had primarily caused approximately 
80% of maritime accidents and near misses, there has been an overwhelming 
understanding that human factors play a significant role in a considerable number of 
incidents or catastrophes by triggering chain events. 
The preliminary findings of the literature review on human factors in maritime accidents 
are stated in Table 2.1, which demonstrate the strengths and weakness of several typical 
studies. For organisational factors, Lu and Tsai (2008) studied the influence of the safety 
culture on ship accidents, concluding that the job safety, management safety practices and 
safety training were among the top influencers. On the other hand, people surrendered the 
level of vessel safety standards to a profitable activity due to commercial pressures 
(Vinagre-Ríos and Iglesias-Baniela, 2013). It showed that increase and decrease in the 




From this point of view, human factors were also derived from the practices and operating 
policies established by shipping companies.  
Table 2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the relevant research 
Researchers Journals  Strengths Weaknesses 





Considered the organisational factors, 
and empirically evaluated the 
influence of safety climate on vessel 
accidents from a seafarer’s 
perspective 
Factors were limited, and it did 
not illustrate the interaction 






The Journal of 
Navigation 
Mentioned the increasing incidence of 
human errors, and pointed out how 
commercial pressures of shipping 
market influence the risk behaviour of 
shipping business decision-makers. 








Identified the difference in the pattern 
of human factors and other factors 
associated with high-speed crafts 
accidents, as compared with the more 
traditional ocean-going ships 
Human factors were limited to 
human tasks, including set 
speed, set heading, lookout 
planning, trip maintenance, 






Improved HFACS framework to 
identify the role of human factors in 
shipping accidents. Improvement of 
safety precautions in shipping 
companies 
Did not reflect the influences 
between different factors’ 
levels. 
Chen et al., 
2013 
Safety Science The use of HFACS-MA model with 
Why-Because Analysis can help 
ensure the relevant latent conditions 
and indicate the adverse influences 
between different factors’ levels. 
It needed a dedicated HOFs 
framework with particular 
items specified for marine 
accidents and the weights of 
the HOFs identified. 




Proposed a modified CREAM to 
facilitate human reliability 
quantification in marine engineering; 
developed a quantitative human 
reliability analysis method using 
It required appropriate 
consideration of the influence 
of the common performance 
conditions with neutral effects 




fuzzy Bayesian; realised real-time 
monitoring of marine engineers' 
failures under uncertainty 






Used HFACS to identify contributory 
factors involved in 39 collisions; used 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis  
and hierarchical clustering to reveal 
three patterns of factors 
The small number of collisions 
studied but the high number of 
variables. 
Soner et al., 
2015 
Safety Science Used FCM with HFACS to propose a 
novel proactive modelling and add 
value to predicting the root causes 
revealed in various levels. 
Detailed predictions of 
suggested safety mechanisms 
will be studied in order to 






Used data collected from the Global 
Integrated Shipping Information 
System (GISIS) together with expert 
judgement 
There was no detailed human 
factors data. 
Zhang et al., 
2016 
Safety Science A literature review on expert 
knowledge and BN modelling for 
shipping accidents in view of risk and 
uncertainty. 
New methods for experts’ 
knowledge elicitation should 
be developed to improve the 
model validity. 
Kim et al., 
2016 
Safety Science Conducted a STAMP-based accident 
analysis of the 2014 Sewol tragedy to 
uncover unsafe interactions among 
components leading to the hazards 
using system thinking. 
Limited extensive data from 








Proposed a collision risk model for the 
incorporation of human factors into 
quantitative risk analysis. 
Focused on calculation of the 
collision accident probability 
due to human error, with 
limited causal analysis. 
Sætrevik and 
Hystad, 2017 
Safety Science Demonstrated that inaccurate SA may 
be the proximal cause for operator 
error. 
It calls for measuring objective 
safety indicators, rather than 
the crew’s subjective risk 
assessment or self-report of 









Showed the key factors influencing 
waterway safety, including the type 
and location of the accident and 
conducted a novel scenario analysis to 
predict accident severity. 
The completeness of the data 
mined from the text case was 
arguable. It focused more on 
objective variables rather than 
human factors. 
Moreover, human factors have complex causal relations with each other. It was widely 
accepted that human factors were associated with a variety of unsafe actions, behaviours, 
omissions and hazardous conditions, and the human element was a critical factor in 
maritime accidents (Antão and Guedes Soares, 2008). Much attention has been paid to 
the risk analysis of accidents’ causes related to human factors. Celik and Cebi (2009) 
proposed a HFACS approach to identify human factors in shipping accidents, which 
revealed the hierarchy structure of human factors and the logic relations within the 
structure. Chen et al. (2013) modified the HFACS to make it more applicable to maritime 
accidents (i.e. HFACS-MA model), to comprehensively describe HOFs in the maritime 
sector. In addition, human performance defined by human reliability in accidents was 
analysed, and the human failure probabilities were estimated to assess the risk level of 
the shipping industry (Yang et al., 2013, Yoshimura et al., 2015, Yang and Wang, 2012). 
Soner et al. (2015) combined FCM with HFACS to generate a proactive model in fire 
prevention, which revealed that human factors were significant factors on board ships, 
leading to the failures of maritime operations with an enormous and long-term loss. In 
STAMP, accidents are conceived as resulting not from component failures, but from 
inadequate control of safety-related constraints on the design, development, and operation 
of the system. Kim et al. (2016) conducted a STAMP-based accident analysis of the 2014 
Sewol tragedy to uncover rationales behind the decision-makings and unsafe interactions 
among components leading to the hazards. Moreover, SA explained variation in unsafe 
actions and in subjective risk assessment (Sætrevik and Hystad, 2017). Variance in SA 
was in turn accounted for by captains’ leadership, and inaccurate SA may be the proximal 
cause for operator error. In addition, the model took into account the human performance 




calculation of human, economic and environmental risks (Sotiralis et al., 2016). 
To analyse human factors, the maritime accident database is used as one of the most 
valuable sources to obtain the primary data, including the global database like GISIS 
(Pristrom et al., 2016), and the historical accident data collected from local maritime 
administrations (Zhang et al., 2016). However, such databases contain less detailed 
information than the extractions from maritime accident reports. From this perspective, 
the investigation reports of maritime accidents provide the navigational circumstance, 
process of the failure chain, environmental information, direct or indirect causes of the 
accidents, and the actions taken during the accidents. Even the hidden potential hazards 
and causal relations between various factors are demonstrated in detail. However, few 
studies utilised accident reports to conduct accident and human factors analysis due to the 
time-consuming process of extracting the data from each report. Therefore, even studies 
utilising accident reports provided limited content of the data sources. For instance, 
Chauvin et al. (2013) underlined 39 vessels involved in 27 collisions derived from the 
accident reports, identifying the importance of Bridge Resource Management for 
situations of navigation in restricted waters. Chen et al. (2013) utilised the accident reports 
of selected cases from MAIB for accidents analysis providing a complement measure. 
Wang and Yang (2018) analysed all accident investigation reports by China's Maritime 
Safety Administration (MSA), to conclude the key risk factors influencing waterway 
accident severity. 
2.6 HOFs technologies and decision making theories 
Celik and Cebi (2009) proposed a HFACS approach to identify human factors and their 
hierarchy structure and the logic relations in shipping accidents. Chen et al. (2013) 
modified the HFACS to make it more applicable to comprehensively describe HOFs in 
the maritime sector. Soner et al. (2015) combined FCM with HFACS to show that human 




The STAMP proposed by Leveson (2004) was used to conduct accident analysis by Kim 
et al. (2016). It was based on systems theory to uncovered rationales behind the decision-
makings and unsafe interactions among components leading to the hazards. 
As for one of the most common approaches used for human factors studies, BN has been 
widely applied to maritime risk analysis, including collision risk assessment (Hanninen 
and Kujala, 2012, Ma et al., 2016), human reliability analyses (Martins and Maturana, 
2013), and risk estimation (Montewka et al., 2014). Zhang et al. (2013) and Zhang et al. 
(2014a) estimated the navigational risk through FSA and BN to improve the navigational 
safety in the Yangtze River, and established the BN for the analysis and prediction of the 
congestion risk of inland waterways. Also, BN was constructed to represent the 
dependencies between the indicators and accident consequences (Zhang et al., 2016), 
revealing that the accident consequences were the most sensitive to the position where 
the accidents occurred.  
Related to BN’s learning and inference algorithms, Weber et al. (2012) pointed out that 
the number of publications on BN in risk analyses increased every year. However, the 
system modelling tends to be complicated with increasing variables, while leading to an 
apparent increase of parameters and related functions (Weber et al., 2012). Because BN 
can conduct bi-directional risk analysis, the transformation from the converging to 
diverging connections has no influence on the final BN results on risk analysis (Wang and 
Yang, 2018). That is to say, arrows’ directions can be changed appropriately to fit the 
demand of a small-size conditional probability table in BN. In this way, the BN approach 
makes it applicable to a sophisticated system.  
Moreover, BN is a competitive approach for maritime risk modelling owing to its abilities 
to utilise either expert knowledge or data-driven methods. Expert knowledge continues 
to be an essential data source for shipping accident modelling, when failure data in the 
relevant investigations are absent (Fu et al., 2016, Zhang and Thai, 2016). However, a 




in order to help rationalise inspection regulations for port state control practice (Yang et 
al., 2018). In light of this characteristic, BN is appropriate for modelling maritime 
accidents since it enables quantitative analyses of HOFs (Trucco et al., 2008a, Castaldo 
et al., 2016, Akhtar and Utne, 2014).  
As far as the maritime accident modelling is concerned, there are many approaches, e.g. 
Naïve Bayesian Networks (NBN), Augmented naive Bayesian Networks (ABN), and 
Tree Augmented Naive Bayes (TAN). Because the complexity of a data-driven BN 
structure super-exponentially increases with the growing number of variables in the 
network (Yang et al., 2018), NBNs are usually used in a simple network structure for the 
risk factors analyses of maritime accidents. To do so, there is a strong assumption in most 
NBN models that it has an independent node as the target node directly connected to all 
the other nodes without other links in the structure. NBN is a commonly used model 
aiming at improved classification (Friedman et al., 1997). On the other hand, in order to 
investigate the relations among risk factors considering more attributes in the network, 
NBN is not appropriate. Friedman et al. (1997) pointed out that TAN outperforms naive 
Bayes, at the same time, maintains the computational simplicity and robustness that 
characterise naive Bayes. Therefore, TAN is suitable for complex BN structure 
considering more human-related RIFs. 
In addition, research suggested that significant work remained to be done after having the 
causations identified. Yang et al. (2018) proposed a Bayesian Network-based approach to 
analyse risk factors influencing Port State Control inspections and predict the detention 
probabilities under different situations. The findings could support port authorities to 
rationalise their inspection regulations as well as the allocation of the resources. Moreover, 
human factors are significant issues among decision making in accident preventions 
accounting for multiple criteria (Othman et al., 2015). For instance, Antão and Guedes 
Soares (2019) suggested to proactively optimise accident prevention through the 




crews, and reactively reduce the consequences of occurrence through equipping more 
life-saving equipment to the areas more prone to specific accidents. However, it revealed 
limited information regarding the direct impact of a human error into an occurrence. 
Othman et al. (2015) introduced TOPSIS method to maritime accident investigation and 
found that Senior Deck Cadets (SDC) are the most affected by distractions during the 
ship's operation. From this point of view, it is worth developing a methodology to 
introduce human factors into effective decision making in accident prevention. 
Individually, the decision maker ranks alternatives after the qualitative or quantitative 
analysis of a set of criteria, and find the most desirable alternative based on the 
intersection of selected criteria (Yue, 2011). Besides, Multi Criteria Decision Making 
(MCDM) has been developed and applied to the maritime sector, especially for accident 
prevention. For instance, Hollnagel (2004) developed barrier functions and modelled 
barrier systems that will enable informed decisions for system changes for accident 
prevention rather than accident analysis. It was stated that accidents could be prevented 
through a combination of multiple criteria, including performance monitoring and barrier 
functions, rather than through the elimination of causes, which is a proactive approach. 
From this point of view, it provided insights for the recommendations in the cases of 
accidents and decision making of onboard operations for seafarers. 
The seafarer’s decision making is associated with watchkeeping duties. Watchkeeping 
concerns those cognitive control processes of decision-making and preparation for action, 
which are activated when another vessel has been located and the potential for a collision 
is apparent. Koechlin et al. (2003) described a hierarchical model of cognitive control, 
wherein selection of motor actions in response to task stimuli (sensory control) are 
informed by existing stimulus-response associations for the situational context 
(contextual control), which in turn, are determined by recall of previous experience 
(episodic control). This model hypothesised that sensory control was localized to motor 




with bilateral activation of caudal (BA44/45) and rostral (BA46) regions of the lateral 
prefrontal cortex (LPC). This model was further developed by Koechlin and colleagues 
(Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007, Domenech and Koechlin, 2015) who proposed two 
methods of arbitration for executive control: (1) a peripheral system located in the 
premotor/caudal/orbitofrontal regions for action selection based on perceptual cues and 
reward values that are stable, and (2) a core system incorporating regions of the 
ventromedial, dorsomedial, lateral and polar PFC that adjust between the 
exploitation/adjustment of a previously learned behavioural set, and exploration/creation 
of new behavioural set in a variable environment. According to this model, the possibility 
of a desirable outcome via a specific behavioural task set is explored via the ventromedial 
region of the PFC. If there is a mismatch, the system reverts to the dorsomedial and lateral 
regions of the PFC to either create a new task-set or select an alternative task-set with a 
greater chance of a desirable output; for elaborated model and further explanation, see 
Koechlin (2016). 
2.7 Mental workload and functional Near-Infrared 
Spectroscopy in transportation fields 
Although the above human factors research indicates the patterns of risk factors 
influencing accidents, there is insufficient evidence to study individual factors which do 
not exist or about which only limited information is contained in accident reports or the 
literature, but are associated with the mental workload for seafarers. In order to find a 
way to obtain the evidence of the mental workload of seafarers to support the hypothesis 
of the study, a literature review has been conducted below.  
Accounting for multi tasks on duty for seafarers, understanding the cognitive demands 
and their relations to human performance during the navigation helps provide insights for 
better performance training for seafarers. Mental workload is one of the fundamental 




in a wide range of applications to evaluate task performance of operators or the practical 
aspect of system design (Ngodang et al., 2012, Dijksterhuis et al., 2011). Although mental 
workload related research has been conducted in road traffic accidents (Boyle et al., 2008, 
Rakauskas et al., 2008) and aviation transportation (Ayaz et al., 2012, Gateau et al., 2015), 
seafarers’ mental workload analysis in maritime transport is scanty (Lim et al., 2018, Fan 
et al., 2018). The mental workload has been described as being responsible for the 
majority of road traffic accidents (Dijksterhuis et al., 2011). Both high and low levels 
cause insufficient perception and attention, which in turn leads to driver errors. 
Mental workload is the amount of demands or resources requiring an operator to complete 
specific tasks. The more sophisticated the tasks, the more mental workloads are required 
to accomplish the tasks. Moreover, the mental workload is also linked to the experience 
of operators. Experienced drivers have acquired more effective automation through 
practice so that a lower level of mental workload was induced compared to novices 
(Patten et al., 2004). In the maritime sector, the majority of trainees had less workload 
when the experienced captain was present, and the latter had the highest workload levels 
while the former revealed low workload and stress because of the shared work and 
responsibility (Lim et al., 2018). Besides, neuroimaging techniques demonstrated 
increases in PFC activation with increases in mental workload (Ayaz et al., 2012). There 
is a threshold for workload, beyond which leads to worse performance and decreases in 
PFC activity (Molteni et al., 2008).  
Brain activity in the transport field has previously been measured using a range of 
techniques, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission 
tomography (PET), and electroencephalogram (EEG). The above three techniques are 
extremely sensitive to motion artefacts, making them difficult to deal with natural 
cognitive tasks in realistic scenarios (Chiarelli et al., 2017). Typically, fMRI and PET 
have physical limitations for participants, requiring them to be in a supine position (Foy 




signal is weak during collection as it is affected by other noise. However, functional near-
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a portable technique for both simulated environment and 
real-world operation. It is more robust to motion artefacts and has a higher temporal 
resolution (Noah et al., 2015). Besides, the hardware cost of fNIRS is significantly lower 
than most functional brain imaging techniques, including fMRI, PET, and EEG (Chiarelli 
et al., 2017).  
fNIRS is an emerging non-invasive brain imaging modality for measuring and recording 
cortical haemodynamic activity (Fishburn et al., 2014). It does not need to confine the 
subject in a small space compared to fMRI, and is also able to generate montages covering 
the whole head or precisely the parts of the cortex that contain relevant activations. This 
functional neuroimaging technique can record changes in brain activation by measuring 
changes in the concentration of oxygenated and deoxygenated haemoglobin, which is 
based on the different absorption spectra of near-infrared light. It is a sensitive and 
consequent mature measurement technique for identifying different mental workloads.  
To quantify the mental workload, fNIRS is a common technique applied in real-world 
scenarios (Christian et al., 2013), as fNIRS is sensitive to the cognitive load and state and 
can be used as a viable alternative of fMRI (Fishburn et al., 2014). Brain changes 
discussed above may also be evident in changes in haemodynamic concentrations 
measured by fNIRS according to a study on the association between haemoglobin levels 
and white matter conducted by Rozanski et al. (2014). More specifically, the increases in 
prefrontal activation are associated with increases in development by using fNIRS 
(Schroeter et al., 2004, Franceschini et al., 2007), which also have been found using fMRI 
(Adleman et al., 2002). Brain activity has a linear relationship with the working memory 
load of the left and right prefrontal cortex (Fishburn et al., 2014). Statistically different 
levels of oxygenation change result from significant changes in task difficulty. However, 
smaller differences in task difficulty were not reliably differentiated in some cases (Ayaz 




of interest of the brain for the investigated tasks. 
2.8 Research gaps 
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of a broad range of literature and the 
available maritime accident database from the MAIB of UK and TSB of Canada 
organisations from 2012 to 2017. Because MAIB adapted European Marine Casualty 
Information Platform (EMCIP) in 2011, and since then the records on maritime accident 
reports have been in uniform style. The number of maritime accidents from two databases 
in five years is reasonable for academic research referring to literature review.  
It provides the comprehensive summaries of the research development of human errors, 
the realistic phenomena in accidents, common errors highlighted concerning human 
errors during the accidents, decision-making theories, and mental worload analysis, see 
Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 Summarise the literature review 
Categorise Main contents 
Human reliability in maritime field 1.Human reliability analysis methods and models used in 
the maritime sector 
2.The investigation of human errors in maritime accident 
reports 
Risk assessment in maritime systems and 
accidents 
1.Maritime accident risk models have been fast developed 
2.Risk analysis of maritime accidents would benefit the 
decision-making systems onboard 
3.The causation analysis and modelling of maritime risks, 
including BN 
Human factors in maritime accidents 1.The strengths and weakness of several typical studies on 
human factors 
2.The maritime accident database used to obtain the 
primary data 
3.BN’s advantages as a competitive approach for human 
factors research 
Decision making in maritime accidents 1.The importance of introducing human factors into 




2.Individually, seafarer’s decision making is associated 
with watchkeeping duties 
Mental workload and fNIRS in 
transportation fields 
1.The reason why this work introduces mental workload 
into human factors study 
2.Definition of mental workload for seafarers 
3.fNIRS’s advantages and applications in transportation 
fields 
More importantly, the research on the common elements contributing to human errors in 
maritime accidents can be complicated and multi-dimensional effects given multi-
disciplines. Consequently, the studies carried out on this topic are relatively rare and can 
be developed. Based on the literature review, some research gaps are discussed as follows. 
i. Redefining the risk factors 
As stated in the maritime accident reports, there are several new factors related to human 
errors compared to the factors highlighted in the past, for example, ergonomic impact of 
ship design, unfamiliar with the automatic equipment on board, cognitive overload, lack 
of situation awareness due to the advanced devices, and over-reliance on AIS (Automatic 
identification system).  
With the development of automation in the shipping industry, fewer crew are on board. It 
is the advance in automation and reallocation of crew responsibility, as well as shore-
based equipment and onboard devices, that permitted reductions in crew size (Council, 
1990). To some extent, the automation could relieve the human errors in shipping by 
simplifying the operational procedures and raising the emergency alarm in time. However, 
it could aggravate a dangerous situation in the condition of situational awareness being 
lost or unfamiliarity with the automatic devices, even in the case of inability to terminate 
the specific automatic action of ships. Moreover, automation has a prospecting 
expectation of personal work and safety, which cannot merely replace human work 
thoroughly. Humans will still work on monitoring, remote control, and maintenance, 
especially on the high seas unmanned ships where it (automation) has to coexist with 




new error pathways, primarily resulting from human errors-related factors, deficiencies 
in mission shifts, and postpones chances to correct errors in the system further into the 
future. It is noteworthy to redefine and explore the potential hazards and risks related to 
human errors to peruse safe navigation, especially associated with psychophysiological 
factors. 
ii. Incorporating quantitative methods into human errors assessment  
Integrating the primary data with the advanced quantitative BN analysis approach 
facilitates maritime accident analysis and prevention from an innovative perspective. 
Despite previous attempts at using BN to model objective data from accident reports 
(Wang and Yang, 2018), the relevant investigation relied on a small scale database 
constrained in a pre-defined water/region. It requires more experiments based on a wide 
range of maritime accident data to be conducted to generalise the finding on BN’s 
feasibility on RIF analyses and more importantly, to reveal the most critical RIF from a 
global perspective, particularly concerning different accident types. Previous studies 
relying mainly on the secondary database for RIFs identification were unable to present 
primary information from accident reports. However, the data acquisition through the 
investigation of accident reports brings new insights, which cannot be achieved from the 
existing databases. One of the research gaps of this study is to propose database for 
quantitative analysis and assessment, and to incorporate human factors derived from 
accident reports into accident analysis, combined with other external factors. 
On the other hand, compared with the studies on the probability and/or the frequency of 
maritime accidents, those addressing the relationship between risk factors and accident 
types are scanty in the literature. For example, the risk factors contributing to collision 
may be different from the risk factors contributing to sinking. It reveals another new 
feature that is the analysis of accident types in maritime transportation and a new 
understanding of differentiation among critical factors contributing to different types of 




data-driven BN in maritime risk analyses is scarce, requiring more experimental evidence 
to be collected before its wide practical applications. To fulfil this gap, the study conducts 
a data-driven BN to generate the structure of RIFs. Consequently, it will provide new 
insights into the differentiation among critical human factors contributing to each of the 
different types of accidents. 
iii. Achieving the control measures of human errors 
Literally the potential human errors during the manoeuvring procedures or navigation 
process could be mitigated at the beginning of ship design. In recent years, the innovation 
of ship development and the increasing complexity of updated manoeuvring-related 
procedures has caused more attention to be paid to the ergonomic issues of vessels, 
particularly within the bridge design. Specifically, visual blind sector ahead and motion 
illusion not only lead to inaccurate or non intuitive data and blurred information in regard 
to observing deviation, but also be vulnerable for the increasing workload and distraction 
of multi-tasks conducting which is a common phenomenon in sailing or navigation 
process. As illustrated in the MAIB 26-2013 and MAIB 03-2017, the bridge design led 
the officer on duty to sit down and then increased the potential for him to fall asleep and 
caused the pilot’s disorientation. It implies that ergonomic design should be considered 
into human factors research in maritime safety. 
Another clue to controlling the human factor risks will be in and after the process of the 
emergency. Understanding the human errors attributes benefits the intervention of people 
or automatic auxiliary system during the emergency process. It is imperative to take 
adequate measures to prevent further hazards from spreading and decrease costs for 
recovering. These issues as to how to reduce the risk level of human errors scenarios and 
the possible potential intervention remain unclear. 
iv. Neurophysiological methods for human factors research 




generate the risk assessment of human mistakes. Relevant studies (Xi et al., 2017, Akyuz 
and Celik, 2014, Chen et al., 2013) focus on the concepts of HOFs, HRA, and human 
errors, human failure etcetera. Most of such studies are unable to measure the specific 
factor changing, especially the quantitative data of psychological and physiological 
characteristics of the human responses. As the method of analysing the questionnaire or 
accident report is one of the subjective ways of data collection, novel quantitative 
methods tend to be further applied in the assessment of human errors. It is necessary for 
the proposed framework to incorporate the novel quantitative approach given multi-
discipline, for example, the cognitive load of seafarers from the psychophysiological 
domain, and the knowledge for feature extraction of human performance. Among them, 
activities of the subject's central nervous system or neurobehavioral parameters could be 
imperative to one of the novel quantitative methods. As is shown in an EEG-based 
CogniMeter system (Hou et al., 2015), emotion, mental workload, and stress using 
cognitive algorithms were detected. With the rising psychological concern, drivers’ 
workload, pressure, emotional stress and environmental stress, can also be monitored 
associated with advanced systems (Liu et al., 2016b, Fan et al., 2017). 
Physiological signals (Hou et al., 2015) are collected to quantify human factors using 
sensors like EEG, ECG, EMG, blood volume pulse, skin electrical response, and eye 
movement. However, the relationship between psychophysiological signals and human 
performance was not demonstrated. Although studies on angry driving in road 
transportation (Yan et al., 2015, Zhang et al., 2014b, Lafont et al., 2018) have been 
conducted to identify the emotional connection between drivers and behaviours, there is 
rare research on similar perspectives in the maritime field. 
Furthermore, research using fNIRS technique provides further support for the activation 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as a reflection of mental workload. 
However, much of this research does not use naturalistic tasks in the maritime field, and 




novice officers. In this regards, another research gap lies in considering more variables 
(e.g. experience, distraction) influencing the mental states of seafarers, and involves 
psychophysiological methods to design human error-oriented scenarios affecting 
seafarers’ performance and measure their mental state in association with these factors. 
Therefore, to fulfil this gap, this study investigates how the mental workload induced by 
scenarios in the ship bridge influences neurophysiological activation, which may generate 
insights for seafarers’ training and certification. 
The above demonstration presents research gaps in the current research field. Also, the 
identified research gaps indicate the valuable points of this work, which clarifies the 
research conducted in the following chapters. 
2.9 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 The maritime system is a human-machine system, and most marine accidents are 
caused, at least in part, by human errors.  
 There are numerous reasons for an individual making errors. These may include 
communication failure, ineffective training, memory lapse, inattention, poorly 
designed equipment, exhaustion or fatigue, ignorance, noisy working conditions, 
other personal and environmental factors.  
 Automation in the vessel creates new error pathways, primarily resulting from human 
errors-related factors, deficiencies in mission shifts, and postpones chances to correct 
errors in the system further into the future. It is noteworthy to redefine and explore 
the potential hazards and risks related to human errors. 
 There are risk factors resulting in human errors in the maritime domain from 
maritime accident reports. The risk factors contributing to collision may be different 




the maritime accident reports database, and selecting the reviewed reports has been 
applied. 
 Since the UK MCA proposed the FSA framework to the International Maritime 
Organization, maritime accident risk models have been fast developed because of the 
goal-setting risk regime. 
 Modelling of maritime accidents since it enables quantitative analysis of HOFs 
explicitly reveals probabilistic dependencies between factors and their causal 
relationships. 
 BN is appropriate for modelling maritime accidents since it enables quantitative 
analysis of HOFs. 
 Compared to the studies using expert judgements in BN construction, data-driven 
BN in maritime risk analysis is scarce, requiring more experimental evidence to be 
collected before its wide practical applications. 
 Physiological signals can be collected to quantify human factors using sensors like 
EEG, ECG, EMG, blood volume pulse, skin electrical response, and eye movement. 
 Mental workload is linked to the experience of operators. Experienced drivers have 
acquired more effective automation through practice so that a lower level of mental 
workload was induced compared to novices. 
 In the maritime sector, the majority of trainees had less workload when the 
experienced captain was present, and the latter had the highest workload levels while 
the former revealed low workload and stress because of the shared work and 
responsibility. 
 To quantify the mental workload, fNIRS is a common technique applied in real-world 
scenarios, as fNIRS is sensitive to the cognitive load and state.  
 Considering more variables (e.g. experience, distraction) influencing the mental 
states of seafarers, and involving psychophysiological methods to design human 
error-oriented scenarios affecting seafarers’ performance and measure their mental 








Chapter 3 Research methodology and approaches adopted 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter discusses the research approaches, which have been implemented to reach 
the defined aims and objectives. One of the objectives is to provide a novel risk 
assessment method for defining, assessing, and analysing the risk factors in maritime 
accidents with human factors perspectives. Due to the insufficient specific data, the 
literature review and maritime accidents review are conducted to generate the raw 
database in risk identification and risk data collection. A systematic procedure for 
searching the maritime accident reports database, and selecting the reviewed reports has 
been applied. BN offers a methodological approach that learns the structure of modelling 
and describes the significant interdependencies between the RIFs. The application of the 
proposed modelling method enhances the practice of risk modelling, which can be used 
to address human factor risk effects and potential risk reduction outcomes in maritime 
accidents, see the left part of Figure 3.1.  
Another aim of this study is to investigate the mental workload and neurophysiological 
activation of seafarers during navigation duty. With this regard, it conducts an 
experimental study using the fNIRS technique. Much of the research does not use 
naturalistic tasks in the maritime field. Therefore this chapter proposes an approach to 
design the experiment, combined with functional connectivity analysis, to explore how 
the mental workload induced by scenarios in the bridge simulation influences 
neurophysiological activation. In order to illustrate the change of brain activity and its 
relations to human performance, relevant theories have been applied for the research, see 
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Figure 3.1 Detailed technical chapters of the work 
3.2 Identification of risk factors 
In order to review human factors in maritime transportation and common factors resulting 
in human errors, a systematic procedure for searching the maritime accident reports 
database, and selecting the reviewed reports has been applied. To begin with, it is 
necessary to conduct a systematic procedure to search the maritime accident reports and 
select the reviewed reports, referring to Macrae (2009), Chauvin et al. (2013), Uğurlu et 
al. (2015a), Wan et al. (2017). The procedure consists of three stages: (1) online database 
searching; (2) reports screening and selecting; (3) refining and analysis. In this process, 
there are 152 accident reports in MAIB and 61 accident reports in TSB from 2012 to 2017. 
In the screening process stage, the accident reports were filtered into human error-related 
accidents to ensure the representativeness and relevance of the reviewed accident reports. 




drowning in the swimming pool on cruise ships, and extreme accidents which occurred 
in small fishing vessels, tugs etcetera were discarded, as their reduced manning 
requirements would easily lead to a distortion of results about the human element 
influence (Tzannatos, 2010). On the other hand, the accident reports on mechanical 
failures or severe weather without serious or obvious human errors were not to be 
screened, considering the relevance of human errors in maritime accidents. In this way, 
there are 109 accident reports extracted from 152 reports in MAIB and 52 accident reports 
obtained from 61 reports in TSB. It is noted that, on rare occasions, an accident report (4 
of 109 in MAIB) may contain two similar or related incidents or accidents from the 
database, where it is counted as one accident for analysis due to the characteristics 
similarity and information integrity. 
In the final stage, these reports had been further refined and analysed through review, 
especially the ‘safety issues’ and ‘common factors’ section in the accident reports. Some 
details of information associated with maritime accidents were involved in refining, such 
as accident report number, accident type, vessel type, a summary of accidents, date of 
occurrence. Specifically, ship operation and voyage segment of the accident were 
analysed from the MAIB database.  
This is a significant process for analysing the accident reports because human factors 
described in reports are not literally classified in the procedures of investigation, where 
more information on human errors is closely linked with near-misses or demonstrated in 
the way of “what if” sentences in reports. To summarise the human error-related factors 
among the accident reports, some descriptions including the behaviour of crews or 
seafarers and key chapters focused on direct or indirect factors of accidents were 
highlighted and extracted as the human error attributes in the study. Although some 
sentences reveal only potential hazards associated with human errors, the majority are 
stated in a causal relationship. Finally, these formulated the database of human error 




occurrence, accident type, vessel type, ship operation, and voyage segment were 
generated. In addition, the analyses of human errors exist in accident reports and the 
common factors contributing to human errors are analysed in maritime accident reports. 
From the perspective of maritime accident human error related factors, such a thorough 
review will be valuable in the evaluation research of human error in maritime accidents 
and hence provide applicable insights in terms of reducing the risk of navigation or 
manoeuvring related to ships in the future.  
With respect to RIFs in maritime accidents, it is necessary to identify the critical factors 
from accident investigation reports. According to the filtered reports, risk factors are 
derived among them according to their appearance frequency in accident reports to 
eliminate the factors of trivial effect (i.e. appearing less than twice across all the  
searched reports). As a result, RIFs are identified for modelling in the next step. 
3.3 RIFs analysis – model structure learning 
BN is a probabilistic directed acyclic graphical (DAG) model (Pearl, 1988) for modelling 
RIFs in this study, which is composed of nodes with the links between them, representing 
variables and influences of one node on the other(s), respectively. The directional arc 
from node A to node B refers that variable A has a direct causal effect on B, representing 
conditional dependencies. In addition, the nodes that are not directly linked are 
conditionally independent of each other. A BN model usually consists of the following 
steps: data acquisition, BN structure learning, BN analysis, and sensitivity analysis and 
model validation (Zhang et al., 2013). 
3.3.1 Naïve Bayesian Network (NBN) 
Once RIFs are identified, a BN structure is to be generated by using the factors as the 
nodes. There are mainly two approaches to BN structure learning. One is based on expert 




relationships. An alternative approach for BN structure learning is the data-driven 
approach to represent the interactive dependencies between variables. This study 
developed BN modelling by the latter data-driven method. 
As far as the data-driven approach is concerned, there are many approaches, e.g. NBN, 
ABN, and TAN. First of all, a simple network structure is used for the risk factors analyses 
of maritime accidents. Because the complexity of a data-driven BN structure super-
exponentially increases with the growing number of variables in the network (Yang et al., 
2018), NBNs are usually used. To do so, there is a strong assumption in most NBN models 
that it has an independent node as the target node directly connected to all the other nodes 
without other links in the structure. NBN is a commonly used model aiming at improved 
classification (Friedman et al., 1997).  
3.3.2 Tree Augmented Naive Bayes (TAN) 
On the other hand, a more complex structure is considered in another model, so as to 
investigate the interdependencies and relations among RIFs further. Besides, more human 
factors are considered for RIFs selection. Among many data-driven approaches, Friedman 
et al. (1997) pointed out that TAN outperforms naive Bayes, at the same time, maintains 
the computational simplicity and robustness that characterise naive Bayes.  
3.4 Quantitative methods on inter-relationships among RIFs 
In order to illustrate the inference process in the above models, as well as reveal inter-
relationships among RIFs, there are quantitative methods applied to the model, including 
mutual information, sensitivity analysis etcetera . 
3.4.1 Mutual information 




between two variables. It describes the amount of information obtained about one random 
variable, through the other random variables (Yang et al., 2018). Mutual information is 
also interpreted as entropy reduction, measuring the mutual dependence of different 
variables. Since the objective of this study is to identify the relationship between RIFs 
and ‘accident type’, ‘accident type’ is determined as the fixed variable in mutual 
information.  
The larger the value of mutual information, the stronger the relationship between 
individual RIF and ‘accident type’. In this way, calculating the mutual information is able 
to filter out the RIFs that are relatively less important in the model. Then the remaining 
RIFs are selected as significant variables with regards to a pre-defined accident type. 
3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis - True Risk Influence (TRI) of risk 
variables 
Based on the significant RIFs screened from mutual information calculation, there is 
another form of sensitivity analysis, e.g. scenario simulation, to determine the effects of 
different variables, particularly in a combined way. The traditional way is to set a scenario 
in which all the other nodes (apart from the investigated ones) are locked, and the target 
node is updated accordingly. It means, for example, 10% up and down for the node reveals 
the effects of the variable in the model. It is considered applicable for variables with two 
states, but not suitable for variables with more than two states. For example, when the 
state value of a bi-state variable is increased from 0% to 10%, the value of the other state 
will decrease from 100% to 90% accordingly. However, the integration of the other states 
of multi-state variables makes it difficult to appropriately decrease their values when a 
selected state increases its value by 10%. In this case, the traditional scenario simulation 
is inappropriate. 




Alyami et al. (2019) is applied here. This method increases the probability of the state 
within the highest influencing on a type of accident to 100% to obtain the High Risk 
Inference (HRI) of this type of accident. Then it increases the probability of the state 
generating the lowest influence on the accident type to 100% to obtain the Low Risk 
Inference (LRI). In this way, calculating the average value of HRI and LRI concludes the 
True Risk Influence (TRI) of each variable in the case of a particular accident type. 
3.4.3 Model validation 
There are two axioms that have at least to be satisfied in the sensitivity analysis for the 
inference process (Yang et al., 2009, Zhang et al., 2013). The axioms are expressed as 
follows: 
Axiom 1: A slight increase/decrease in the prior probabilities of each test node should 
contribute to the corresponding increase/decrease in the posterior probability of the target 
node. 
Axiom 2: The total influence of the combination of the probability variations of x 
parameters (evidence) should be no smaller than the one from the set of y (y∈x) risk 
factors. 
3.4.4 Scenario analysis 
BN modelling can also explain the most probable scenario with reference to a particular 
accident type, which is helpful to demonstrate inter-relationships among RIFs in TAN 
model. Providing a plausible explanation for the observed findings is called the most 
probable explanation (MPE). It is a particular case of the maximum a-posteriori 
probability. In the case that results of regular belief updating are questionable, the MPE 
can be used to identify the states of RIFs to provide a scenario for which the beliefs are 




insights by putting the Bayes net in MPE mode, entering the evidence, and observing the 
most probable configuration for the maritime accident type. 
3.5 fNIRS technique for maritime transportation 
In order to explore the mental workload for seafarers in the experimental study, the 
Nirsport 88 (NIRx Medical Technologies LLC, USA) continuous wave (CW) fNIRS 
device was used to measure DLPFC activity of seafarers. This particular device records 
at a frequency of 8.9286Hz and performs dual-wavelength CW near-infrared (NIR) 
diffuse tomographic measurements. It consists of 8 sources and 8 detectors that emit near-
infrared light at 760nm and 850nm wavelengths, which are absorbed primarily by 
deoxygenated and oxygenated haemoglobin, respectively. These objective measurements 
help understand mental workload of seafarers and the situational awareness obtained 
during the watchkeeping.  
3.6 Subjective workload measurement 
Developed initially as a paper and pencil questionnaire by NASA Ames Research 
Center’s (ARC) Sandra Hart in the 1980s, NASA Task Load Index (TLX) has become the 
gold standard for measuring subjective workload across a wide range of applications 
(Hart, 2006). NASA TLX questionnaire is used to assess subjective levels of perceived 
workload. An extended NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire is supposed to be 
completed for the scenario developed in bridge simulation. This is a self-assessed 
measure based on six 10-point scales, with 1 being “Very Low” and 10 “Very High.” The 
scales are Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Performance, Effort, 
and Frustration. Additional information about education degree, STCW qualification, and 
practical maritime seafaring experience (month or year) are also supposed to be given by 
participants. On the other hand, the staff in the control room next to the simulator should 




changed time with corresponding distance (distance 2). The above information and 
questionnaires are used to analyse behavioural performance and task load. 
3.7 fNIRS experiment for seafarers in the bridge simulator 
The experiment uses a mixed design, where two groups of participants are allocated to 1) 
experienced group and 2) inexperienced group, depending on their STCW qualification 
and nautical experience. Specifically, the experienced group included a master mariner 
(MM), chief mate (CM), and officer of the watch (OOW), while the inexperienced group 
contained able seamen (AB) and cadets. Both groups undergo the scenario with the 
timeline of baseline, watchkeeping, and decision-making. However, it is presented in 1) 
non-distraction condition or 2) distraction condition. The non-distraction condition is 
shown in the workflow of Chapter 7. The distraction condition is demonstrated by setting 
the reporting points (Rn) at the same intervals while watch-keeping and decision-making. 
It distracts the participants' attention by requiring them to report the vessel's position 
every 10' of difference in longitude, as well as answering the questions from the staff in 
the control room, which is the same as the seafarers’ daily work.  
The participant wears the NIRx Sport apparatus, which is an fNIRS skullcap containing 
infrared sensors and detectors allowing the operator to see the blood volume, oxygenated 
and deoxygenated blood flow in the DLPFC indicating how the state of the seafarer 
changes during the navigation scenario and showing what the difference is between 
experienced and inexperienced. The scenario lasts on average no longer than 30 minutes. 
Then the NASA- TLX questionnaire is collected after each scenario. The following 
process demonstrates the trials in a ship bridge simulator: 
a) Taking blood pressure if necessary (hypertension self-reported by participants): this 
step is to exclude the participants suffering from high blood pressure since this may affect 




b) Read information sheet and give informed consent: this step is compulsory, and no 
participant will be allowed to take part in the study before having read the information 
provided, understood the conditions of the experiment and having signed the consent 
form. 
c) Training on the simulator: All the participants will be asked to take several minutes to 
attend the training session of the bridge simulator to familiarise them with the bridge and 
the mission. 
d) fNIRS placement: the equipment will be placed on participants’ heads to measure 
oxygenated and deoxygenated haemoglobin with seven sensors, and seven detectors 
relaying information on the blood volume and flow in the prefrontal cortex of the brain 
by the emission of infrared light during the experiment. 
e) Simulator trial: participants will be allocated to the experienced group (20) or 
inexperienced group (20). Moreover, each group will undergo the scenario in the bridge 
simulator, 10 participants of each group are in 1) non-distraction condition and 10 
participants are in 2) distraction condition. 
f) Questionnaire: after the scenario test, the participant is supposed to finish the 
questionnaire about the subjectively perceived workload. 
g) Debrief: review the performance. 
3.8 Functional connectivity and graph theory 
The functional connection between pairs of brain regions demonstrates the temporal 
correlation of regional haemodynamics. Thus symmetric correlation matrices are 
obtained from the partial correlation coefficients of all pairwise combinations of the 15 
channels, for each group or segment, shown in Figure 3.2. The rows and columns of the 




of the corresponding channels. From these matrices, weak links are representing spurious 
connections, where they should be discarded by thresholding (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). 
It is necessary to decide on a threshold level for the correlation scores to demonstrate 
where the strong connections are. In order to calculate various threshold levels, the 
percentile distribution of all correlation values is obtained. For example, a very liberal 
threshold (50th percentile), a more conservative threshold (75th percentile) and extremely 
conservative threshold (95th percentile) are selected. Obviously, there are many 
connections for the liberal threshold and very few for the threshold based on the 95th 
percentile. Only coefficients greater than or equal to the chosen threshold value are kept 
as connections assigned with a value of 1. Otherwise, the coefficient is replaced with a 0, 
thus creating a binary adjacency matrix (in Figure 3.3). In this way, it creates a cross-
correlation matrix to represent these data in a visualisation.  
 
Figure 3.2 Constructing a binary functional connection network from fNIRS-data. Partial correlation 
coefficients were calculated for all pairwise combinations of channels to obtain a symmetrical cross-
correlation matrix 
 
Figure 3.3 Constructing a binary functional connection network from fNIRS-data. Binary adjacency 





Figure 3.4 Constructing a binary functional connection network from fNIRS-data. Network metrics 
density and clustering coefficient were obtained on the functional connectivity networks (binary 
connection work) described by the adjacency matrices 
In order to reflect the characteristics of networks (Figure 3.8), there are two most 
commonly used parameters (Racz et al., 2017) to describe it: the connection density (D), 
and the local clustering coefficient (C). The connection density of a network is the fraction 
of the existing connections to all possible connections. The density is used to describe the 
overall ‘wiring cost’ of the given network (Racz et al., 2017). In addition, the clustering 
coefficient for an individual node, defines the fraction of its neighbours which are also 
neighbours of each other (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), i.e. reflecting the number of triangles 
around the given node (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). 
To sum up, the above approaches aim at analysing the risk factors in maritime accidents 
with human factors perspectives and conducting experimental research on mental 
workload for seafarers. That is to say, a novel risk assessment method on human factors 
research has been proposed to generate a raw database for risk factors identification, learn 
the structure of the model, and describe the interdependencies among RIFs with human 
factors perspectives using methodologies in Section 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. By doing this, it 
generates insights for countermeasures for human errors in maritime accidents.  
On the other hand, an experimental study using the fNIRS technique has been conducted 




mental workload for seafarers from subjective and microcosmic perspectives. It explores 
how the mental workload induced in the bridge simulation influences neurophysiological 
activation using neurophysiological methods. The descriptions on how these 
methodologies will be applied to bridge the gaps previously identified can be seen in 
Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Methodology adopted in all technical chapters 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 The analysis of human errors exists in accident reports, and the common factors 
contributing to human errors are analysed in maritime accident reports. From the 
perspective of maritime accident human error related factors, such a thorough review 




hence provide applicable insights in terms of reducing the risk of navigation or 
manoeuvring related to ships. 
 BN is a probabilistic DAG model, which is composed of nodes with the links between 
them, representing variables and influences of one node on the other(s), respectively. 
A BN model usually consists of the following steps: data acquisition, BN structure 
learning, BN analysis, and sensitivity analysis and model validation. 
 There are mainly two approaches to BN structure learning. One is based on expert 
knowledge, which is used to conduct a qualitative analysis based on subjective causal 
relationships. An alternative approach for BN structure learning is the data-driven 
approach to represent the interactive dependencies between variables. This study 
developed BN modelling by the latter data-driven method. 
 Quantitative methods on inter-relationships among RIFs reflect in the sensitivity 
analyses of the BN model with regard to human factors in maritime accidents.  
 In order to measure the neurophysiological activation in the experimental study, the 
Nirsport 88 continuous wave fNIRS device is used to measure the DLPFC activity 
of seafarers.  
 Associated with the fNIRS technique, scenarios designed with bridge simulator and 
NASA-TLX questionnaires are utilised to conduct the experiment and subjectively 
quantify mental workload. 
 The functional connection between pairs of brain regions demonstrates the temporal 
correlation of regional haemodynamics, reflecting the activity of brain areas and 





Chapter 4 Identification of risk factors 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
In order to identify risk factors contributing to human errors in maritime accidents, this 
chapter describes the procedure of generating a source database for risk factors to fulfil 
further risk analyses. It aims at illustrating the features of maritime accidents, the 
description of human errors, and risk factors related to human errors from the accident 
reports investigated by maritime organisations. Accidents related to human errors in the 
process of navigation and sailing that happened in the six years from 2012 to 2017, 
integrated with literature, are analysed to identify risk factors in maritime accidents from 
different views. From this perspective, this chapter provides a general demonstration of 
maritime accidents and rational classification of related risk factors as procedure factors, 
individual factors, vessel factors, environmental factors, regulation and management 
factors. 
4.2 Data collection of maritime accidents 
4.2.1 Distribution by the source database 
Among the database composed of 161 accident reports (selected from Chapter 3), 109 
accident reports are from MAIB and 52 reports from the TSB. They are selected based on 
the methodology in Section 3.2. Besides MAIB and TSB, there is the fact that numerous 
maritime accident investigation organisations exist, e.g. United States National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in USA, 
Marine Department-Hong Kong (MARDEP) in China, Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau (ATSB) in Australia, Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) in Norway 
etcetera. However, considering the flexibility of obtaining the data and representativeness 




this study, as they are among the most representative from the literature (Chauvin et al., 
2013, Graziano et al., 2015, Kum and Sahin, 2015).  
MAIB examines and investigates all types of marine accidents happening to or on board 
UK ships worldwide, and all vessels in UK territorial waters (MAIB, 2015). And, TSB is 
an independent agency that investigates occurrences in several modes of transportation, 
including the marine section. The maritime accident reports databases from these two 
organisations are the two most frequently used databases in maritime accident analysis, 
referring to Chauvin et al. (2013) and Uğurlu et al. (2015b). The details of accident reports 
are in the below Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Code of maritime accidents reports 
No Code Source No Code Source 
1 26-2017 MAIB 83 2-2014 MAIB 
2 25-2017 MAIB 84 1-2014 MAIB 
3 24-2017 MAIB 85 SB3/2014 MAIB 
4 23-2017 MAIB 86 26-2013 MAIB 
5 22-2017 MAIB 87 24-2013 MAIB 
6 21-2017 MAIB 88 23-2013 MAIB 
7 20-2017 MAIB 89 22-2013 MAIB 
8 19-2017 MAIB 90 20-2013 MAIB 
9 17-2017 MAIB 91 18-2013 MAIB 
10 16-2017 MAIB 92 17-2013 MAIB 
11 14-2017 MAIB 93 14-2013 MAIB 
12 11-2017 MAIB 94 11-2013 MAIB 
13 10-2017 MAIB 95 10-2013 MAIB 
14 8-2017 MAIB 96 9-2013 MAIB 
15 7-2017 MAIB 97 8-2013 MAIB 
16 5-2017 MAIB 98 7-2013 MAIB 
17 4-2017 MAIB 99 6-2013 MAIB 
18 3-2017 MAIB 100 5-2013 MAIB 
19 1-2017 MAIB 101 4-2013 MAIB 
20 27-2016 MAIB 102 3-2013 MAIB 
21 26-2016 MAIB 103 1-2013 MAIB 
22 25-2016 MAIB 104 SB3/2013 MAIB 




24 20-2016 MAIB 106 26-2012 MAIB 
25 19-2016 MAIB 107 25-2012 MAIB 
26 18-2016 MAIB 108 24-2012 MAIB 
27 17-2016 MAIB 109 11-2012 MAIB 
28 16-2016 MAIB 1 m16p0362 TSB 
29 15-2016 MAIB 2 M16P0241 TSB 
30 14-2016 MAIB 3 M16P0162 TSB 
31 13-2016 MAIB 4 M16P0062 TSB 
32 12-2016 MAIB 5 M16C0036 TSB 
33 10-2016 MAIB 6 M16C0014 TSB 
34 8-2016 MAIB 7 M16C0005 TSB 
35 6-2016 MAIB 8 M16A0327 TSB 
36 4-2016 MAIB 9 M16A0141 TSB 
37 3-2016 MAIB 10 M16A0140 TSB 
38 2-2016 MAIB 11 M16A0115 TSB 
39 1-2016 MAIB 12 M15P0347 TSB 
40 28-2015 MAIB 13 M15P0286 TSB 
41 27-2015 MAIB 14 M15P0037 TSB 
42 26-2015 MAIB 15 M15P0035 TSB 
43 25-2015 MAIB 16 M15C0094 TSB 
44 24-2015 MAIB 17 M15C0045 TSB 
45 20-2015 MAIB 18 M15C0006 TSB 
46 18-2015 MAIB 19 M15A0189 TSB 
47 17-2015 MAIB 20 M15A0045 TSB 
48 16-2015 MAIB 21 M15A0009 TSB 
49 15-2015 MAIB 22 M14P0150 TSB 
50 14-2015 MAIB 23 M14P0121 TSB 
51 13-2015 MAIB 24 M14P0110 TSB 
52 12-2015 MAIB 25 M14P0023 TSB 
53 11-2015 MAIB 26 M14P0014 TSB 
54 10-2015 MAIB 27 M14C0219 TSB 
55 9-2015 MAIB 28 M14C0193 TSB 
56 7-2015 MAIB 29 M14C0156 TSB 
57 6-2015 MAIB 30 M14C0106 TSB 
58 5-2015 MAIB 31 M14C0045 TSB 
59 3-2015 MAIB 32 M14A0348 TSB 
60 1-2015 MAIB 33 M14A0289 TSB 
61 32-2014 MAIB 34 M14A0051 TSB 
62 31-2014 MAIB 35 M13W0057 TSB 
63 30-2014 MAIB 36 M13N0014 TSB 




65 28-2014 MAIB 38 M13M0287 TSB 
66 25-2014 MAIB 39 M13M0102 TSB 
67 24-2014 MAIB 40 M13L0185 TSB 
68 21-2014 MAIB 41 M13L0123 TSB 
69 19-2014 MAIB 42 M13L0067 TSB 
70 18-2014 MAIB 43 M13C0071 TSB 
71 17-2014 MAIB 44 M12W0207 TSB 
72 16-2014 MAIB 45 M12W0070 TSB 
73 15-2014 MAIB 46 M12N0017 TSB 
74 13-2014 MAIB 47 M12L0147 TSB 
75 12-2014 MAIB 48 M12L0098 TSB 
76 11-2014 MAIB 49 M12L0095 TSB 
77 10-2014 MAIB 50 M12H0012 TSB 
78 9-2014 MAIB 51 M12F0011 TSB 
79 8-2014 MAIB 52 M12C0058 TSB 
80 7-2014 MAIB    
81 6-2014 MAIB    
82 4-2014 MAIB    
4.2.2 Distribution by year of occurrence 
According to the database established, their distribution by year from January 2012 to 
December 2017 is represented in Figure 4.1. It is noted that the specific number of 
maritime accidents or near misses which happened during this period is much larger than 
the number of accident reports. In order to refine and analyse common factors 
contributing to human errors in maritime accidents, only the accidents described and 
investigated in the way of accident reports are considered. It is noted that four accidents 
reports from MAIB in the database contain eight accidents’ details, so that they are 
counted as 113 cases of MAIB instead of 109. The way of counting is according to the 
date of accidents’ occurrence rather than the date of reports published. Hence, the number 
of accident reports in 2017 is only one, due to the uncertainty for the period of the 





Figure 4.1 Distribution of reports by year of occurrence, by January 2018 
4.2.3 Distribution by accident type 
According to the database reviewed, their distribution by accident type is stated in Figure 
4.2. In both MAIB and TSB sources, grounding accidents are the most frequently 
occurring accidents in the maritime transportation, accounting for 21.10% of total 
accidents in MAIB, and 26.92% of them in TSB. The grounding accidents are usually 
linked with human fatigue and human errors (Akhtar and Utne, 2014, Uğurlu et al., 
2015b). Although the number of collision accidents ranks second among the accident type, 
it reveals the severe consequences once they have happened in maritime transportation 
according to the accident reports and literature (Rudan et al., 2012, Macrae, 2009, 












Figure 4.2 Distribution of reports by accident type 
4.2.4 Distribution by vessel type, ship operation, and voyage 
segment 
From the accident reports from MAIB, it is demonstrated that the accidents occurring on 
merchant vessels of 100 gross tons or over account for the majority of accidents, followed 
by fishing vessels (Figure 4.3). In addition, fishing and passenger vessels tend to be 
involved in maritime accidents according to the data from TSB. Most of the accidents 
happened when the ship was on passage rather than other ship operations, e.g. fishing, 
pilotage, at anchor. Due to the fact of the long period of voyage path compared to arrival 
or departure, the mid-water is regarded as the most likely accident area during the voyage 
















(A) Vessel type from MAIB                     (B) Vessel type from TSB 
 
(C) Ship operation from MAIB                  (D) Voyage segment from MAIB 
Figure 4.3 Distribution by (A)(B) vessel type, (C) ship operation, and (D) voyage segment 
4.3 Common factors contributing to human errors 
According to the data collected from maritime accident, common risk factors are 
extracted from the primary reports. Some factors including communication and 
coordination, lookout, use of navigation equipment, supervision and supports, are related 
to the working procedure of people; some factors are individual factors, such as fatigue 
and situational awareness (SA), which are related to the individual themselves; vessel 
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environment factors are weather condition, sea condition, the density of fairway traffic, 
and the noisy acoustic environment; regulation and management factors are associated 
with code, endorsement, regulations, procedure, instruction, formally published guidance, 
operation manual, and requirement. 
4.3.1 Procedure factors 
Human errors may be caused by procedures during the sailing or manoeuvring, especially 
for improper planning and communication problems. Macrae (2009) maps the typical 
patterns of human and organisational causes in grounding and collision maritime 
accidents to point out that groundings are more likely caused by inadequate passage 
planning, problem locating vessels, or communication on the bridge. While collisions 
commonly resulted from the inadequate planning process. Chauvin et al. (2013) found 
that most collisions were due to decision errors by a modified HFACS model in collisions, 
and Bridge Resource Management deficiencies and Inter-ship communications problems 
are more likely occurring in restricted waters and including vessels that are carrying pilots. 
Research on the prevention of grounding accidents involving human errors was 
conducted using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Uğurlu et al., 2015b). It suggested the 
most significant causes are, lack of communication and coordination in Bridge Resource 
Management, position-fixing application errors, lookout errors, interpretation errors, use 
of improper charts, inefficient use of bridge navigation equipment, and fatigue. A study 
using the FTA method (Uğurlu et al., 2015a) found that reasons leading to human-error-
originated initial events for collision accidents are, lack of education and experience, 
unfamiliarity with bridge and devices, lack of coordination in the bridge resources 
management, and inconvenient work hours. For grounding accidents, there is a lack of 
education and experience, errors in the passage plan and chart, failure to use the echo 
sounder, lack of communication, and inconvenient working hours. 




sums up the dangers of ineffective communications (Winbow, 2002). It illustrated the 
importance of effective communications between seafarers or between ship and shore, 
and the severe dangers if they go badly wrong. Meanwhile, it pointed out that ineffective 
or misunderstood communications often occur partly due to cultural differences but also 
due to language ‘barriers’ (TSB M14C0193). Research interviewing crew managers and 
seafarers in Greek shipping (Theotokas and Progoulaki, 2007), showed predominant 
problems like communication with multicultural crews, are rooted in cultural 
incompatibility and inadequate training, which inevitably affected the crew management 
and operation on board. It concluded that culture management could improve crew team 
coordination, communication, working environment and the overall performance of the 
team. Latterly, support of human operation, especially improving the ship’s navigation 
and aiding the master’s command, is proved to be necessary for shipping safety 
(Tzannatos, 2010). 
Apart from this, ineffective supervision and supports, and improper supervision of 
loading operation are frequent during the navigation. Lone watchkeeper or working 
isolated makes the procedures on board vulnerable to the hazards due to the workload 
pressure or onboard culture. From MAIB 17-2016 report, although required by the Arco 
Avon’s SMS, the third engineer did not inform the chief engineer or the bridge OOW of 
the leaking problem of fuel or his intention to fix it. The reason for him not doing so was 
probably influenced by the onboard culture of routinely working isolated and the absence 
of adequate and frequent communication. Also, Arco Avon’s chief engineer’s standing 
orders requiring the duty engineer to progress routine duties and conduct planned 
maintenance while on watch, effectively condoned working alone and disobeyed the 
guidance provided in section 15.9.1 of COSWP, and with the guidance provided in the 
Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seafarers 2015 edition. It all contributes to 
the mistakes the third engineer made. Moreover, from the MAIB 8-2014 report, the master 
and chief officer kept lone watched on the bridge with the functional Bridge Navigational 




similar others in the past, MAIB demonstrated that it was not safe for only two bridge 
watchkeepers to operate vessels because of the workloads placed on watchkeeping 
officers. 
From the maritime accident reports (MAIB 6-2014), the bridge team’s action was too late 
to be taken to prevent the collision with the method of recognising the high speed. Also, 
from the grounding accident (TSB M14P0014), upon initiating the turn, the vessel’s rate 
of speed limited the time available to respond to the surrounding developing situation, 
resulting in that the vessel was on a course for the silting of the channel. It is also evident 
that relying on a single navigational device produced the risk of undetected potential 
errors or inaccuracies. From the perspective of pilotage, there is a risk that pilots make 
decisions referring to imprecise information if they do not take advantage of the accurate 
navigational aids available. 
4.3.2 Individual factors 
The human error relates to individuals themselves or the crew in teamwork, especially 
fatigue-related problems. Faced with the unique environment, seafarers on board take the 
irregular sleep patterns within the existence of time-zone crossings, noise, heat, cold, 
vibration and motion of vessels. It means sleep under such conditions is often interrupted, 
and the risk of fatigue induced by inadequate sleep and rest is relatively high. Also, 
seafarers are involved in multi-tasks. These include navigation, cargo handling, 
watchkeeping, communication, emergency response, paper charts, maintenance, 
administration and human resources management that is interacted with other vessels and 
a shore-based centre.  
The research demonstrated three levels of reference to sleep - either being asleep without 
fatigue, conflicting pressures of work and sleep, and the nature of sleeping and work 
(Phillips, 2000). It revealed contributing factors of sleepiness among crucial crew 




not with fatigue all the time. Hetherington et al. (2006) found that fatigue is more 
significant in the near sea than in support shipping. Exposure factors predicting fatigue 
are the length of working hours, sleep problems, tour length (more extended tours equate 
to less fatigue), shift length, job demands, stress or pressure, and standing watch. For ship 
types, seafarers on ferries reported higher levels of fatigue than other ship types. Strauch 
(2015) proposed a systematic method to determine whether fatigue adversely affected 
mariner performance in an accident. Akyuz and Celik (2015) adopted Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) to assess human reliability along with 
the cargo loading process, and Akhtar and Utne (2015) used it to study common patterns 
of interlinked fatigue factors. It illustrated that “inattention”, “inadequate procedures”, 
“observation missed”, and “communication failure” were related to fatigue factors that 
influenced the human cognitive processes in accidents. The bridge team should be trained 
to recognise fatigue and exercise caution related to the fatigue factors.  
Lack of SA is another focus of the individual factors contributing to human errors, which 
is also associated with being distracted, use of recreational drugs or alcohol. Prospect 
(MAIB 07-2014) grounded because the skipper was distracted due to a telephone 
conversation and his intention to check whether an email had been received during the 
departure, resulting in the loss of situation awareness. Also, from the MAIB 12-2016, the 
master, owing to lack of adequate assistance, was unable to maintain his situational 
awareness, resulting in a grounding accident. Due to the loss of situation awareness, the 
bridge team or masters have difficulties identifying the hazards around the ships, as well 
as dealing with the proper manoeuvring. Specifically, it will take a long time for the OOW 
to realise the vessel is in trouble even with the information shown in the navigational aids 
display, for example, the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) 
(MAIB 24-2014). As stated in MAIB 28-2015, the master and the third officer lost 
situation awareness before the collision, resulting in that the bridge team did not monitor 
another ship’s position and movement during the eight minutes from the pilot’s 




awareness of the seafarers on board. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the master’s lack 
of situational awareness is contributed by stress, panic and poor communication regarding 
the status of the ship control (MAIB 20-2017). 
In the maritime sector, Lim et al. (2018) suggested the majority of trainees had less 
workload when the experienced master was present, and the latter had the highest 
workload levels while the former had low workload because of the shared work and 
responsibility. Mental workload is the number of demands requiring a person to complete 
specific tasks. The more sophisticated the tasks, the more mental workload is required to 
do the tasks. It has been used in a wide range of applications to evaluate task performance 
of operators or the practical aspect of system design (Ngodang et al., 2012, Dijksterhuis 
et al., 2011). Moreover, the mental workload is linked to the experience of operators. 
Experienced drivers have acquired more effective automation through practice, so that a 
lower level of mental workload was induced compared to novices (Patten et al., 2004).  
4.3.3 Vessel factors 
As the maritime accident reports present, vessel factors containing the condition of 
vessels, devices onboard, the ergonomic impact of design, updated information supports 
are concluded. Lema et al. (2014) used The K-means clustering method with 15 a priori 
defined clusters to indicate that human factors coexist with the condition of the ship and 
other external factors. From the perspective of the state of vessels, the increasing 
complexity of propulsion arrangements, modifications made to vessels, and the change 
of the size of ships are consistent with the development of ship automation. It is also 
related to the ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design, for example, visual blind 
sector ahead and motion illusion. From the MAIB 26-2013, the bridge design led the 
second officer on duty to sit down and then increased the potential for him to fall asleep. 
The same ergonomic problem exists in the collision accident reported in MAIB 03-2017 




bridge windows and lack of visual references that led to the pilot’s disorientation.  
The devices and equipment on board not being fully utilised or operated correctly leads 
to the human errors directly or indirectly, for example, the BNWAS is switched off; alarm 
systems are not in the recommended position or not noticed. Moreover, the insufficient 
or lack of updated information aggravated the situation. Poor quality of equipment data 
and falsified records of data contribute to the failure of transforming data into effective 
information for decision making, as well as the difficulties for the accident/incident 
investigation. The automatic means or indicators for necessary observing, e.g. working 
signs or lights, are the critical way to decrease the workload or the possibility of overload 
among the seafarers. From the MAIB 27-2016, it is evident that in this collision case, 
radar, visual and Automatic Identification System (AIS) information could have been 
utilised more efficiently. Furthermore, using all the information available on the bridge 
makes a high standard of watchkeeping to obtain and maintain a good sense of the 
situation.  
4.3.4 Environmental factors 
Environmental factors, especially in port service, contribute to human errors. The weather 
condition, sea condition, the density of fairway traffic, and the noisy acoustic environment 
are all considered in the environmental factors. Hsu (2012) utilised a fuzzy AHP model 
to identify ports’ service attributes for ship navigation safety, and the Dissatisfaction 
attitude (DA) was used to determine the attributes priorities. It concluded that the traffic 
control of fairway is the most critical aspect to be improved according to human errors 
contributors. Moreover, the Master Pilot Exchange (MPX) that is a document of debatable 
value in pilotage waters is designed to reflect local navigational challenges and port 
requirements (Wild and Constable, 2013). However, investigation recommendations are 
not consistently reflected in MPX forms, and there is a gap between them and what should 




used to evaluate the importance of the factors, to rank the factors affecting navigation 
safety, and to rank the safety level of ports in Korea (Pak et al., 2015). The results showed 
that the element of weather was of higher importance than others.  
Lee and Kim (2013) used the AHP to analyse the relative importance of the risk factors 
for the maritime traffic environment. It showed that the relative importance of visibility 
restriction is the highest among risk factors, and the relative importance of the traffic 
condition is the most senior among risk categories. From the MAIB 20-2016, the 
submarine’s command team did not perceive any risk of collision or need for avoiding 
action. It is highly likely that the density of shipping traffic and the other factors 
contributed to cognitively overloaded crews. The reduced passing distances, the traffic 
density, bridges, moorings, tidal streams and the possibility of interaction on the vessel 
make the voyage a significant challenging area in which to navigate, as demonstrated in 
the report MAIB 13-2015. On the other hand, the repetitive nature of the route increases 
the individual errors like overconfidence on the duties or underestimation of the severity 
of the condition with a low state of alertness.  
The noisy and vibrating environment and sea condition containing a strong tidal stream, 
current, and waves, influence the performance or behaviours of crews in the process of 
operation. It contributes to the emotional response and psychological effects on the crews. 
From the MAIB 10-2014, the master did not take the tidal condition into account, and it 
was without a plan in conjunction with experienced staff, resulting in the collision due to 
lack of appreciation of the hazards from tidal effects on the tow when anchoring.  
4.3.5 Regulation and management factors 
Regulation and management factors reflect the organisational factors in the maritime 
system. It is regarded as the essential cause of human errors. Inappropriate or ambiguous 
code, endorsement, regulations, procedure, instruction, formally published guidance, 




human errors. Branch et al. (2004) illustrated that the hours of working and lookout 
requirement contained in the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1995 (STCW 95) and the principles of safe 
manning, endorsed by the experiences of the MAIB during accident investigation, have 
insufficient impact on those factors.  
In addition, a lack of safety culture and precautionary thought are critical factors for 
human errors. Lu and Tsai (2008) conducted the factor analysis revealed six safety climate 
dimensions, and used logistic regression analysis to evaluate the effects of the safety 
climate on vessel accidents. The results suggested that job safety has the most critical 
impact on vessel accidents, followed by management safety practices and safety training 
dimensions. 
Risk assessment in maritime and several management systems benefits the safe operation 
of ships and manoeuvring. A valid risk assessment conducted provides a good view of 
the potential hazards and risks existing in the activities on board, while improper risk 
assessment leads to less than adequate crew emergency preparedness, onboard 
management, safety management, and practical training. At the same time, it can identify 
the appropriate fitness requirements for pilots by their specific duties at their port of 
employment (MAIB 21-2017). The robust vessel’s risk assessments may make the 
onboard working environment safer. From the investigation of MAIB 24-2014, it is 
evident that the onboard management of Ovit was dysfunctional, as well as the safety 
culture developed on the bridge provided by the insufficient leadership of the master. 
Meanwhile, there are serious shortcomings highlighted in the reports that had not been 
realised from the vessel’s audits and inspections. By the way, the assessment of 
competence plays a role in crew management. It means judgement as to whether a seafarer 
is competent, or what a seafarer needs to know and what skills and knowledge he or she 
requires to learn, before that person is deemed to be competent. Many accidents occur 




As the literature shows, people tend to exchange the level of safety standard of the vessel 
for a profitable and riskier activity, considering the commercial affairs of ships (Vinagre-
Ríos and Iglesias-Baniela, 2013). It highlights the existence of human errors derived from 
the practices and manning policies established by the managers of shipping companies. 
Namely, crews can choose the risky or dangerous way to complete the operation or 
manoeuvring process due to commercial pressure. As stated in MAIB 12-2015, it was 
proved that financial constraints, rather than lack of experience or the sense of safety, 
caused the skipper to work single-handed and induced him not to maintain the ship and 
its equipment on board safe. Under the pressure of finance, industry, and public, more 
attention and concentration is assigned to deal with the cost calculation behind every 
decision. It results in the potential risk of human errors causing maritime accidents. 
4.4 Identification of risk factors  
Furthermore, maritime accidents reports during 2012-2017 have been reviewed for the 
human error attributes. The accident database utilised is the MAIB in UK and the TSB in 
Canada. There are 109 accident reports extracted from 152 reports in MAIB and 52 
accident reports obtained from 61 reports in TSB.  
The procedure consists of three stages: (i) online database searching, (ii) reports screening 
and selecting, (iii) refining and analysis. Then, the maritime accident data is obtained 
according to the filtered accident reports. 
Concerning RIFs in maritime accidents, it is necessary to identify the critical factors from 
accident investigation reports. According to the filtered reports, the factors (i.e. 32 risk 
factors) contributing to accidents are classified and described in five categories, as seen 
in Table 4.2. However, risk factors are derived among them according to their appearance 
frequency in accident reports to eliminate the trivial effect of the factors appearing once 




According to the source or origin that human errors come from, the common factors 
contributing to human errors are classified and described in 5 categories with 32 attributes. 
The categories are based on the descriptions in Section 4.3, and consulted by the experts 
in maritime sector and human factors research filed, which are selected for better 
illustrating the 32 attributes. The specific common factors derived from the maritime 
accidents reports are stated.  
Table 4.2 Attributes of common factors contributing to human errors. 
Categories Attributes Source representatives 
Procedure 






ineffective supervision and support (lone 
watchkeeper or working isolated, improper 





no detailed passage plan or revised passage 





swift duty between pilots and seafarers or 
change of the steering mode 
MIAB15-2015 
TSBM16C0005 






fast speed MAIB20-2017, MAIB14-2013 
no clear order (not accurately interpret and 





limited time to respond TSBM14C0045, TSBM16P0062 
Individual 
















unfamiliar with/lack of equipment 





complacent about the duties or 
underestimation of the severity of the 




recreation drugs, alcohol MAIB25-2015, MAIB7-2014 











the poor condition of the vessel, increasing 
complexity of propulsion arrangements, and 
modifications made to vessels, size 
MAIB23-2017, MAIB20-2017, 
MAIB19-2017 
devices and equipment on board not fully 
utilised or operated correctly (BNWAS 
switched off, alarm system not in the 





ergonomic impact of innovative bridge 






insufficient or lack of updated information 
(poor quality of equipment data, falsified 
records of information, relies on a single 
piece of navigational equipment); no 
automatic means or without indicators for 







weather condition: wind, visibility(dense 
fog) 
MAIB19-2017, MAIB8-2013 







noisy and vibrating environment MAIB20-2016 
fairway traffic (traffic density, repetitive 






inappropriate or ambiguous code, 
endorsement, regulations, procedure, 
instructions, formal published guidance; 










dysfunctional management system (shore 
management, maintenance management, 
bridge source management, onboard 
management, safety management systems, 
port service, qualification examination, 






lack of safety culture, precautionary thought 
MAIB 25-2015, MAIB24-2014, 
MAIB4-2014 
TSBM12L0147 
no medical and fitness standards for crews 
MAIB17-2016 
TSBM12W0070 
commercial pressure, public pressure or 
industrial pressure (financial constraints) 
MAIB12-2015 
TSBM12N0017 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 To provide the comprehensive summaries of the research development of human 
errors, the realistic phenomena in accidents, and common errors highlighted 
concerning human errors during the accidents, common factors contributing to 
human errors are analysed on several given categories and concluded from the 
accident reports as well as literature. 




error attributes. The accident database utilised is from MAIB and TSB. There are 109 
accident reports extracted from 152 reports in MAIB and 52 accident reports obtained 
from 61 reports in TSB. 
 According to the source or origin that human errors come from, the common factors 






Chapter 5 Analysis of risk factors for maritime transport 
accidents 
5.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter proposes a Bayesian Network-based risk analysis approach to analyse the 
risk factors influencing maritime transport accidents. Comparing with previous studies in 
the relevant literature, it reveals new features including new primary data directly derived 
from maritime accident records by two major databanks, MAIB and TSB from 2012 to 
2017; also, the quantification of the extent to which different combinations of the factors 
influence each accident type. The network modelling the interdependency among the risk 
factors is constructed by using NBN and validated by sensitivity analysis. The results 
reveal that the common risk factors among different types of accidents are ship operation, 
voyage segment, ship type, gross tonnage, hull type, and information. Scenario analyses 
are conducted to predict the occurrence likelihood of different types of accidents under 
various situations. The findings provide transport authorities and ship owners with useful 
insights for maritime accident prevention. 
5.2 Background information  
Waterborne transportation accounts for approximately 90% of the world’s trade by 
volume, representing one of the essential transportation modes in ensuring the prosperity 
of international trade and the global economy. Maritime accidents have revealed new 
features in the past few years. According to the ‘Safety and Shipping’ Annual Report of 
2017 (Specialty, 2018), published by Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, more than a 
quarter of ship losses in 2016 occurred in the South China, Indochina, Indonesia and 
Philippines regions. Although the number of maritime casualties has declined over the 




(e.g. high demand on human reliability in complicated operations introduced by advanced 
technologies). The questionnaire survey on maritime operations conducted by Safahani 
(2015) emphasised the non-technical skills: 75% stated that a team leader should discuss 
the work plan with his/her teammates; 90% thought that monitoring the task provided an 
essential contribution to effective team performance; almost everyone in the survey 
believed that communication was a significant factor, and that teams who do not 
communicate effectively would increase the possibility of making errors. Branch et al. 
(2004) disclosed that watchkeeper manning levels and a master’s ability to discharge his 
duties were significant factors influencing collisions and groundings.  
Studies on maritime accident analysis rely on the discretional context and experts’ 
knowledge to extract the causal relations among the process of accidents, as well as data-
driven methodologies. Specifically, causal relations were connected to one type of 
accidents through accident analysis methods, specifically for grounding or collision 
(Hanninen and Kujala, 2012, Macrae, 2009, Uğurlu et al., 2015a). Moreover, some studies 
focused on the probability or the frequency of maritime accidents. Fabiano et al. (2010) 
investigated the occupational accident frequency affected by the organisation, job 
experience, and productivity. Pristrom et al. (2016) estimated the likelihood of a ship 
being hijacked in the Western Indian or Eastern African region by using the GISIS 
database together with expert judgement. Other studies concentrated on the severity or 
the consequence of maritime accidents. Zhang et al. (2016) predicted the accident 
consequences in the Tianjin port by statistical analysis of historical accident data. Wang 
and Yang (2018) analysed the key risk factors influencing waterway accident severity by 
using Bayesian Networks (BN). In addition, some studies investigated the combination 
of the above two (i.e. likelihood and consequence) (Bouejla et al., 2014, Balmat et al., 
2011). However, few studies have been carried out to investigate the issues on how risk 
factors affect maritime accident types, leaving a research gap to fill for effective accident 
prevention. The key factors contributing to collisions are probably quite different from 




contributing to different types of accidents will help generate useful insights for 
reasonable risk control measures. 
This chapter aims at investigating how different risk factors generate, in an individual or 
combined manner, an impact on different types of maritime accidents in terms of 
likelihood. Manual case by case analysis of recorded maritime accidents from MAIB and 
TSB that occurred from 2012 to 2017 is undertaken to develop a primary database to 
support this study. A BN-based approach is proposed to analyse accident types in 
maritime transport.  
5.3 Raw data collection and RIFs selection 
The accident reports are from MAIB in UK and TSB in Canada, as they are among the 
most representative from the literature (Chauvin et al., 2013, Graziano et al., 2015, Kum 
and Sahin, 2015). The raw data derived from the MAIB and TSB contains general 
information of the ship and the voyage, accident evolution process, and details related to 
the management and organisational factors. In the screening process stage, the accident 
reports were screened with a focus on error-related accidents to ensure their 
representativeness and relevance. In the final stage, these reports had been further refined 
and analysed, especially the ‘safety issues’ and ‘common factors’ section in the accident 
reports. Some details of information associated with the accident process were involved 
in the refining. According to such analysis, there are 109 accident reports extracted from 
152 reports in MAIB and 52 accident reports obtained from 61 reports in TSB, as shown 
in Chapter 4. 
In total, the 161 maritime accidents involving 208 vessels reported in MAIB and TSB 
between Jan. 2012 and Dec. 2017 were carefully reviewed and analysed manually. The 
search was conducted in Jan. 2018 and the general statistical analysis and findings are 
presented in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, and Figure 5.3, which provide the raw data for the 





Figure 5.1 Accident distribution by accident types 
 





Figure 5.3 Accident distribution by voyage segments from MAIB 
As is indicated in Figure 5.1, grounding, collision and contact/crush accounted for more 
significant percentages than other kinds of accidents while sinking and flooding 
accounted for lower percentages. Specifically, there were 23 grounding accidents from 
MAIB and 14 from TSB, while there were 3 sinking accidents from MAIB and 4 from 
TSB. And Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show accident distributions by ship operation and 
voyage segment from MAIB. The number of accidents happening on passage was much 
higher than those others, followed by ‘fishing’ and ‘at anchor’. However, the number of 
accidents that happened in mid-water was much higher than others like ‘departure’ and 
‘in port’. 
These reports had been further refined and analysed. Furthermore, special attention is 
paid to the ‘safety issues’ and ‘common factors’ in the accident reports. Some details of 
information associated with the accident process were involved in the refining. According 
to such analysis, the common factors contributing to the accidents are generated. 
Concerning the accident type, a maritime accident can be classified into collision (S1), 




sinking (S7), overboard (S8), and others (S9), which refer to the combined description 
and definition in MAIB and TSB. These 9 types of accidents consist of 9 states (S1~ S9) 
of the variable ‘accident type’ in the study. 
Furthermore, the accident-related RIFs are retrieved in Table 5.1. In the quantitative 
analysis of BN modelling, the accident type is defined as a dependent variable, variables 
in Table 5.1 are defined as independent variables.  
Table 5.1 The accident-related RIFs  
RIFs Notation Description 
Values of state 
in BN 
Ship type RST Passenger vessel, tug, barge, fishing vessel, container ship, 
bulk carrier, RORO, tanker or chemical ship, cargo ship, 
others. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
Hull type RHT Steel, wood, aluminium, others 1, 2, 4, 5 
Ship age (years) RSA (0 5], [6 10], [11 15], [16 20], >20, NA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Length (metres) RL ≤100, >100, NA 1, 2, 3 
Gross tonnage (GT) RGT ≤300, 300 to 10000, >10000, NA 1, 2, 3, 4 
Ship operation RSO Towing, Loading/unloading, Pilotage, Manoeuvring, Fishing, 
At anchor, On passage, others 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8 
Voyage segment RVS In port, Departure, Arrival, Mid-water, Transit, others 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Weather condition RWC Good or poor considering rain, wind, fog, visibility 1, 2 
Sea condition RSC Good or poor considering falling/rising tide, current, waves 1, 2 
Time of day RTD 07:00 to 19:00, other 1, 2 
Fairway traffic RFT Good or poor considering complex geographic environment, 
dense traffic, or repetitive nature of the route contributing to 
ignorance 
1, 2 
Ship speed*  RSS Normal, Fast  1, 2 
Vessel condition Rvc Good condition of vessels, or the condition of vessel has 
nothing to do with the accidents; 
Poor condition of vessels, or increasing complexity of 
propulsion arrangements, or modification made to vessels and 
size contributes to the accidents 
1, 2 
Equipment/device RE Devices and equipment on board operate correctly; 
Devices and equipment not fully utilised or operated correctly 
(e.g., BNWAS switched off, alarm system not in the 
recommended position or not noticed) 
1, 2 






ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design (e.g., visual 
blind sector ahead, motion illusion) 
Information  RI Effective and updated information provided; 
Insufficient or lack of updated information (e.g., poor quality 
of equipment data, falsified records of information, relies on a 
single piece of navigational equipment, without working 
indicators or light for necessary observing) 
1, 2 
*The ship speed is grouped into normal and fast states based on the description in the 
MAIB accident reports. 
A majority of definitions of variables’ states are derived from accident reports. To quantify 
such states, the majority of variables are defined and quantified based on Chapter 4. 
However, variables, e.g. accident type, ship type, hull type, ship operation, and voyage 
segment, are divided into different states according to the classification of MAIB or TSB 
investigation. The ‘vessel condition’ is quantified into two states based on whether it is 
blamed for the faults in accidents, as described in the reports. The grading of ‘ship speed’ 
is based on the description in the MAIB accident reports, rather than the grading method 
by Wang and Yang (2018). The main reason is that accurate speeds of vessels involved in 
accidents are not clearly indicated in the source database. 
5.4 Bayesian networks model for maritime accidents 
In the study, the only child node of BN is ‘accident type’, i.e. the class variable (S). The 
parent node set R = {RST,  RHT,  RSA, RL,  RGT, RSO,  RVS, RWC,  RSC, RTD, RFT,
RSS,  Rvc, RE, RED, RI} is the set of risk variables (Rk) including the RIFs (in a matching 
order), for example, ship type, hull type, ship age, length, gross tonnage, ship operation, 
voyage segment, weather condition, sea condition, time of day, fairway traffic, ship speed, 
vessel condition, equipment, ergonomic design, and information. Then, the structure 
learning is simplified to demonstrate the relationship between S and Rk.  




only child of each RIF. The ‘Accident type’ is assigned to S, representing 9 different 
accident types, and has 16 influencing parent nodes. Each node is assigned with multiple 
states. Then the number of conditional probability distributions 
P(S|RST, RHT, RSA, ⋯ , RI)  is more than 2E+09 for any observation set R =
{RST, RHT, RSA, ⋯ , RI} , That is to say, the size of the conditional probability table 
increases exponentially, resulting in the complex computation in this converging BN. 
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Figure 5.4 ‘Accident type’ as a child node               
Information
Accident type
Ship type Hull type Ship age
……
 
Figure 5.5 ‘Accident type’ as a parent node 
To simplify the BN structure, a modified diverging NBN structure in which ‘Accident 
type’ has no parents but is the only parent of other RIFs is presented, as shown in Figure 
5.5, by referring to Wang and Yang (2018). In this way, this NBN structure includes the 
prior distribution P(S) and the conditional probability table with relatively small number 
of conditional probability distributions P(Rk|S). Compared to the structure in Figure 5.4, 
this structure significantly reduces the computation and number of conditional probability 
distributions. Hence, it is adopted to express the relationship between risk variables in the 
NBN structure. Because BN can conduct bi-directional risk analyses, the transformation 
from the converging to diverging connections will be well reflected by the adapted CPT 





Although the assumption that the variables are completely independent is not always valid 
in reality, modified diverging NBN simplifies the structure by reducing the number of 
conditional probability distributions. Moreover, such an assumption does not significantly 
affect the posterior probabilities calculated, which does not affect the scenario analysis in 
the study (Wang and Yang, 2018), given the fact that the statistical analysis of all the 
accidents did not indicate strong correlation among the RIFs. Therefore, assuming that all 
the variables, i.e. the child nodes, are independent of each other, the NBN is constructed. 
Based on the NBN model, the parameter learning of CPTs from the cases is conducted by 
the software ‘Netica’ using the counting-learning algorithm. They are calculated by the 
manual collected database from accident reports. Once the CPTs are constructed and 
obtained in Table 5.2, the posterior probabilities of each variable can be calculated.  




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 7.5472  11.3207  3.7736  13.2076  5.6604  9.4340  5.6604  7.5472  15.0943  20.7547  
2 18.1818  7.2727  7.2727  10.9091  9.0909  9.0909  3.6364  7.2727  21.8182  5.4546  
3 5.8824  5.8824  5.8824  23.5294  5.8824  11.7647  11.7647  11.7647  11.7647  5.8824  
4 9.5238  9.5238  4.7619  23.8095  4.7619  4.7619  9.5238  4.7619  19.0476  9.5238  
5 6.0606  18.1818  9.0909  30.3030  6.0606  6.0606  3.0303  6.0606  3.0303  12.1212  
6 12.5000  6.2500  3.1250  12.5000  3.1250  12.5000  12.5000  12.5000  12.5000  12.5000  
7 11.1111  11.1111  16.6667  22.2222  5.5556  5.5556  5.5556  5.5556  5.5556  11.1111  
8 10.3448  6.8966  3.4483  41.3793  6.8966  3.4483  3.4483  3.4483  10.3448  10.3448  
9 17.5000  12.5000  10.0000  12.5000  2.5000  12.5000  2.5000  2.5000  15.0000  12.5000  
 
Equipment_ device 
Accident type 1 2 
1 64.4445  35.5556  
2 48.9362  51.0638  




4 69.2308  30.7692  
5 60.0000  40.0000  
6 62.5000  37.5000  
7 30.0000  70.0000  
8 80.9524  19.0476  
9 65.6250  34.3750  
 
Ergonomic design 
Accident type 1 2 
1 71.1111  28.8889  
2 85.1064  14.8936  
3 88.8889  11.1111  
4 92.3077  7.6923  
5 96.0000  4.0000  
6 75.0000  25.0000  
7 90.0000  10.0000  
8 95.2381  4.7619  
9 96.8750  3.1250  
 
Fairway traffic 
Accident type 1 2 
1 66.6667  33.3333  
2 74.4681  25.5319  
3 66.6667  33.3333  
4 92.3077  7.6923  
5 92.0000  8.0000  
6 79.1667  20.8333  
7 90.0000  10.0000  
8 95.2381  4.7619  
9 90.6250  9.3750  
 
Gross tonnage 
Accident type 1 2 3 4 
1 36.1702  23.4043  29.7872  10.6383  
2 18.3674  48.9796  28.5714  4.0816  
3 36.3636  18.1818  36.3636  9.0909  
4 46.6667  26.6667  20.0000  6.6667  




6 19.2308  38.4615  38.4615  3.8462  
7 75.0000  8.3333  8.3333  8.3333  
8 52.1739  26.0870  13.0435  8.6957  
9 38.2353  29.4118  20.5882  11.7647  
 
Hull type 
Accident type 1 2 4 5 
1 72.3404  10.6383  8.5106  8.5106  
2 81.6327  6.1225  4.0816  8.1633  
3 45.4545  27.2727  9.0909  18.1818  
4 53.3333  33.3333  6.6667  6.6667  
5 59.2593  7.4074  11.1111  22.2222  
6 76.9231  7.6923  7.6923  7.6923  
7 41.6667  25.0000  8.3333  25.0000  
8 52.1739  4.3478  4.3478  39.1304  
9 67.6471  2.9412  5.8824  23.5294  
 
Information 
Accident type 1 2 
1 64.4445  35.5556  
2 31.9149  68.0851  
3 33.3333  66.6667  
4 69.2308  30.7692  
5 68.0000  32.0000  
6 25.0000  75.0000  
7 60.0000  40.0000  
8 71.4286  28.5714  
9 68.7500  31.2500  
 
Length 
Accident type 1 2 3 
1 58.6957  34.7826  6.5217  
2 60.4167  37.5000  2.0833  
3 50.0000  40.0000  10.0000  
4 71.4286  21.4286  7.1429  
5 84.6154  7.6923  7.6923  
6 52.0000  44.0000  4.0000  




8 77.2727  18.1818  4.5455  
9 63.6364  30.3030  6.0606  
 
Sea condition 
Accident type 1 2 
1 55.5556  44.4444  
2 31.9149  68.0851  
3 66.6667  33.3333  
4 61.5385  38.4615  
5 24.0000  76.0000  
6 54.1667  45.8333  
7 40.0000  60.0000  
8 47.6191  52.3810  
9 59.3750  40.6250  
 
Ship age 
Accident type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 18.3674  16.3265  8.1633  8.1633  26.5306  22.4490  
2 13.7255  13.7255  11.7647  11.7647  45.0980  3.9216  
3 15.3846  7.6923  23.0769  7.6923  38.4615  7.6923  
4 11.7647  11.7647  17.6471  5.8824  35.2941  17.6471  
5 17.2414  10.3448  10.3448  13.7931  34.4828  13.7931  
6 21.4286  10.7143  10.7143  14.2857  21.4286  21.4286  
7 7.1429  14.2857  21.4286  7.1429  35.7143  14.2857  
8 12.0000  12.0000  12.0000  16.0000  24.0000  24.0000  
9 13.8889  19.4444  5.5556  11.1111  36.1111  13.8889  
 
Ship operation 
Accident type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1.9608  1.9608  1.9608  5.8824  5.8824  1.9608  78.4314  1.9608  
2 18.8679  1.8868  18.8679  11.3207  1.8868  5.6604  39.6226  1.8868  
3 6.6667  6.6667  13.3333  6.6667  20.0000  6.6667  33.3333  6.6667  
4 5.2632  10.5263  5.2632  5.2632  5.2632  10.5263  52.6316  5.2632  
5 29.0323  3.2258  3.2258  16.1290  22.5806  3.2258  16.1290  6.4516  
6 10.0000  6.6667  13.3333  16.6667  6.6667  6.6667  33.3333  6.6667  
7 18.7500  6.2500  6.2500  6.2500  6.2500  12.5000  37.5000  6.2500  
8 7.4074  7.4074  7.4074  11.1111  37.0370  3.7037  22.2222  3.7037  






Accident type 1 2 
1 80.0000  20.0000  
2 89.3617  10.6383  
3 88.8889  11.1111  
4 92.3077  7.6923  
5 92.0000  8.0000  
6 70.8333  29.1667  
7 90.0000  10.0000  
8 95.2381  4.7619  
9 93.7500  6.2500  
 
Time of day 
Accident type 1 2 
1 42.2222  57.7778  
2 51.0638  48.9362  
3 55.5556  44.4444  
4 53.8462  46.1538  
5 60.0000  40.0000  
6 58.3333  41.6667  
7 70.0000  30.0000  
8 52.3810  47.6191  
9 65.6250  34.3750  
 
Vessel condition 
Accident type 1 2 
1 84.4445  15.5556  
2 68.0851  31.9149  
3 77.7778  22.2222  
4 53.8462  46.1538  
5 60.0000  40.0000  
6 79.1667  20.8333  
7 20.0000  80.0000  
8 80.9524  19.0476  






Accident type 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2.0408  12.2449  2.0408  51.0204  30.6123  2.0408  
2 1.9608  15.6863  29.4118  39.2157  11.7647  1.9608  
3 7.6923  7.6923  7.6923  46.1538  23.0769  7.6923  
4 5.8824  5.8824  17.6471  52.9412  11.7647  5.8824  
5 13.7931  17.2414  3.4483  44.8276  17.2414  3.4483  
6 7.1429  10.7143  42.8571  10.7143  14.2857  14.2857  
7 7.1429  7.1429  21.4286  28.5714  28.5714  7.1429  
8 8.0000  4.0000  8.0000  60.0000  8.0000  12.0000  
9 19.4444  5.5556  22.2222  36.1111  13.8889  2.7778  
 
Weather condition 
Accident type 1 2 
1 66.6667  33.3333  
2 46.8085  53.1915  
3 44.4444  55.5556  
4 61.5385  38.4615  
5 60.0000  40.0000  
6 62.5000  37.5000  
7 60.0000  40.0000  
8 66.6667  33.3333  
9 65.6250  34.3750  
 
The statistical analysis of the probability of variables reveals interesting initial findings 





Figure 5.6 Results of NBN 
Figure 5.6 presents the results of NBN involving all the retained 16 RIFs. Among the 
accidents, grounding and collision are the two most frequently occurring types of 
accidents: accounting for 20.3% and 21.2%, respectively. A majority of vessel lengths 
(i.e., 65%) are less than 100m. Vessels with gross tonnages less than 300 account for 37.5% 
of shipments involved in accidents. In addition, 67.5% of vessels are made of steel. 
In light of environmental factors, 40% of vessels in the accidents are involved in the ship 
operation of ‘on passage’, 41.3% are involved in the voyage segment of ‘mid-water’. 
Besides this, only 19.1% of ships involved in accidents are in poor fairway traffic in the 
process of accidents, 45.7% are at night time. Severe weather condition accounts for 40.2% 
of accidents, while tough sea condition accounts for 53.2%. 














































































































































































18.4%) of shipments in accidents. Ships older than 20 years are presented in 33.2% of 
accidents. Also, 46% of vessels convey insufficient information, 14.2% have ergonomic 
design problems, 38.9% are faced with invalid equipment or devices on board, and 30.4% 
experience the condition of modification or increasing size.  
5.5 Sensitivity analyses and model validation  
5.5.1 Mutual information analysis 
Table 5.3 demonstrates the mutual information shared between ‘accident type’ and RIFs. 
When ‘accident type’ is the parent node, “ship operation” with the corresponding mutual 
information value of 0.28294, has the most potent effect on the accident type. To select 
important variables, a threshold of the mutual information value is set as 0.09, which is 
the average mutual information value. The variables with I(S,Rk) larger than 0.09, i.e. 
‘ship operation’, ‘voyage segment’, ‘ship type’, ‘gross tonnage’, ‘hull type’, and 
‘information’, illustrate essential impacts on ‘accident type’. Thus, these variables are to 
be computed for the factor analysis in the next step. In addition, variables that have less 
impact on ‘accident type’ mainly include ‘ship age’, ‘vessel condition’, ‘ergonomic 
design’, ‘length’, ‘fairway traffic’, ‘sea condition’, ‘equipment or device’, ‘ship speed’, 
‘time of day’, and ‘weather condition’. 
Table 5.3 Mutual information shared with ‘accident type’ 
Node Mutual Info. Percentage Variance of Beliefs 
Accident_type 2.95073 100 0.7352824 
Ship_operation     0.28294 9.59 0.0156048 
Voyage_segment   0.21515 7.29 0.0076025 
Ship_type 0.13632 4.62 0.0048136 
Gross_tonnage    0.12415 4.21 0.0037518 
Hull_type 0.10076 3.41 0.0024178 
Information   0.09665 3.28 0.0032523 
Ship_age  0.07052 2.39 0.0019386 




Ergonomic_design 0.05944 2.01 0.0030873 
Length   0.05745 1.95 0.0009204 
Fairway_traffic      0.05660 1.92 0.0022666 
Sea_condition 0.05270 1.79 0.001587 
Equipment_device 0.03650 1.24 0.0008695 
Ship_speed 0.03372 1.14 0.0012873 
Time_of_day    0.01941 0.658 0.000732 
Weather_condition 0.01907 0.646 0.0009535 
5.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In order to overcome the drawback of the traditional way, a new method proposed by 
Alyami et al. (2019) is applied here. This method increases the probability of the state 
within the highest influencing on a type of accident (e.g. collision) to 100% to obtain the 
High Risk Inference (HRI) of collision. Then it increases the probability of the state 
generating the lowest influence on the collision to 100% to obtain the Low Risk Inference 
(LRI) of collision. In this way, calculating the average value of HRI and LRI concludes 
the True Risk Influence (TRI) of each variable in the case of a particular accident type. It 





                                                          
where HRI refers to ‘High Risk Inference’ which is calculated for a variable influencing 
‘collision’, LRI is ‘Low Risk Inference’ calculated for a variable influencing ‘collision’, 
and TRI refers to ‘True Risk Influence’ for a variable influencing ‘collision’. To obtain 
the variable influence on ‘accident type’, a similar analysis procedure is applied to other 
accident types, ‘grounding’ and ‘flooding’ etcetera. Then TRIs for a variable influencing 
all accident types are obtained. After applying this method for each variable, the TRIs for 
all variables for all accident types are available. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis 
illustrates the ranking of variables’ influences on accident types according to the value of 




In terms of sensitivity analysis, Table 5.4 demonstrates the TRI value of ‘ship operation’ 
against collision, where S1 refers to collision. Table 5.5 indicates the values of all RIFs 
for all accidents, where S1~ S9 are defined in Section 5.3. 
Table 5.4 TRI of a risk variable (ship operation) for collision 
Ship_operation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 S1* HRI LRI TRI 
/ / / / / / / / 20.30 19.50 17.31 18.41 
100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.99    
0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.99    
0 0 100% 0 0 0 0 0 4.41    
0 0 0 100% 0 0 0 0 11.00    
0 0 0 0 100% 0 0 0 10.80    
0 0 0 0 0 100% 0 0 7.26    
0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 0 39.80    
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100% 10.70       
*S1 - Collison 
Table 5.5 TRI of risk variables for all accident types 
Node 
TRI 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Average 
Ship_operation     18.41  20.33  2.37  4.21  10.07  6.24  3.56  12.94  19.36  10.83  
Voyage_segment   16.44  14.94  1.96  2.06  9.07  13.38  2.03  9.06  14.82  9.30  
Ship_type 11.70  11.82  3.09  3.35  8.72  9.63  4.44  8.61  8.23  7.73  
Gross_tonnage    5.35  11.90  1.70  1.19  7.59  6.01  3.58  3.89  4.10  5.03  
Hull_type 7.00  7.30  3.91  8.23  4.67  3.47  4.02  9.41  8.51  6.28  
Information   4.25  9.40  1.53  1.70  3.11  6.20  0.51  3.24  4.25  3.80  
Specifically, in Table 5.4, the first row denotes the base-case scenario where the value of 
S1 is ‘20.3’, and the following rows represent the different scenarios with each state of 
the variable reaching 100%, for example, the second row increases the probability of the 
state 1 of ship operation to 100% to obtain the value of S1 (2.99). The same process is 
applied to all states of ship operation. According to column ‘S1’, ‘39.8’ is the largest, 
which means the state 7 of ship operation is the state within the highest influencing on S1 
(collision), and the difference between ‘39.8’ and ‘20.3’ (base-case scenario) is the HRI, 




is the state within the lowest influencing on S1 (collision), so the LRI is obtained as 
‘17.31’. Then the TRI is calculated by averaging them. In this way, TRIs of each RIF of 
each accident type are obtained in Table 5.5. 
To obtain the impact levels of such RIFs in accident types, TRIs are compared and ranked. 
Generally, the most important variables lists for ‘accident types’ are as follows: 
Ship operation > Voyage segment > Ship type > Hull type > Gross tonnage > 
Information 
In detail, the most important variables lists for different accident types are demonstrated 
in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 The most important variables  
Accident type 
Ship 
operation     
Voyage 
segment   
Ship type Hull type 
Gross 
tonnage    
Information   
S1 Collision 1 2 3 4 5 6 
S2 Grounding 1 2 4 6 3 5 
S3 Flooding 3 4 2 1 5 6 
S4 Fire/explosion 2 4 3 1 6 5 
S5 Capsize 1 2 3 5 4 6 
S6 Contact/crush 3 1 2 6 5 4 
S7 Sinking 4 5 1 2 3 6 
S8 Overboard 1 3 4 2 6 5 
S9 Others 1 2 4 3 6 5 
5.5.3 Model validation 
To validate the model, another sensitivity analysis is conducted by investigating the 
results of the model given RIFs. It is also used to test the combined effect of multiple 
RIFs to the accident types. There are two axioms that have at least to be satisfied for the 
inference process (Yang et al., 2009, Zhang et al., 2013), referring to Chapter 3. 




of each state. The ‘information’ is selected as the first node, the state generating the 
highest changed value of state 1 in ‘accident type’ is increased by 10%, while the state 
generating the lowest changed value of state 1 in ‘accident type’ is decreased by 10%. 
This procedure is written as ‘~10%’ in Table 5.7. Then, the same approach is applied to 
the next RIF, and the cumulative changed value is obtained and updated. The updating 
procedure would continue until all the RIF nodes are involved. Similarly, the same 
updating procedure is applied into the state 2, 3… 9 in ‘accident type’ respectively, until 
all states of accident type are included, as seen in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 Accident rate of minor change in variables 
Node Accident rate of minor change 
Information / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Hull type / / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Gross tonnage / / / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Ship type / / / / ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Voyage segment / / / / / ~10% ~10% 
Ship operation / / / / / / ~10% 
S1 20.30 20.70 21.00 21.20 21.40 22.00 23.40 
S2 21.20 22.20 22.60 23.40 23.60 24.20 24.60 
S3 3.69 3.85 4.04 4.14 4.18 4.23 4.27 
S4 5.53 5.71 5.90 5.96 6.01 6.08 6.17 
S5 11.10 11.40 11.50 11.90 12.10 12.30 12.50 
S6 10.60 11.30 11.40 11.70 11.80 12.20 12.30 
S7 4.15 4.20 4.51 4.77 4.85 4.91 4.99 
S8 9.22 9.57 9.84 10.10 10.40 10.50 11.00 
S9 14.30 14.7 15.00 15.10 15.20 15.40 15.80 
The first column of the data in Table 5.7 shows the original values of 9 states of accident 
types in NBN, and the rest of the columns state the updated, changed values of results. 
However, each state of ‘accident type’ is calculated separately, i.e. each row is computed 
through the change of states of RIFs in each accident type. Specifically, for the first 
row, ’20.30’ is the original value of accident type S1 (grounding). Moreover, ‘20.70’ is 
calculated by the way that the state of ‘Information’ generating the highest changed value 
of S1 is increased by 10% while the state generating the lowest changed value of S1 is 




table, which means the state of ‘Hull type’ generating the highest changed value of S1 is 
increased by 10% while the state generating the lowest changed value of S1 is decreased 
by 10%. Then ‘Gross tonnage’, ‘Ship type’, ‘Voyage segment’, ‘Ship operation’ apply 
this method sequentially. Furthermore, the same updating procedure is applied into the 
S3, S4, …, S9, respectively, until accident types are included. Besides that, the updated 
values of the target node demonstrate this model is in line with Axiom 1. Moreover, 
Axiom 2 is examined by comparing the initial target value with the updated one under all 
states. From Table 5.7, the updated values of the target node are gradually increasing or 
decreasing, along with the continuous updating of RIFs. 
5.6 Implication: scenario analyses 
The study enables the understanding of differentiation among critical factors contributing 
to different types of accidents. BN modelling is applicable to analyse the occurrence 
likelihood of each accident type in different scenarios involving vessel condition and 
environmental factors. To do this, two scenarios are proposed for useful research 
implications and managerial contributions. 
5.6.1 Scenario 1: environmental factor 
In the first scenario, maritime accidents under specific shipping environmental factors are 
estimated. Shipping environmental factors contain ship operation, voyage segment, 
weather condition, sea condition, time of day, fairway traffic in this scenario. For different 
assigned states of these factors, maritime accidents reveal different types.  
When the nodes are assigned with the specific states in Figure 5.7, the effects of the 
shipping environment are revealed. The probability of collision is the highest among the 
‘accident type’, accounting for 85.1%, followed by grounding only accounting for 4.52%. 
Such probability indicates the considerable increase in the risk of collision compared to 
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Figure 5.8 Posterior probability analysis in Scenario 1 - grounding 
Concerning the following states in Figure 5.8, the effects of the environment are revealed. 
The probability of grounding is the highest among the ‘accident type’, accounting for 
79.9% of the accident types. Therefore, transport authorities and ship owners should pay 
more attention to risk-reduction measures for collision or grounding under specific 
navigational environment, especially the strongly related variables, i.e. ship operation, 
voyage segment, fairway traffic, and sea condition. 
5.6.2 Scenario 2: vessel factor 
In the second scenario, attention has been paid to vessel factors associated with maritime 
accident types. The variables include ship age, ship type, information, ergonomic design, 
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vessel factors, maritime accident types have shown different likelihoods. 
Assuming that variables are assigned with the specific states in Figure 5.9, the effects of 
vessel factors on accident types are illustrated. The probability of collision is the highest 
among ‘accident type’, accounting for 82.1%. This probability indicates the considerable 
increase in the risk of collision compared to the initial states in Figure 5.6 due to the 
combined effect of the involved RIFs.  
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Figure 5.10 Posterior probability analysis in scenario 2 - grounding 
Assuming that the variables are assigned with the specific states in Figure 5.10, the effects 
of vessel factors are indicated. The probability of grounding is the highest among 
‘accident type’, accounting for 62.6%, followed by sinking (i.e., 12.7%). This probability 
indicates a significant increase in the risk of grounding and sinking compared to the initial 
states in Figure 5.6. 
According to the above analysis, transport authorities and ship owners can use these 
findings to put forward the most effective risk control measures for different types of 
accidents derived from various vessel factors, especially the strongly related variables, 
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Compared to previous studies focusing on causal factors related to the severity and the 
probability of maritime accidents, this study uses an NBN approach to investigate how 
different risk factors pose an impact on different types of maritime accidents. To identify 
RIFs, maritime accident reports from MAIB and TSB within a five-year period are 
extracted and reviewed to develop a primary database on maritime accidents. Then the 
risk-based NBN model is constructed to analyse RIFs in maritime accidents. At last, the 
sensitivity analysis is conducted, as well as scenario analysis to indicate research 
contributions. In general, the results from the NBN model present the distinctions among 
the key factors contributing to different types of accidents, which helps generate insights 
for accident prevention. 
In summary, the findings of this study can be summarised as follows: 
(1) According to the calculations of the mutual information, crucial RIFs are ranked under 
different accident types. The results reveal that critical RIFs for maritime accident types 
are ‘Ship operation’, ‘Voyage segment’, ‘Ship type’, ‘Gross tonnage’, ‘Hull type’, 
‘Information’. 
(2) There is the highest probability of overboard occurring on fishing vessels. When the 
ship operation is ‘towing’, the accident type has a high likelihood of being ‘capsize’; 
‘manoeuvring’ and ‘on passage’ operation contribute to the higher probability of 
grounding; ‘pilotage’ is closely related to ‘contact/crush’. 
(3) When ships are in ‘mid-water’ and ‘transit’ voyage segments, there is a higher 
probability of being in a collision. Grounding is more likely to happen in ‘departure’ and 
‘arrival’ segments. 




Among them, the scenario analysis reveals that environmental factors and vessel factors 
of maritime accidents generate a significant impact on accident types.  
With respect to the environmental factors, the probability of collision is the highest among 
the ‘accident type’ when a ship is in the following states: ‘voyage segment – transit’; ‘ship 
operation - on passage’; ‘before 7:00 am or after 7:00 pm’; ‘good weather and sea 
condition’; ‘not considering the fairway traffic appropriately’. The probability of 
grounding is the highest when a ship is in the following states: ‘voyage segment – 
departure’; ‘ship operation – pilotage’; ‘between 7:00 am and 7:00 pm’; ‘severe weather 
and sea condition’; ‘not considering the fairway traffic appropriately’.  
Concerning the vessel factors, the probability of grounding is the highest among ‘accident 
type’ if a ship is in the following states: ‘older than 20 years’, ‘effective and updated 
information provided’, ‘ergonomic problem’, ‘equipment operates correctly’, ‘good 
condition of vessel’, ‘fast ship speed’. The probability of grounding is the highest among 
‘accident type’ if a fishing ship is in the following states: ‘older than 20 years’, ‘lack of 
updated information’, ‘ergonomic design friendly’, ‘equipment not fully utilised’, 
‘modification made to vessels and size’, ‘normal ship speed’. Therefore, such conclusions 
can effectively assist maritime authorities in developing countermeasures for accident 
prevention.  
There are also limitations in this study. The small number of flooding data makes the 
results not significant and robust. Although BN can conduct bi-directional risk analysis, 
the transformation from the converging to diverging connections does not intuitively 
represent the accident development. Moreover, more human factors, underlining 
communication, situation awareness, fatigue, etcetera, will be processed to conduct 




5.8 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 New primary data is analysed directly from maritime accident records. 
 Analysis of risk factors for rational prevention. 
 Evaluation of RIFs contributes to different types of maritime accidents. 






Chapter 6 Incorporation of human factors into maritime 
accident analysis 
6.1 Introductory remarks 
Based on the results of the NBN model in Chapter 5, more human factors need to be 
included, as well as the inter-relations among different risk factors. With this perspective, 
another data-driven Bayesian Network is used to investigate the effect of human factors 
on marine safety in maritime accident analyses. Its novelties consist of 1) incorporation 
of human factors into causational analysis concerning different maritime accident types, 
and 2) modelling by a historical accident data-driven approach, to generate new insights 
on critical human factors contributing to different types of accidents. The modelling of 
the interdependency among the risk influencing factors is structured by TAN and 
validated by sensitivity analyses. The findings reveal that the critical risk factors for all 
accident types are ship age, ship operation, voyage segment, information, and vessel 
condition. More importantly, the findings also present the differentiation among the vital 
human factors against different types of accidents. Most probable explanation (MPE) is 
used to provide a specific scenario in which the beliefs are upheld, observing the most 
probable configuration. The work pioneers the analyses of various impacts of human 
factors on different maritime accident types. It helps provide specific recommendations 
for the prevention of a particular type of accidents involving human errors. 
6.2 Background information 
Most shipping accidents (e.g. collisions, groundings, crash, fire and explosions) are 
characterised with a feature of low probability-high consequence. Catastrophic maritime 
accidents may cause a huge loss of human lives, damage to the society and environment 




transportation, the IMO introduced FSA methodology for its applications to the rule-
making process (IMO, 2002, IMO, 2013). Although modern ships are highly equipped 
with advanced technologies (e.g. navigation technology, onboard information, bridge 
resource management systems), human factors present a significant contribution to 
accidents. There is no consensus on the statistical analysis of the causations leading to 
maritime accidents, due to the different perspectives on the analysis and use of various 
investigation approaches. According to the literature, the organisation, working condition, 
and navigational environment are the major driving forces to maritime accidents (García-
Herrero et al., 2012). However, human errors, technical failures, and mechanical failures 
are traditionally highlighted as the main root causes of accidents (Celik and Cebi, 2009). 
It is widely accepted that the human element, accounting for 75%-96% of maritime 
casualties, plays an essential role in accidents involving modern ships (Trucco et al., 
2008b, Fan et al., 2018, Tzannatos, 2010). Human factors are often viewed as causes 
behind anything that goes improperly at sea.  
Human factors are usually adopted as a concept that considers other relevant factors, 
including workplace conditions, physical and natural environment, procedures, 
technology, training, organisation, management, as well as seafarers (i.e. fatigue, task 
load, mental state, etcetera) (Psarros, 2015). Several researchers have studied the 
contribution of human and organisational factors to ship accidents (Chauvin et al., 2013, 
Chen et al., 2013, Xi et al., 2017). The majority of accidents occurred due to one of or a 
combination of the following causes: poor crew competence, fatigue, lack of 
communication, lack of proper maintenance, lack of application of safety culture and 
protocols or other procedures, inadequate training, poor situation assessment, and stress 
(Vinagre-Ríos and Iglesias-Baniela, 2013, Fan et al., 2018). Generally, seafarers often 
face more accidents than the crews working onshore, as reported by Roberts and Hansen 
(2002). Also, there is a consideration that a system for the training and assessment of the 
non-technical skills (NTS) needs to be established in the maritime industry (Saeed et al., 





Risk analyses are an effective way of devising mitigation measures that prevent accidents. 
Among the studies on the risk analyses for maritime transportation, historical data 
analyses have been widely used. A number of papers have used historical accident data 
for such purposes (Zhang et al., 2013, Zhang et al., 2016). Ronza et al. (2003) investigated 
828 accidents in port areas using event trees to predict the frequency of accidents. Kujala 
et al. (2009) included detailed accident statistics over a ten-year period in a collision 
model, to analyse the safety in the Gulf of Finland. Jin and Thunberg (2005) proposed the 
logic regression model based on accident data from 1981-2000 to analyse fishing vessel 
accidents. Quantitative risk and reliability analyses techniques have been widely used to 
reduce the probability of failure in offshore sectors, including Hazard and Operability 
Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and BN. (Yeo et al., 2016, Zhang and Thai, 2016). BN 
became popular for maritime risk modelling during the period of 2004–2013. Experts’ 
knowledge was also found to play an essential role in Bayesian Network structures, 
regarding the definition of the relative probabilities due to insufficient historical data 
(Hänninen and Kujala, 2014, Zhang and Thai, 2016). 
This chapter investigates how human factors, combined with other factors, affect 
maritime transportation using risk analysis. Allowing for the drawbacks arising from 
traditional studies, this study proposes a novel risk assessment of the human factors 
contributing to maritime accidents. Since 75-96% of maritime accidents involve human 
elements, to which extent a maritime accident is defined to be a human-related maritime 
accident. This study aims at investigating how different risk factors generate, in an 
individual or combined manner, an impact on different types of human-related maritime 
accidents. Based on recorded maritime accident reports from MAIB and TSB between 
2012 and 2017, a primary database is developed. Owing to the use of accident data, the 




BN-based approach for accident analyses. 
6.3 RIFs identification 
To analyse the maritime accident types under various RIFs, identifying and selecting the 
RIFs from the accident reports is necessary. The data was obtained from case-by-case 
analyses of recorded maritime accidents from MAIB and TSB that occurred from 2012 
to 2017. These reports are among the most representative from the literature (Chauvin et 
al., 2013, Graziano et al., 2015, Kum and Sahin, 2015). 
To generate the RIFs, the procedure consists of four stages: (1) online database searching, 
(2) reports screening and selecting, (3) refining and analysis, (4) RIFs selecting, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. Through online database searching, the maritime accident 
reports from MAIB and TSB between Jan. 2012 to Dec. 2017 were obtained. In order to 
ensure the human element relevance, these accident reports are screened with a focus on 
human factors-related accidents. Therefore, the study generates the database with 161 
reports involving 208 vessels. Then, the reports are further refined and analysed, 32 risk 
factors contributing to human errors are identified and described in Chapter 4, shown in 
Table 6.1. Then factors with high occurrence frequencies are selected as common factors, 
and the others are excluded due to low frequencies and hard measurement.  
Table 6.1 The risk factors contributing to human errors in maritime accidents 
Number Risk factors Frequency 
24 Sea condition: falling tide, current, waves 53.37% 
22 Insufficient or lack of updated information (poor quality of equipment data, 
falsified records of information, relies on a single piece of navigational 
equipment); no automatic means or without indicators for necessary observing 
(working indicators, light) 
45.67% 
29 Dysfunctional management system (shore management, maintenance 
management, bridge source management, on board management, safety 
management systems, port service, qualification examination, inadequate 
training, practice, emergency drill) 
40.87% 




20 Devices and equipment on board not fully utilised or operated correctly 
(BNWAS switched off, alarm system not in the recommended position or not 
noticed) 
37.98% 
7 No clear order (not accurately interpret and apply the requirements of a safe 
manning document) 
37.50% 
2 Ineffective supervision and support (lone watchkeeper or working isolated, 
improper supervision of loading operation) 
32.69% 
12 Unfamiliar with/lack of equipment knowledge, inexperienced, ill-prepared 32.69% 
1 Poor communication and coordination 30.77% 
19 Poor condition of the vessel, increasing complexity of propulsion arrangements, 
and modifications made to vessels, size 
28.85% 
28 Lack of risk assessment 26.92% 
30 Lack of safety culture, precautionary thought 24.52% 
13 Complacent about the duties or underestimation of the severity of the condition 
(low state of alertness) 
21.63% 
27 Inappropriate or ambiguous code, endorsement, regulations, procedure, 
instructions, formal published guidance; operation manual, requirement 
19.71% 
17 Distracted/insufficient attention 16.35% 
26 Fairway traffic (traffic density, repetitive nature of the route) 16.35% 
5 Over-reliance on devices (AIS, GPS…), or poor lookout 15.38% 
9 Lack of situation awareness 14.42% 
3 No detailed passage plan or revised passage plan was unsafe 13.46% 
10 Fatigue/asleep/tiredness and desire to rest 13.46% 
8 Limited time to respond 12.50% 
21 Ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design (visual blind sector ahead, 
motion illusion) 
11.06% 
6 Fast speed 9.62% 
14 Recreational drugs, alcohol 6.73% 
15 Cognitively overload 4.81% 
32 Commercial pressure, public pressure or industrial pressure (financial 
constraints) 
4.33% 
31 No medical and fitness standards for crews 2.40% 
11 Emotion (low level of arousal, panic, anger, unhappiness) 1.92% 
4 Swift duty between pilots and seafarers or change of the steering mode 1.44% 
16 Physical incapacitation 0.96% 
25 Noisy and vibrating environment 0.96% 
18 Stress 0.48% 
However, human factors in maritime accidents are usually combined with other external 
factors, such as sea condition, weather condition, fairway traffic, and vessel condition, to 
affect the safety procedure in navigation. From this perspective, it is beneficial to combine 




safety. The average frequency of all common factors was calculated as the threshold of 
RIFs selection. Therefore, the top 14 common factors whose frequencies were higher than 
the average value, 19.35%, were extracted as RIFs in the study. Besides, combined with 
the factors identified from Chapter 5, encompass a total of 25 RIFs, seen in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 25 RIFs defined in maritime accidents  
No RIFs Notation Description 
Corresponding 
values 
1 Ship type RST 
Passenger vessel, tug, barge, fishing vessel, 
container ship, bulk carrier, RORO, tanker or 
chemical ship, cargo ship, others. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
2 Hull type RHT Steel, wood, aluminium, others 1, 2, 4, 5 
3 Ship age (years) RSA (0 5], [6 10], [11 15], [16 20], >20, NA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 




RGT ≤300, 300 to 10000, >10000, NA 1, 2, 3, 4 
6 Ship operation RSO 
Towing, Loading/unloading, Pilotage, Manoeuvring, 
Fishing, At anchor, On passage, others 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8 
7 Voyage segment RVS 
In port, Departure, Arrival, Mid-water, Transit, 
others 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
8 Ship speed RSS Normal, fast  1, 2 
9 Vessel condition Rvc 
The condition of vessel has nothing to do with the 
accidents; 
Increasing complexity of propulsion arrangements, 







Devices and equipment onboard operate correctly; 
Devices and equipment not fully utilised or operated 
correctly (e.g., BNWAS switched off, alarm system 






Ergonomic friendly or ergonomic aspects have 
nothing to do with accidents; 
Ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design (e.g., 
visual blind sector ahead, motion illusion) 
1, 2 
12 Information RI 
Effective and updated information provided; 
Insufficient or lack of updated information (e.g., 
poor quality of equipment data, falsified records of 
information, relies on a single piece of navigational 









RWC Good/poor considering rain, wind, fog, visibility 1, 2 
14 Sea condition RSC 
Good/poor considering falling/rising tide, current, 
waves 
1, 2 
15 Time of day RTD 07:00 to 19:00, other 1, 2 
16 Fairway traffic RFT 
Good or poor considering complex geographic 
environment, dense traffic, or repetitive nature of the 
route contributing to ignorance 
1, 2 
17 Communication A1 Good or poor communication and coordination  1, 2 
18 Supervision A2 
Effective or ineffective supervision and supports  
(lone watchkeeper or working isolated, improper 
supervision of loading operation) 
1, 2 
19 Clear order A6 
Good or unclear order from documents 
(not accurately interpret and apply the requirements 
of a safe manning document) 
1, 2 
20 Experienced A11 
Familiar or unfamiliar with/lack of equipment 
knowledge, experienced or inexperienced, good or 
ill-prepared; 
1, 2 
21 Complacent A12 
Properly understand or complacent about the 
duties/underestimation of the severity of the 
condition (low state of alertness) 
1, 2 
22 Regulation A18 
Good or inappropriate/ambiguous code, 
endorsement, regulations, procedure, instructions, 
formal published guidance; operation manual, 
requirement 
1, 2 
23 Risk assessment A19 Good or lack of risk assessment 1, 2 
24 Management A20 
Good or dysfunctional management system  
(including shore management, maintenance 
management, bridge source management, onboard 
management, safety management systems, port 
service, qualification examination, inadequate 
training, practice, emergency drill) 
1, 2 
25 Safety culture A21 Good or lack of safety culture, precautionary thought 1, 2 
Most of the definitions of variables’ states can be seen in accident investigation reports. 
For example, ‘accident type’, ‘ship type’, ‘hull type’, ‘ship operation’, and ‘voyage 
segment’, are classified into different states according to the classification of MAIB or 
TSB. Some variables are degraded according to the literature, like ‘ship age’, ‘length’, 
and ‘gross tonnage’. Also, ‘vessel condition’, ‘communication’, ‘supervision’, etcetera, 





In the quantitative analysis of BN modelling, the accident type is defined as a dependent 
variable, as presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Accident type 










6.4 TAN Modelling for maritime accidents 
A Bayesian network encodes a joint probability distribution over a set of random variables 
U, which is an annotated directed acyclic graph (DAG). Let  1 n, ,U A A C  where n 
stands for the number of RIFs, the variables 1, nA A  are the RIFs and C is the class 
variable (accident types). Consider a graph structure where the class variable is the root, 
that is, C   ( C  denotes the set of parents of C in U), and each RIF has the 
class variable as its unique parent, i.e. iA C  for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A BN defines a unique 
joint probability distribution over U given by 
1 n 1
( , , ) ( ) ( | )
n
ii
P A A C P C P A C

                                        
The DAG on  1, nA A  is a tree if iA  contains only one parent for all Ai, except for 
one variable without parents (referred to as the root). There is a function π which can 




the tree), and there is no sequence 1, ki i  such that 1jij i （ ）  for i ≤ j< k and 
1ki i （ ）  (i.e., no cycles). Such a function defines a tree network where 
 ( ),i iA C A  if 0i （） , and iA C  if 0i （） .  
Learning a TAN structure is an optimisation problem. Solving this problem follows the 
general procedure proposed by Chow and Liu (1968), who used conditional mutual 
information between attributes. The function can be defined as  
i
, ,
( , | )
( , | ) ( , , ) log
( | ) ( | )
ii ji i
ii ji i
P j ii ji i
a a c ii i ji i
P a a c
I A A C P a a c
P a c P a c
                       
where IP represents the conditional mutual information, aii is the i
th state of RIF Ai, aji is 
the ith state of RIF Aj, ci is the i
th state of ‘accident type’. The optimisation problem, i.e. 
learning a TAN structure, is to find a tree defining function π over 1, nA A such that the 
log likelihood is maximised.  
This function measures the information that Ai provides about Aj when the value of C is 
known. The procedure of TAN modelling consists of five steps: 
(a) Compute ( , | )P i jI A A C  between each RIF given ‘accident type’, i j . ‘Accident 
type’ is the class variable. 
(b) Build an undirected graph in which the vertices are the RIFs 1, nA A . Annotate the 
weight of an edge linking RIF Ai to RIF Aj by ( , | )P i jI A A C . 
(c) Build a maximum weighted spanning tree, i.e. the tree that has a maximum sum of
( , | )P i jI A A C . 




RIFs according to (c) and setting the direction of all edges linking RIFs to be outward 
from it. 
(e) Construct a TAN structure by adding a vertex labelled by ‘accident type’ and adding 
an arc from ‘accident type’ to each RIFs. 
To generate the BN model, 25 RIFs are involved in demonstrating their relationships with 
the dependent variable (i.e. accident type). The Netica software package (Norsys, 
http://www.norsys.com) is applied to assist the calculation. It has a ‘learning network’ 
function that develops the TAN network. The structure of the BN is presented in Figure 
6.1.  
 
Figure 6.1 Proposed BN for analysis of accident types’ probability 
Based on the TAN model, the parameter learning of CPTs from the cases is conducted by 




































































































































































































































of each variable can be calculated. The statistical analysis of the probability of variables, 
reveals interesting initial findings of useful insights regarding safety caution and accident 
prevention as follows. 
 
Figure 6.2 Results of TAN 
Figure 6.2 presents the results of TAN involving all the retained 25 RIFs. Among the 
accidents, grounding and collision are among the most frequent accident types, 
accounting for 20.3% and 21.2%, respectively. 
6.5 Sensitivity analysis 
6.5.1 Mutual information 




































































































































































































































From this point of view, the variables with higher I(S,Rk) reflects essential impacts on 
‘accident type’. When ‘accident type’ is the parent node, ‘ship age’ with the corresponding 
mutual information value of 0.05422, has the most significant effect on the accident type. 
Meanwhile, variables ‘ship age’, ‘ship operation’, ‘voyage segment’, and ‘information’, 
are selected to be calculated for the factor analysis in the next step.  
Table 6.4 Mutual information shared with ‘Accident type’ 
Node    
 Variance 
Reduction    
 Percentage 




(%)    
Variance of 
Belief 
Ship_age    0.02399 0.284 0.05422 1.84 0.0015433 
Ship_operation    0.3115 3.69 0.05132 1.74 0.0030026 
Voyage_segment    0.11 1.3 0.03595 1.22 0.0013546 
Vessel_condition    0.07391 0.874 0.03171 1.07 0.0006767 
Information          0.06113 0.723 0.03042 1.03 0.0010573 
Ship_type         0.03119 0.369 0.02891 0.98 0.0011112 
A21        0.01585 0.188 0.02871 0.973 0.000501 
Hull_type     0.1171 1.39 0.02838 0.962 0.0008351 
Gross_tonnage     0.0414 0.49 0.02482 0.841 0.0010064 
A18           0.01091 0.129 0.02306 0.782 0.0005812 
Length        0.02874 0.34 0.02151 0.729 0.0003882 
Ergonomic_design       0.07421 0.878 0.0194 0.657 0.0006816 
Sea_condition   0.0168 0.199 0.01774 0.601 0.0006831 
A19       0.06751 0.799 0.01466 0.497 0.0004953 
A11 0.000957 0.0113 0.01271 0.431 0.0003126 
Ship_speed      0.006733 0.0797 0.01172 0.397 0.0003134 
Weather_condition   0.004131 0.0489 0.00889 0.301 0.0004858 
A20                   0.02553 0.302 0.00851 0.288 0.0001854 
A6               0.01196 0.142 0.00707 0.24 0.0002377 
Fairway_traffic    0.03498 0.414 0.00704 0.238 0.0001619 
Time_of_day      0.04428 0.524 0.00671 0.227 0.0002614 
A12            0.003327 0.0394 0.006 0.203 0.000211 
A1 5.57E-05 0.000659 0.00547 0.185 0.0000786 
Equipment/device 0.003186 0.0377 0.00541 0.183 0.0001612 
A2            0.01893 0.224 0.00399 0.135 0.0001467 
6.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 




types, the next step is to figure out how these variables (the states of variables) affect the 
target accident type. To do so, the calculation of a joint probability of each variable and 
‘accident type’ is presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 The joint probability of the TAN model 
Ship age   
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
1 23.6 19.8 3.69 3.88 12 13.9 2.56 7.7 12.9 
2 22.4 21.1 2.2 4.99 8.81 8.73 3.8 8.21 19.7 
3 14.8 23.5 7.24 8.87 8.93 11.2 7.74 8.92 8.82 
4 15.8 22.5 2.69 3.72 13.7 12.6 3.33 12.9 12.8 
5 16.8 27.7 4.27 5.58 11.7 7.02 4.11 7.15 15.7 
6 29.3 6.95 2.07 6.52 10.6 14.3 4.13 13.2 13 
Ship operation  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
1 12.8 25.3 3.3 4.74 15.2 9.75 4.48 7.9 16.5 
2 15.9 16.3 4.1 6.5 10.3 11.1 4.57 9.81 21.4 
3 14.4 28.4 4.08 5.32 9.28 11.9 4.14 8.9 13.6 
4 16.5 21.6 3.51 5.05 12.5 12.2 3.92 9.36 15.4 
5 16.9 14.2 4.45 5.12 15.4 9.69 3.98 15.9 14.3 
6 16.6 20 4.26 6.75 10.7 11.6 5.26 9.27 15.7 
7 35.7 22.8 2.64 5.19 6.51 8.71 3.14 6.08 9.23 
8 17.5 18 4.51 6.48 12.7 12.2 5.03 9.82 13.7 
Voyage segment  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
1 15.3 15.6 4.24 6.03 13.5 11 4.72 9.95 19.6 
2 20.3 23.5 3.73 5.31 12.6 10.6 4.16 7.96 11.8 
3 11.5 28.5 3.2 5.44 7.72 15.9 4.29 7.54 15.9 
4 25.4 22.1 3.17 5.34 11.3 5.86 2.99 10.6 13.3 
5 27.5 17.7 3.89 5.02 10.9 9.84 4.67 7.51 13 
6 16.5 16.9 4.6 6.53 11.1 14.2 5.12 11.8 13.3 
Vessel condition  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
1 24.3 21.191 3.63 4.46 9.56 11.5 2.22 10.1 13.1 
2 12.8 21.212 3.8 7.53 13.9 8.99 7.76 7.52 16.5 
Information  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
1 21.8 15.8 3.33 6.17 13.2 7.28 4.28 10.6 17.6 





According to Table 6.5, the state of each variable that poses the highest influence on an 
accident type is shown (in bold value), as well as the state of each variable that poses the 
lowest influence on an accident type (in bold value). For example, when a ship is in the 
state of ‘on passage’, there is the highest probability for the accident to be ‘collision’ 
(35.7%); when ‘ship operation’ is the state of ‘towing’, there is the lowest probability to 
be ‘collision’ (12.8%). However, when a ship is in ‘pilotage’, there is the highest 
probability to be ‘grounding’ (28.4%); in ‘fishing’ operation, there is the lowest 
probability to be ‘grounding’ (14.2%). For the voyage segment, when in the state of 
‘transit’, a ship has the highest probability to be in ‘collision’ (27.5%); when in ‘arrival’ 
segment, it has the lowest probability to be in ‘collision’ (11.5%), but has the highest 
probability to be in ‘grounding’ (28.5%). As far as the ship age is concerned, a ship with 
age from 11 to 15 years has the lowest probability to be involved in ‘collision’(14.8%), 
whereas a more than 20-year-old ship has the highest probability to be involved in 
‘grounding’(27.7%). Although with good vessel condition and the condition of good 
information, the ship associates with ‘collision’, whereas the situation of poor information 
on-board ship exposes the highest risk of ‘grounding’. 
In this way, it demonstrates the influence of the certain state of a single variable on an 
accident type. Moreover, it illustrates how different states of a single variable contribute 
to the probability of a particular accident type. 
In terms of TRI sensitivity analysis, Table 6.6 demonstrates the TRI value of ‘ship age’ 
against collision. Table 6.7 indicates the values of all RIFs for all accidents. Moreover, 
by comparing the updated value of the target node, it is claimed that the model is in line 
with Axiom 1.  
Table 6.6 TRI of a risk variable (ship operation) for collision 
Ship age          
1 2 3 4 5 6 Collision HRI LRI TRI 




100% 0 0 0 0 0 23.6  
 
 
0 100% 0 0 0 0 22.4  
 
 
0 0 100% 0 0 0 14.8    
0 0 0 100% 0 0 15.8    
0 0 0 0 100% 0 16.8    
0 0 0 0 0 100% 29.3    
 
Table 6.7 TRI of risk variables for all accident types 
Node 
TRI 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 Average 
Ship age    7.25 10.38 2.59 2.58 2.45 3.64 2.59 3.03 5.44 4.44 
Ship operation    11.45 7.10 0.94 0.88 4.45 1.75 1.06 4.91 6.09 4.29 
Voyage segment    8.00 6.45 0.72 0.76 2.89 5.02 1.07 2.15 3.30 3.37 
Vessel condition    5.75 0.01 0.09 1.54 2.17 1.26 2.77 1.29 1.70 1.84 
Information          1.55 5.50 0.37 0.66 2.17 3.41 0.14 1.39 3.40 2.06 
 
Specifically, in Table 6.6, the first row denotes the base-case scenario, and the following 
rows represent the different scenarios when each state of the variable reaches 100%. To 
obtain impact levels of such RIFs in accident types, TRIs are compared and ranked. 
Generally, based on Table 6.7, the most important variables for ‘accident types’ are as 
follows: 
Ship age > Ship operation > Voyage segment > Information> Vessel condition 
Ship age is ranked as the most important variable, and vessel condition is ranked as the 
fifth important variable for ‘accident types’. Compared to the results in Chapter 5, it 
shows that the majority of the results remain the same. However, the ship age and vessel 
condition reveal more contribution to the accident types when more human factors are 
considered within their interactions in the model. Both of them are vessel factors, which 





In detail, the most important variables list for different accident types is demonstrated in 
Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 The most important variables  






S1 Collision 3 1 2 4 5 
S2 Grounding 1 2 3 5 4 
S3 Flooding 1 2 3 5 4 
S4 Fire/explosion 1 3 4 2 5 
S5 Capsize 3 1 2 4 4 
S6 Contact/crush 2 4 1 5 3 
S7 Sinking 2 4 3 1 5 
S8 Overboard 2 1 3 5 4 
S9 Others 2 1 3 5 4 
From this point of view, different accident types are correlated to different variable 
priorities. For example, ‘vessel condition’ is the most important RIF for ‘sinking’, but the 
least important RIF for ‘contact/crush’. And ‘ship operation’ contributes more to the 
accidents like ‘collision’, ‘capsize’, and ‘overboard’, than the accidents like ‘sinking’ and 
‘contact/crush’.  
6.5.3 Model validation 
To validate the model, it is examined by testing the combined effect of multiple RIFs to 
the accident types. Accounting for different states of the parent nodes, this study 
calculates the changed value of each state. The ‘information’ is selected as the first node, 
the state generating the highest changed value of state 1 (i.e. collision) in ‘accident type’ 
is increased by 10%, while the state generating the lowest changed value of state 1 in 
‘accident type’ is decreased by 10%. This procedure is written as ‘~10%’ in Table 6.9. 
Then, the same approach is applied to the next RIF, and the integrated changed value is 




included. Similarly, the same updating procedure is applied into the state 2, 3… 9 in 
‘accident type’ respectively, until all states are included. 
The first column of the data in Table 6.9 shows the original values in TAN, and other 
columns state the updated, changed values of results. However, each state of ‘accident 
type’ is calculated separately from each other, i.e. each row is computed through the 
change of states of RIFs in each accident type. From Table 6.9, the updated values of the 
target node are gradually increasing or decreasing along with the continuously changing 
RIFs, so that Axiom 2 is examined. 
Table 6.9 Accident rate of minor change in variables 
Information / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Vessel condition / / ~10% ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Voyage segment / / / ~10% ~10% ~10% 
Ship operation / / / / ~10% ~10% 
Ship age / / / / / ~10% 
S1 20.3 20.4 21.2 21.5 22 22.2 
S2 21.2 21.761 21.765 22 22.2 22.6 
S3 3.69 3.72 3.74 3.76 3.79 3.8 
S4 5.53 5.6 5.8 5.82 5.85 5.91 
S5 11.1 11.3 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 
S6 10.6 10.9 11.1 11.371 11.426 11.6 
S7 4.15 4.16 4.52 4.57 4.61 4.68 
S8 9.22 9.36 9.53 9.61 9.79 9.91 
S9 14.3 14.6 14.86 14.945 15.1 15.3 
6.6 Implications  
The study enables the understanding of differences among critical factors, contributing to 
different types of accidents by incorporating human factors into the analysis. BN 
modelling can also explain the most probable scenario with reference to a particular 
accident type. 




usually, some bars in RIFs are at lower levels, as seen in Figure 6.3. It reveals the most 
probable configuration by assuming the state with the bar at the 100% level for each 
variable. The shorter bars indicate the relatively low probabilities of the other states, given 
that the other variables are in the most probable configuration. In addition, they are scaled 
by the same factor used to bring the longest bar to 100%.  
 
Figure 6.3 Most Probable Explanation for the BN model 
From Figure 6.3, ‘overboard’ is the most probable accident type, as its high occurrence 
frequency indicates, and other RIFs reveal the corresponding most probable states. That 










































































































































































































1) Ship age ‘more than 20’, ship length ‘100m or less’, gross tonnage ‘300GT or less’, in 
‘finishing’ operation and ‘mid-water’ voyage segment with ‘normal’ speed, in ‘good 
condition’, with friendly ergonomic design and correctly operating device, and with 
effective navigational information;  
2) Bad sea condition, during the time from 7:00 to 19:00; 
3) Dysfunctional management system, lack of safety culture. 
With regard to this explanation, it emphasises the critical causal relation between the 
dysfunctional management system and overboard. The management system refers to 
shore management, maintenance management, bridge source management, onboard 
management, port service, inadequate training, emergency drill, etcetera, which is a 
complex system as a significant variable influencing human factors for overboard. 
Besides, the lack of safety culture explains some dangerous behaviours of passengers or 
crew, so as to cause overboard. 






Figure 6.4 Most Probable Explanation for ‘collision’ 
From Figure 6.4, there are multiple 100% bars for ‘hull type’. Typically, when two or 
more states of the same variable have bars that are at the 100% level, it indicates that there 
is more than one configuration with the highest probability (i.e. the configurations have 
equal probability). Then one of the states is to be entered with an artificial finding that 
the variable is in that state, to see how it changes the multiple 100% bars of other variables. 
When accident type is selected in Figure 6.4, there is a high probability for the ‘fishing 
vessel’ to collide under these circumstances: 
1) Ship age ‘more than 20’, ship length ‘100m or less’, gross tonnage ‘300GT or less’, 
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vessel condition’, with friendly ergonomic design and correctly operating device, and 
adequate navigational information; 
2) During the time before 7:00 or after 19:00; 
3) Ineffective supervision or support of operation. 
Under this circumstance, ineffective supervision or support of operation is strongly 
related to the collision. Branch et al. (2004) reported that at least three of the fifteen ships 
which failed to keep a proper lookout at night for collision had lone watchkeepers on the 
bridge. Working isolated or improper supervision increases the risk of human errors in 
navigation compared to operating under supervision.  
By trying each of the possibilities, all the configurations that are at the highest probability 
level are revealed. Table 6.10 illustrates the MPE for all accident types. Although there 
are influences between different RIFs, poor vessel condition such as increasing 
complexity of propulsion arrangements or modification made to vessels size has a strong 
relation to sinking. Insufficient or lack of updated information, such as falsified records 
of information, relies on a single piece of navigational equipment, or without working 
indicators for necessary observing, contributes to grounding, contact, and other incidents. 
Ergonomic impact of innovative bridge design (e.g., visual blind sector ahead, motion 
illusion) is strongly related to fire and sinking. Also, it emphasises several human factor 
related variables under different accident types. For example, there is a high probability 
for a collision to happen under the case of lone watchkeeper or working isolated. 
Grounding usually happens under the circumstance with inadequate risk assessment, 
dysfunctional management system, unclear order from documents, and ineffective 
supervision. The most probable explanation given human factors for flooding is the lack 
of safety culture and precautionary thought. Human factors for capsize are related to lack 
of risk assessment, unclear order, and ineffective supervision. The situation with poor 





Table 6.10 Most Probable Explanation for all accident types 
Variable S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
Ship age    5 5 5 5 1 6 5 5 2 
Ship operation    7 1 5 7 1 7 1 5 2 
Voyage segment    4 2 4 4 5 3 5 4 1 
Vessel condition    1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Information          1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Ship type         4 3 4 4 2 7 2 4 9 
A21        1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Hull type     2 1 2 2 1 1 1 5 1 
Gross tonnage     1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 
A18           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Length        1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Ergonomic design       1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
Sea condition   1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 
A19       1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 
Ship speed      1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Weather condition   1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
A20                   1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 
A6               1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Fairway traffic    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time of day      2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
A12            1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
A2            2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
6.7 Discussion 
Compared to previous studies focusing on causal factors related to the severity and the 
probability of maritime accidents, this study uses a data-driven TAN approach, to 
investigate how different risk factors generate an impact on different types of maritime 
accidents with a focus on human factors. To identify RIFs, maritime accident reports from 
MAIB and TSB within a five-year period of 2012-2017, are extracted and reviewed to 
develop a primary database on maritime accidents. Then the risk-based TAN model is 
constructed to analyse RIFs incorporating human factors in maritime accidents. Lastly, 





According to the calculations of the mutual information, crucial RIFs are ranked under 
different accident types. The results reveal that critical RIFs for maritime accident types 
are ‘ship age’, ‘ship operation’, ‘voyage segment’, ‘information’, and ‘vessel condition’. 
Meanwhile, it is evident that: 
(1) The management system, including shore management, maintenance management, 
bridge source management, onboard management, port service, inadequate training, 
emergency drill etcetera, is a significant variable influencing human factors for overboard. 
Besides, the lack of safety culture explains dangerous behaviours on board, so as to cause 
overboard. 
(2) Ineffective supervision is strongly related to the collision. Working isolated or 
improper supervision increases the risk of human errors in navigation compared to 
operating under supervision. 
(3) Collision tends to happen under the case of lone watchkeeper or working isolated. 
Grounding is a probability under the circumstance with inadequate risk assessment, 
dysfunctional management system, unclear order from documents, and ineffective 
supervision. The most probable explanation given human factors for flooding is the lack 
of safety culture and precautionary thought. Human factors for capsize are related to lack 
of risk assessment, unclear order, and ineffective supervision. The situation with poor 
safety culture, dysfunctional management, and unclear order is strongly associated with 
sinking. 
The scenario analysis provides a plausible explanation for the observed findings, 
revealing the most probable scenario under specific accident type. Therefore, it can help 
identify the potential hazards and effectively assist maritime authorities in developing 




Generally, results from the TAN model present differentiation among the vital human 
factors contributing to different types of accidents, which helps provide the clue for 
accident investigation and generates insights for accident prevention. The stakeholders, 
such as ship owners and maritime authorities, will benefit from the findings and obtain 
the clue for accident investigation and prevention. However, there is a drawback in the 
MPE method for implications. Generally, its results can change with the introduction of 
irrelevant variables, and be deceptive in situations where even the most probable 
explanation is improbable. In addition, there is insufficient evidence to study individual 
factors which do not exist or contain limited information in the raw database, but are 
associated with the mental workload for seafarers. Further work should be conducted to 
propose a way to quantify or measure the mental workload of seafarers to support the 
human factors study. 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 Incorporate human factors into causational analysis of maritime accident types. 
 Develop a historical accident data-driven approach to train prior probabilities in the 
risk-based BN. 
 Conduct an empirical study to provide insights for the prevention of a particular type 





Chapter 7 Mental workload analyses for seafarers in the 
ship bridge 
7.1 Introductory remarks 
From the above human factors research derived from accident reports and works of 
literature, there is still a gap for individual factors which contain limited information in 
the raw database, but are associated with the mental workload for seafarers. This research 
has to find a way to obtain the evidence towards the mental workload of seafarers to 
support the hypothesis of the study. This chapter investigates how mental workload 
influences neurophysiological activation and decision making of experienced and 
inexperienced deck officers concerning collision avoidance. This last was done with 
simulated watch-keeping tasks in a maritime bridge simulator, and using fNIRS 
technology to measure neurophysiological activation. It demonstrates that the developed 
scenario distracted the ship officers by reporting vessel position at specific points, which 
is the common task requiring temporal mental workload in the real world. The results 
show that experienced participants were considered to believe they have better 
performance than inexperienced people. It also illustrates better performance for 
experienced seafarers because they made decisions earlier, which leads to collision 
avoidance successfully. Participants under distraction were considered to require more 
temporal demand than without distraction. In terms of fNIRS data, it shows significant 
differences in the right DLPFC of the brain. Greater oxygenation is found during decision 
time for participants with distraction. Higher oxygenation is observed for experienced 
participants at the end of watchkeeping. 
7.2 Background information 




improperly at sea. Out of nearly 62% of pollution and maritime accidents (Er and Celik, 
2005), human factors were comprised of 30% deck officer error, 7% shore-based 
personnel error, 2% engine officer error, 8% pilot error. Compared to the offshore crews, 
ship officers are faced with higher risks during ship navigation. 
The deck officer is required to obtain plenty of skills, especially non-technical skills, 
including defining problems, managing workload, maintaining the standards of the 
watch-keeping, implementing the best solution, responding to the changes of the 
information, anticipating future events, sending information clearly and concisely, 
maintaining concentration, coping with stressors, etcetera (O'Connor and Long, 2011). 
Therefore, they are supposed to deal with multi-tasks during navigation. Among them, 
watchkeeping is one of the significant duties along the voyage and needs to be done with 
other missions simultaneously, especially for Officers of Watch (OOWs). During this duty, 
OOWs keep a proper lookout to know what is happening near the ship and obtain the 
information from various sensors to be aware of the situation in which they are immersed.  
MAIB stated that of the 1,647 collisions, groundings, contacts and near collisions that 
were reported to MAIB between 1994 and 2003, two-thirds of vessels involved in 
collisions were not keeping a proper lookout (Branch et al., 2004). Watchkeepers have to 
deal with various issues including observing and recording the vessel position at intervals, 
paying attention to the radio or alarm, checking onboard equipment or devices, while they 
do watchkeeping. The workload of deck officers varies along with time and combined 
tasks. Thus, the effective evaluation of the deck officer’s workload during watchkeeping 
will help understand the risk to which seafarers are exposed and improve navigation safety. 
Mental workload is the amount of demands or resources requiring an operator to complete 
specific tasks. Furthermore, the more sophisticated the tasks, the more mental workload 
is required to accomplish the tasks. It has been used in a wide range of applications to 
evaluate the task performance of operators or the practical aspect of system design 




research has been conducted in road traffic accidents (Boyle et al., 2008, Rakauskas et al., 
2008) and aviation transportation (Ayaz et al., 2012, Gateau et al., 2015), seafarers’ mental 
workload analysis in maritime transport is scanty (Lim et al., 2018, Fan et al., 2018).  
Moreover, mental workload has been described as being responsible for the majority of 
road traffic accidents (Dijksterhuis et al., 2011). Both high and low levels cause 
insufficient perception and attention, which in turn leads to driver errors. However, in the 
maritime sector, Lim et al. (2018) suggested the majority of trainees had less workload 
when the experienced captain was present, and the latter had the highest workload levels 
while the former revealed low workload and stress because of the shared work and 
responsibility.  
Mental workload is also linked to the experience of operators. Experienced drivers have 
acquired more effective automation through practice, so that a lower level of mental 
workload was induced compared to novices (Patten et al., 2004). Besides, neuroimaging 
techniques demonstrated increases in PFC activation with increases in mental workload 
(Ayaz et al., 2012). There is a threshold for workload, beyond which it leads to worse 
performance and decreases in PFC activity (Molteni et al., 2008).  
For ship officers, the ship bridge simulator is widely used for crew training and further 
understanding of human factors in these dedicated systems. The IMO utilised the 
simulation for crews’ training based on the simulation training requirements (A-I/6: 
Training and Assessment) in the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
Convention (STCW 78-95). The awareness of the significance of human factors among 
navigation and maritime safety was aroused, and this stimulated studies on human 
performance in the ship bridge, which is commonly conducted in the bridge simulator. 
However human performance in the ship bridge is related to many elements, such as task 
demands, prior experience, personality, voyage segment, workload, etcetera (Ngodang et 




To measure the mental workload of seafarers, especially ship officers, brain activity needs 
to be recorded. Brain activity in the transport field has previously been measured using a 
range of techniques, including fMRI, PET, and EEG. The above three techniques are 
extremely sensitive to motion artefacts, making them difficult to deal with natural 
cognitive tasks in realistic scenarios (Chiarelli et al., 2017). Typically, fMRI and PET 
have physical limitation for participants, requiring them to be in a supine position (Foy et 
al., 2016). EEG has the advantage of greater time resolution. The functional near-infrared 
spectroscopy (fNIRS) is a portable technique for both simulated environment and real-
world operation. Along with the high sensitivity for muscle movement, both EEG and 
fNIRS are susceptible to head movement. However, the use of short-leads for fNIRS can 
isolate effects of blood flow in the scalp. The advantage of fNIRS over EEG is greater 
spatial resolution of the signals and less crosstalk between sites. It is more robust to 
motion artefacts and has a higher temporal resolution (Noah et al., 2015).  
Besides, the hardware cost of fNIRS is significantly lower than most functional brain 
imaging techniques, including fMRI, PET, and EEG (Chiarelli et al., 2017). fNIRS is an 
emerging non-invasive brain imaging modality for measuring and recording cortical 
haemodynamic activity (Fishburn et al., 2014). It will not confine the subject in a small 
space compared to fMRI, and is also able to generate montages covering the whole head 
or precisely the parts of the cortex that contain relevant activations. This functional 
neuroimaging technique can record changes in brain activation by measuring changes in 
the concentration of oxygenated and deoxygenated haemoglobin, which is based on the 
different absorption spectra of near-infrared light. It is a sensitive and consequently 
mature measurement technique for exploring different mental workloads.  
The current research investigates how mental workload influences neurophysiological 
activation and decision-making of experienced and inexperienced deck officers 
concerning collision avoidance. This last was done with simulated watchkeeping tasks in 




However, much of similar research does not use naturalistic tasks in the maritime field, 
and none has focused on differences in DLPFC activity between experienced officers and 
novice officers. Therefore, this study investigates how the mental workload induced by 
scenarios in the ship bridge influences neurophysiological activation and whether there is 
a difference between experienced and inexperienced seafarers, which may generate 
insights for seafarers’ training and certification. 
7.3 Materials and methods 
7.3.1 Participants 
A total of 41 participants were recruited from the Nautical Institute London Branch and 
Liverpool John Moores University. Inclusion of participant recruitment is limited to 
adults (>18 years old), without head injury conditions or suffering from high blood 
pressure since this may affect the results from fNIRS. In the study, any person suffering 
from anxiety condition or receiving medication for anxiety condition is excluded. 
Participants were divided into two groups based on their navigation experience. Twenty 
experienced seafarers whose average age is 44.60 (SD = 15.47) include master mariner 
(MM), chief mate (CM), and officer of the watch (OOW). Twenty-one inexperienced 
seafarers whose average age is 24.76 (SD = 5.25) are AB and cadets. Raw NASA-TLX 
data of 41 participants were kept for behaviour performance analysis. However, there was 
a severe ‘detector saturation’ of data collection for one inexperienced participant. This 
raw fNIRS data was deleted for not being recorded correctly. Therefore 20 pieces of data 
for experienced seafarers who had 213.4 months (SD=188.8) experience at sea, and 20 
for inexperienced seafarers who had 27.2 months (SD=30.5) experience at sea, were 
obtained for further analysis, see Table 7.1. Exclusion criteria included: history of head 
injury, high blood pressure, anxiety or currently taking medication for anxiety.  




Group Average age (year) STCW qualification Experience at sea (month) 
Experienced 44.60 (SD = 15.47) MM,CM,OOW 213.4 (SD=188.8) 
Inexperienced 24.76 (SD = 5.25) AB, Cadets 27.2 (SD=30.5) 
The experimental procedure is in accordance with the principles set out in the Declaration 
of Helsinki and was reviewed and approved by the ethics committee at Liverpool John 
Moores University. The experimental protocol for the study was approved by the 
institutional ethics committee prior to data collection. All participants received a full 
explanation of the purpose, procedures, risks, and benefits of the experiment. They were 
provided written informed consent for participation and well trained for the study. More 
details are demonstrated in Appendix B. 
7.3.2 Bridge simulator and scenarios 
The experiment took place in a ship bridge simulator (Transas) fitted with instrument 
panels located at Liverpool John Moores University. An illustration of the participant 
view of the facility is provided in Figure 7.1A. The Transas simulator is configurable for 
specific ship types using ship-modelling software which manages the simulation 
environment, allowing for positioned interactive tides, currents, geographically-variable 
wind, and sea, and changing conditions such as light, visibility, fog and rain. The bridge 
simulator can deliver a 360° field-of-view but the display was constrained to a 180° field-
of-view for the purpose of the current study for two reasons: (1) the scenario involved 
watchkeeping in the forward view only, and (2) it tried to avoid significant movement of 
the head and upper body to minimize artifacts in the fNIRS data.  
The task scenario was designed to occur along a North/South axis to better accommodate 
a realistic reporting system that kept the participant occupied in a time framework. All 




watchkeeping period was terminated when participants spotted a ‘target’ vessel that 
appeared randomly at one of 10 locations in the field of view, see Figure 7.1B. The target 
















Figure 7.1 (A) View of the participant in the ship bridge simulator, (B) The position of the target vessel 
appeared from 10 different directions in the exercise 




under the case of lone watchkeeper or working isolated. Hence the exercise for this 
chapter was conducted for lone watchkeeper under the collision avoidance scenario. 
Participants were required to press the button of the buzzer when they spotted the target 
vessel. And its approximate location was recorded by the staff in the control room. On 
average, this duration of this watchkeeping phase of the task was 19min:42sec. The 
distance in nautical miles between the target vessel and the participants’ ship when the 
former was spotted was captured as a dependent variable. The target vessel approached 
the participants’ ship on a course that would lead to a collision if the participant failed to 
make an evasive manoeuvre. Once participants had spotted the target vessel, the scenario 
enters a decision-making phase that was terminated when the participants made the 
evasive manoeuvre; the experiment also ended at this point. On average, all participants 
made an evasive manoeuvre at 24min: 26sec; the distance in nautical miles between target 
vessel and participants’ ship when the manoeuvre was made was recorded as a dependent 
variable. 
To generate different task demands, the navigation scenarios in the study were formed 
into two mental workload levels based on the experts’ opinions, who are an experienced 
captain and chief mate.  
In addition to the scenario described in the previous section, half of the participants (10 
experienced and 10 inexperienced) were required to perform an additional reporting task 
as a distractor. This task was based on existing maritime reporting procedures and 
participants were required to make a verbal report of the position of their vessel, then 
followed by replying questions from the control room, i.e. vessel’s flag, type of vessel, 
speed, IMO number. Participants in the distraction group were required to make this 
verbal report whenever the position of their vessel had changed by 10 degrees of longitude, 




7.3.3 fNIRS montage and data collection 
In this study, the montage (Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3) was designed using NIRSite software. 
To measure the haemodynamic activity of DLPFC which is associated with brain 
functions of working memories and decision-making, 7 sources and 7 detectors were 
utilised to design the montage, resulting in a total of 15 channels of HbO and HbR. In the 
montage, the specific brain area has been divided into three sub-areas: left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, left DLPFC (channel 1-5); central dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, central 
DLPFC (channel 6-10); right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right DLPFC (channel 11-
15). 
 
Figure 7.2 fNIRS probe placement - 2D montage, where red point refers to ‘Source’, blue point refers to 





Figure 7.3 fNIRS probe placement - 3D montage, where red point refers to ‘Source’, blue point refers to 
‘Detector’, and red lines refer to channels in the montage 
The software used for recording the fNIRS data is the NIRStar, and nirsLAB software 
was used for the pre-processing of fNIRS data. The fNIRS device was placed on the desk 
behind the participant in the bridge simulator. Care was taken to avoid hair from the 
eyebrows or side of the head interfering with detectors and sources. 
7.3.4 Questionnaires 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were required to complete a brief form 
prior to the experiment recruitment. This form was used to record the participant’s age, 
gender, nationality, and seafarer experience. The experience was measured by the 
qualification license they obtained.  
To conduct the questionnaires, an extended NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire 
(see Appendix A) was completed after the scenario. The participant was supposed to 




questions referring to six different scales, followed by adding their other information and 
experience. The questionnaires were completed based on their feelings of the whole test. 
Once the participant carefully filled the form, it was returned to the researcher for further 
analysis.  
The questionnaire is a self-assessed measure based on six 10-point scales, with 1 being 
“Very Low” and 10 “Very High.” The scales are Mental Demand, Physical Demand, 
Temporal Demand, Performance, Effort, and Frustration. They also gave additional 
information about education degree, STCW qualification, and practical maritime 
seafaring experience (month or year). On the other hand, the staff in the control room next 
to the simulator recorded the target spotted time with corresponding distance (distance 1), 
and the course changed time with corresponding distance (distance 2). The above 
information and questionnaires were used to analyse behavioural performance and task 
load. 
7.3.5 Experiment procedure 
The experiment used a mixed design, where two groups of participants were allocated to 
1) experienced group and 2) inexperienced group, depending on their STCW qualification 
and nautical experience. Specifically, the experienced group included master mariner 
(MM), chief mate (CM), and officer of the watch (OOW), while the inexperienced group 
contained AB and cadets. Both groups underwent the scenario with the timeline of 
baseline, watchkeeping, and decision-making. However, it was presented in 1) non-
distraction condition or 2) distraction condition. The non-distraction condition was shown 
in the above workflow. The distraction condition was demonstrated by setting the 
reporting points (Rn) at the same intervals while watch-keeping and decision-making. It 
distracted the participants' attention by requiring them to report the vessel's position every 
10' of difference in longitude, as well as answering the questions from the staff in the 

















Spot the ship Alter the course
...R1 R2 R3 ... Rn
 
(B) 
Figure 7.4 The fNIRS data collection procedure for (A) non-distraction group and (B) distraction group, 
where R1 is reporting point 1, n represents reporting times 
The participant wore the NIRx Sport apparatus, which is an fNIRS skull - cap containing 
infrared sensors and detectors allowing the operator to see the blood volume, oxygenated 
and deoxygenated blood flow in the DLPFC indicating how the state of seafarers changes 
during the navigation scenario and showing what is the difference between experienced 
and inexperienced. The scenario lasted on average no longer than 30 minutes. Then the 
NASA- TLX questionnaire was collected after each scenario. 
7.3.6 Performance evaluation 
Subjective data from questionnaires were analysed for performance evaluation. The 
analysis is to determine whether distraction influenced the time when participants spotted 
the ship and altered the course, and whether there was difference between experienced 
and inexperienced deck officers. 2 (distraction) × 2 (experience) analysis of variances 
(ANOVAs) were conducted for the time and distance when participants spotted the vessel, 




to observe whether the position of the target vessel influenced the performance of deck 
officers. 
7.3.7 fNIRS data pre-processing 
Raw fNIRS data (15 channels × 2 wavelengths) was pre-processed using nirsLAB 
software. The Interpolate function was used to fill the data in each channel where there 
was detector saturation. However, for those channels which lost too much data, this 
function was not applicable. Then the data quality function was applied to check and 
identify any ‘poor quality’ channels in which the signal was too weak. After removing 
discontinuities (STD threshold is 5) and spike artefacts (artefacts replaced by nearest 
signals), a low-pass filter was applied in order to reduce high-frequency instrument noise 
and physiological noise such as fast cardiac oscillations (e.g. heartbeat 1~1.5Hz) with the 
frequency of 0.04Hz. The pre-processed data was imported for haemodynamic states 
calculation using the modified Beer-Lambert law (Sassaroli and Fantini, 2004). It reveals 
changes in oxygenated haemoglobin (HbO), deoxygenated haemoglobin (HbR) and total 
haemoglobin (Hb). It should be noted that HbO and HbR tend to be most highly correlated 
with other neuroimaging measures such as the fMRI measured blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) response (Huppert et al., 2006, Schroeter et al., 2006, Foy et al., 2016), 
and strong correlations with HbO and Hb have also been found (Strangman et al., 2002). 
All fNIRS results were reported in micromoles (μM). The focus of this study highlights 
HbO. 
7.3.8 Data analysis 
For fNIRS data analysis, there was a transformation on the data called Correlation-Based 
Signal Improvement (CBSI) that forces HbO and HbR to be negatively correlated and 
controls for head movement, which was developed by Cui et al. (2010). As HbR is 





The analysis was conducted to investigate how distraction influenced neurophysiological 
activation and decision-making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers with respect 
to collision avoidance. Moreover, it determined whether there were differences between 
left, central, and right DLPFC activity. However, the HbO in the baseline period of the 
experiment procedure revealed that the majority of participants had active brain activities, 
which was opposite to the expectation of the experiment design. Because the heavy fog 
over the sea introduced uncertainty for professional seafarers who were more conscious 
of the navigational environment, reflecting active mental states of seafarers. Therefore, 
the baseline data was ignored and deleted. In order to create ANOVA models for statistical 
testing, the 15 channels of HbO were divided into three regions of interest: left DLPFC 
(channel 1-5); central DLPFC (channel 6-10); right DLPFC (channel 11-15) (Figure 7.2). 
In addition, the period of watchkeeping during the task scenario was divided into four 
periods of equal duration for each participant (w1, w2, w3, w4) and the decision-making 
phase of the task was divided into two periods of equal duration (d1,d2), seen in Figure 
7.5.  
Baseline Watchkeeping Decision
w1 w2 w3 w4 d1 d2
 
Figure 7.5 Averaged fNIRS data in the procedure 
7.4 Results 
The results section is divided into two sections: subjective mental workload and 
behavioural data, and the average level of HbO at specific sites. Data are subjected to 
statistical analyses via ANOVA and MANOVA models. Outliers are defined as any data 




positive or negative direction. For those models with a repeated-measures component, 
sphericity is tested using Mauchly’s Test and the Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment is 
performed. The average levels of HbO are obtained in MATLAB software, and the 
analysis is conducted in SPSS software. 
7.4.1 Subjective mental workload and behavioural data 
Raw TLX data scores from 1 to 10 were used for analysis, as they are more sensitive than 
other methods of data treatment such as scale weighting (C. Hendy et al., 1993). Between 
distraction and non-distraction groups, one-way ANOVAs showed a main effect of 
distraction for Temporal Demand (‘How much time pressure?’) (F(1, 39) = 4.229, p 
= .046; Figure 7.6A). Participants under distraction (M = 5.05, SD = 2.139) were 
considered to require more temporal demand than participants without distraction (M = 
3.76, SD = 1.868). There was no disadvantage on any performance indicators for 
distracted participants. However, performance (‘How successful were you at meeting the 
goals of the task?’) showed a significant main effect of experience (F(1, 39) = 11.0342, p 
= .002; Figure 7.6B). Experienced participants (M = 9.05, SD = .945) were considered to 
have better performance than inexperienced people (M = 7.86, SD = 1.315). And 
experienced participants were more confident/did not work as hard (effort). Between 
experienced and inexperienced groups, one-way ANOVAs showed there was not 
significant effect for Distance 1 (F(1, 39) = .438, p = .512). No advantage for spotting 








Figure 7.6 NASA-TLX scores (A) Temporal demand - ‘How much time pressure did you feel due to the 
pace at which task elements occurred?’ - scores in NASA-TLX (B) Performance - ‘How successful do 
you think you were in completing the goals of the task?’ - scores and Effort - ‘How hard did you have to 
work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance?’ - scores in NASA-TLX  
There was no statistically significant interaction effect between experience and distraction 
on the combined dependent variables (p > .05). From MANOVAs results, the estimated 
marginal means for the dependent variables ‘Distance 1 – distance when target spotted’ 
and ‘Distance 2 – distance when manoeuvre executed’ were shown in Figure 7.7A and 



























2 = .114). The distance of two ships when experienced participants changed the 
course (Distance 2) (M = 2.755, SD = .298) was farther than the distance when 
inexperienced participants did (M = 1.847, SD = .291), shown in Figure 7.7C. It 




























Figure 7.7 (A) Distance 1 – distance when target spotted, (B) Distance 2 – distance when manoeuvre 
executed, (C) Distance when manoeuvre executed (Distance 2) for experienced and inexperienced groups 
Exercises in the experiment were selected randomly from 10 samples which were in the 
same scenario but from 10 different directions, seen in Figure 7.1. One-way ANOVAs 
were also conducted to analyse whether there was a significant difference in the exercise 
for the subjective mental workload. It showed there was not significant effect of exercise 
direction for Distance 1 (F(9, 31) = 1.057, p = .420), Distance 2 (F(9, 31) = .681, p = .720), 
Mental Demand (F(9, 31) = .590, p = .795), Physical Demand (F(9, 31) = .827, p = .596), 
Temporal Demand (F(9, 31) = 1.423, p = .221), Performance (F(9, 31) = 2.086, p = .062), 
Effort (F(9, 31) = .604, p = .784), or Frustration (F(9, 31) = .887, p = .548). It revealed 
that the experimental design of randomly selecting directions that the ship appears from, 
did not affect the mental workload or behavioural performance. 
7.4.2 Average level of HbO at specific sites 
There were in total 40 participants’ fNIRS data which was valid for the analysis.  
The fNIRS data were divided into three Regions Of Interest (ROI) corresponding to the 














oxygenated haemoglobin (HbO) data were averaged for each period of the task, i.e. four 
periods of watchkeeping and the two periods of decision making. HbO data for each ROI 
were subjected to a 2 (experienced/inexperienced) x 2 (distraction/no-distraction) x 6 
(task period) ANOVA.   
Analyses of left-lateral and medial ROI failed to reveal any statistically significant main 
effects or interactions. However, analysis of HbO data from the right-lateral ROI revealed 
a significant main effect for Task Period [F(5,30) = 3.76, p=.02, ηp
2=0.4], as well as 
significant interactions between Distraction x Task Period [F(5,30) = 3.99, p<.01, 
ηp
2=0.43] and Experience x Task Period [F(5,30) = 2.30, p=.05, ηp
2=0.27]. Post-hoc 
testing indicated that average HbO at the right-lateral ROI was significantly lower during 
W3 and W4 than all other periods (p<.05); this effect is illustrated in Figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.8 Mean HbO and standard error during all Task Periods for Right-Lateral ROI (N=38), i.e. 2 
participants were omitted as outliers from this model. 
A number of post-hoc t-tests were conducted to analyse the two interaction effects. It was 
found that average HbO was significantly higher for participants who performed the 




had been spotted: D1 [t(36)=2.17, p=.04], D2 [t(36)=2.69, p=.02]. This effect is illustrated 
in Figure 7.9. 
 
Figure 7.9 Average HbO/standard error in the Right-Lateral ROI for Task Period x Distraction Interaction 
(N=38) 
The interaction effect between Experience x Task Period was also explored using t-tests.  
These tests revealed that average HbO was higher for experienced participants at the 
right-lateral ROI, but only during the fourth period of watchkeeping (W4) when the ship 





Figure 7.10 Average HbO/standard error in the Right-Lateral ROI for Task Period x Experience 
Interaction (N=38). Note: ** = significant difference at p<.01 
7.5 Discussion 
This research aimed to investigate how mental workload influences neurophysiological 
activation and decision-making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers with respect 
to collision avoidance, both of which have been linked to human performance during 
navigation and also changes in DLPFC activity. 
With respect to the behavioural data, experienced participants were considered to believe 
they have better performance than inexperienced people do. Due to sufficient training and 
outstanding experience, experienced seafarers who have a higher level of STCW 
qualifications also believed they had better performance. In addition, experienced 
seafarers tended to change the course earlier than inexperienced participants did when 
they faced the collision condition. It also illustrates better performance for experienced 
seafarers because they made decisions prior to an event, which leads to successful 
collision avoidance. Meanwhile, participants under distraction were considered to require 




developed scenario distracted the ship officers by reporting vessel position at certain 
points, which is the common task requiring temporal mental workload in the real world.  
Generally, research has demonstrated a correlation between brain activity and 
performance of a task (Ullman et al., 2014). Right-lateral ROI showed increased 
oxygenation during the decision phase of the task, due to a more significant mental 
workload/decision-making – there was some evidence that decreased oxygenation during 
w3 and w4 was due to boredom. Greater oxygenation was found during decision time for 
participants with distraction, because of higher workload when simultaneously 
performing a distraction task and making the decision to change course. Higher 
oxygenation was observed for experienced participants at the end of watchkeeping, due 
to more considerable attention being focused on the duty – which may have contributed 
to superior performance. 
From the perspective of designed scenarios in the bridge simulator, actually, zero 
visibility was proved to be invalid for the baseline design, as experienced seafarers tend 
to be more cautious about the environment with uncertainty, which is opposed to the 
expectation that they will be relaxed. Because seafarers were not told whether the ship 
appeared in the baseline phase or not. The heavy fog over the sea introduced uncertainty 
for professional seafarers who were more conscious of the navigational environment, 
reflecting active mental states of seafarers. Therefore, the baseline data which did not  
meet expectations was deleted in this study.  
The current study was not without a number of significant limitations. The task simulation 
used during the experiment was highly simplistic and designed to facilitate collection of 
neurophysiological data. It could be argued that the ecological validity of the simulation 
was compromised by our desire to reduce artefacts in the fNIRS data. For example, the 
task simulation failed to accommodate any aspect of team work, which is the more 
common operational situation on the bridge of a large ship; in addition, watchkeeping 




and running communications tasks. These characteristics of high workload multi-tasks 
are typically found in the real world, which is also the environments that demonstrate the 
highest accident rates (Foy et al., 2016). In addition, the decision not to utilize the 360° 
field-of-view capability in the bridge simulator (once again in order to minimize the 
influence of physical artifacts in the fNIRS signal) was problematic, as it enormously 
simplified and artificially constrained the challenge of the vigilance task in a maritime 
environment. Our decision to seat participants at the helm of the vessel was also 
uncharacteristic of the bridge environment and participants were seated to minimize those 
systemic influences on the fNIRS signal that were likely to occur if the participants were 
standing and ambulatory. 
Moreover, complicated or combined tasks such as introducing weather forecast or 
communication while watchkeeping could be used to manipulate mental workload in a 
naturalistic navigation task.  
In conclusion, the results of this study support fNIRS as a valuable neuroimaging 
technique which can be used in realistic situations such as ship navigation and could be 
implemented in the assessment and prediction of ship officer overload and subsequent 
manoeuvre (Franceschini et al., 2007). This research achieves its aim of investigating 
deck officers’ mental workload during watchkeeping and decision – making.  
7.6 Ethics statement 
This study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of Liverpool John 
Moores University with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave 
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol 




7.7 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 It was done with simulated watch-keeping tasks in the maritime bridge simulator, and 
using fNIRS technology to measure neurophysiological activation.  
 The results show that experienced participants were considered to believe they have 
better performance than inexperienced people do. It also illustrates better 
performance for experienced seafarers because they made decisions earlier, which 
leads to successful collision avoidance.  
 Participants under distraction were considered to require more temporal demand than 
those without distraction.  
 In terms of fNIRS data, it shows significant differences in the right DLPFC of the 
brain. Greater oxygenation was found during decision time for participants with 






Chapter 8 Functional connectivity analyses for seafarers 
using bridge simulation 
8.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter was done further with simulated watchkeeping tasks in the maritime bridge 
simulator and fNIRS technology to measure neurophysiological activation. Besides the 
mental workload and fNIRS data analysis in Chapter 7, this chapter conducts the 
functional connectivity analyses for seafarers with bridge simulation. The results show 
that reduced connection density and a higher level of local clustering across a frontal 
montage of 15 channels was associated with action selection in comparison to the earlier 
watchkeeping period of vigilant attention. Activity in the right DLPFC and the level of 
local clustering decline across the watchkeeping period for participants. The study also 
demonstrates a significant association between connection density and behavioural 
responses to a safety-critical scenario. 
8.2 Background information 
Brain changes may indicate evident changes in haemodynamic concentration measured 
by fNIRS according to a study on the association between haemoglobin levels and white 
matter conducted by Rozanski et al. (2014). More specifically, the increases in prefrontal 
activation are associated with increases in development by using fNIRS (Schroeter et al., 
2004, Franceschini et al., 2007), which also have been found using fMRI (Adleman et al., 
2002).  
Brain activity has a linear relationship with the working memory load of the left and right 
prefrontal cortex (Fishburn et al., 2014). Statistically different levels of oxygenation 




task difficulty were not reliably differentiated in some cases (Ayaz et al., 2012). In this 
way, fNIRS can be used to design optode holders to analyse the region of interest (ROI) 
for the investigated tasks. 
The current research investigates how functional connectivity changes when measuring 
the mental workload of seafarers by fNIRS, which explains neurophysiological activation 
and decision-making of experienced and inexperienced deck officers. This last was done 
further with simulated watch-keeping tasks described in Chapter 7.  
8.3 Materials and methods 
8.3.1 Participants 
A total of 41 participants were recruited from the Nautical Institute London Branch and 
Liverpool John Moores University, as demonstrated in Chapter 7. And 40 sets of data 
were used for the analysis in this chapter. 
8.3.2 fNIRS data  
Raw fNIRS data were collected and pre-processed from Chapter 7. The first step of the 
data analysis was obtained from Section 7.3.7, followed by network analysis. 
8.3.3 Functional connectivity 
In order to find out how brain connectivity changes during the periods, a functional 
connection network was generated. Network analysis was performed on HbO after CBSI 
treatment of the signals in Chapter 7. The functional connection between pairs of brain 
regions demonstrated the temporal correlation of regional haemodynamics. Concerning 
functional connection, symmetric correlation matrices were obtained from the partial 




task period, shown in Figure 8.1A. The rows and columns of the matrix represented the 
channels, while cells of the matrix reflected the correlation coefficient of the 
corresponding channels, explaining the connectivity between channels.  
Among these matrices, there were cells with weak links representing spurious 
connections between pairs of brain regions, where they should be discarded by 
thresholding (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). On the other hand, cells with strong links 
represent significant connections and reveal reliable information on the patterns of brain 
activities, where they should be kept for next-step analysis. Therefore, it was necessary 
to decide on a threshold level for the correlation scores to demonstrate where the strong 
connections are. Moreover, it should be a consistent procedure for threshold calculation 
for each participant across all task periods. 
In order to obtain the reasonable standard for threshold calculation, various threshold 
levels were calculated to compare with each other, and then the percentile distribution of 
all correlation values was obtained. Specifically, a very liberal threshold (10th percentile), 
a more conservative threshold (50th percentile) and extremely conservative threshold (90th 
percentile) were selected. The percentiles determined the absolute threshold values for 
each participant across all task periods. There were many connections for the liberal 








(B) P=10th ,50th ,90th percentiles  
 
(C) 
Figure 8.1 Constructing a binary functional connection network from fNIRS-data, (A) Partial correlation 
coefficients were calculated for all pairwise combinations of channels to obtain a symmetrical cross-
correlation matrix, (B) Binary adjacency matrices were calculated by thresholding along with different 
threshold values, (C) Functional connection networks were described by the adjacency matrices 
It is noticed that all negative correlation values should be eliminated before conducting 
thresholding, as its influence on the functional connectivity was not considered (Rubinov 
and Sporns, 2010). Only coefficients greater than or equal to the chosen threshold value 
were kept as connections assigned with a value of 1. Otherwise, the coefficient was 
replaced with 0, which creates a binary adjacency matrix (in Figure 8.1B). Furthermore, 
it created a cross-correlation matrix to represent these data in a visualisation. In this way, 
the functional connectivity network was developed by adjacency matrices, seen in Figure 
8.1C, which explained the activities of the specific area of the brain by various parameters 




Unlike those authors, the analysis of functional connectivity in this study was based upon 
a matrix of partial correlations, i.e. the association between two channels of HbO while 
controlling for the effect of all remaining 13 channels. A matrix of partial r values was 
calculated for all 15 channels of HbO for each of the six periods (watch1, watch2, watch3, 
watch4, decision1, decision2) for each participant.   
A process of thresholding was applied in order to construct a binary functional connection 
network based on these matrices of partial correlations. The first step of this analysis was 
to remove any partial correlation coefficients that fell below zero so only positive 
associations were considered as part of the thresholding process. A criterion level of 0.28 
was selected in order to remove weak or spurious levels of correlation, this value 
represents the critical value for a one-tailed test of Pearson’s coefficient at p<.05 for N=40. 
This process of thresholding converted the original matrices of partial correlations into 
binary adjacency matrices that were suitable for graph-theoretic analyses. 
8.3.4 Graph theory 
In order to reflect the characteristics of the above networks, there are two most commonly 
used parameters (Racz et al., 2017) to describe it in graph theory: the connection density 
(D), and the clustering coefficient (C). This study used these two parameters to describe 
the functional connectivity for brains. 
The connection density of a network is the fraction of the existing connections to all 
possible connections, which is used to describe the overall ‘wiring cost’ of the given 











between channel i and j, 0 otherwise.  
In addition, the local clustering coefficient for an individual node is a parameter to define 
the fraction of its neighbours which are also neighbours of each other (Watts and Strogatz, 
1998), i.e. reflecting the number of triangles around the given node (Rubinov and Sporns, 










Where ki is the degree of channel i, C is how the neighbouring channels in the network 
form connected groups.  
The above functions for the graph theory metrics were obtained from the Brain 
Connectivity Toolbox (Rubinov and Sporns, 2010). Statistics were performed with IBM 
SPSS statistics 26 with differences considered significant in the case of p<0.05. Measures 
of D and C were calculated per participant for each period of the task and subjected to 
statistical testing. 
8.4 Results 
Activation of the PFC is assessed using a 15-channel fNIRS montage. Partial correlations 
of each channel across all periods are calculated, followed by the selection of the 
threshold. Then 2 (Experienced/Inexperienced) x 2 (Distraction/No Distraction) x 6 (Task 
Period) ANOVA is performed on density and clustering. Outliers are defined as any data 
point that lay more than 3 standard deviations from the mean for that ‘cell’ in either a 
positive or negative direction. 
8.4.1 Brain connectivity in networks 




from the partial correlation coefficients of all pairwise combinations of the 15 channels, 
which illustrates the information transaction between each channel of the montage 
designed in Chapter 7.  
In order to visualise connections between each pair of channels, partial correlation 
coefficients are given to generate the heatmap of each task period from w1 to d2. Then 
the percentile distribution of all correlation values is given. It is demonstrated for the 
selection of rational thresholding value, which will describe the patterns of brain 
connectivity. Similarly as reported in relevant studies (Friston et al., 1993), an inverse 
relationship is observed between the parameters and the threshold, i.e. an increase in the 
threshold decreases the number of existing channels in the network. By looking through 
matrices from various threshold values, the pattern is observed that the matrices with 
thresholds 50th and 90th percentiles reveal relatively fewer white squares, which is lack of 
enough links and information for functional connectivity analysis. Therefore, the 
threshold below 50th percentile is considered to be explored further to reveal the 
differences between groups. 
Combined with the graph theory in Section 8.3.4, the calculation of density and clustering 
parameters narrows down the range of threshold selection. It is found that the clustering 
coefficients in the network become smaller and smaller when the white squares in 
matrices decrease. It is clear that at 40th percentile, most of the clustering scores are zero, 
so either 20th or 30th percentile is used in this study. Finally, 20th percentile is selected to 
reveal brain connectivity in networks.  
Based on the procedures of calculating absolute threshold for each participant, the same 
method is applied for each group. Calculations are conducted to demonstrate and compare 
brain connectivity between distraction and non-distraction groups, or between 
experienced and inexperienced groups.  




compared to a non-distraction group, implying that more activation across the network is 
found for the distraction group overall. Each task period reflects the same phenomenon 
as well. Specifically, w1 shows an apparently higher density of white squares for the 
distraction group, which means the reporting mission on board led to activation across 
the network at the beginning of watchkeeping. Similarly, task periods d1 and d2 are 
observed to show the difference between the two groups. Participants of the distraction 
group have to simultaneously decide whether and when to alter the course while reporting 
the vessel’s position, and while answering the navigational questions to the VTS, which 











Figure 8.2 Cross-correlation matrix of distraction and non-distraction groups (w1, w2, w3, w4, d1, d2 for 
the task periods; ND for non-distraction, D for distraction) 
As shown in Figure 8.3, the experienced group shows relatively equal white squares in 
overall. However, for each task period, they are slightly different. The numbers of white 
squares reveal a slight difference in w4 task period. It demonstrates more activations in 
the network for the experienced group than the inexperienced one at the end of the 
watchkeeping period, which illustrates that inexperienced participants are subject to  
boredom after a relatively long-time watchkeeping, so as to cause low cognitive demands. 
Moreover, task period d2 implies decision-making action. The inexperienced group 
shows more connections than experienced people, which means it costs more activations 














Figure 8.3 Cross-correlation matrix of experienced and inexperienced groups (w1, w2, w3, w4, d1, d2 for 
the task periods; IE for inexperienced, E for experienced) 
8.4.2 Functional connectivity analyses 
From the above observations in the squares, it is not statistical to describe the patterns of 
brain connectivity. In order to illustrate features of the connection network in more detail, 
calculations of network parameters per each participant across all task periods are 
conducted in MATLAB software and analysed in SPSS.  
However, when partial correlations are calculated based on different thresholds, which 
provides a unique score of correlation between 2 variables while adjusting for all other 
correlations, the network is insensitive for the high thresholds. A criterion level of 0.28 
was selected in order to remove weak or spurious levels of correlation, this value 
represents the critical value for a one-tailed test of Pearson’s coefficient at p<.05 for N=40.  
A 2 (high/low experience) x 2 (distraction/no distraction) x 6 (task period) ANOVA was 
conducted on the measure of connection density (D). This model revealed a significant 
main effect for task period [F(5, 28) = 15.88, p < .01, ηp
2=0.33], but no significant effects 
for either experience level [F(1, 32) = 0.97, p = .33] or distraction [F(1, 32) = 0.82, p 
= .37]. Post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed a significant decline of D during both decision-
making periods of the task compared to the four watch-keeping periods [p<.01]. 
Descriptive statistics for connection density over the six periods of the task are provided 
in Figure 8.4. There was only one significant interaction effect in the ANOVA model, 
which indicated an effect between Distraction and Task Period [F(5, 28) = 3.15, p = .03, 
ηp




increase of D during the fourth period of watchkeeping (w4) for those participants in the 
no-distraction group compared to the distraction group [t(34)=2.97, p<.01]. In addition, 
the significant trend over the six periods of the task differed for the distraction group in 
comparison to the main effect observed in Figure 8.4, i.e. there was no significant 
difference between w4 and either of the two decision periods (Figure 8.5). 
 
Figure 8.4 Average levels of D (Connection Density) with standard error across all fNIRS channels for six 





Figure 8.5 Interaction between distraction group x task periods for mean D (connection density) across all 
fNIRS channels for six periods of the task (N=36). Note: ** = significant difference at p<.01 
The same 2 x 2 x 6 ANOVA was conducted on the mean clustering coefficient. There 
were no significant main effects for either Experience or Distraction, but a significant 
effect was found with respect to Task Period [F(5,28) = 2.60, p = .05, ηp
2=0.32 ]. Post-
hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that: (i) C was significantly higher during decision1 
compared to watchkeeping periods w3 and w4 (p<.01), (ii) C was significantly higher 
during decision2 compared to w4 (p<.01), and (iii) C was significantly lower during w4 





Figure 8.6 Average levels of C (clustering) across all fNIRS channels for six periods of the task (N=36) 
It also produced one significant interaction between Distraction and Task Period [F(5, 28) 
= 2.79, p = .04, ηp
2=0.34]. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that the clustering coefficient was 
significantly lower at w4 compared to w1 [t(17)=-2.21, p=.04] and d2 [t(17)=-1.98, p=.05] 





Figure 8.7 Interaction between distraction group x task periods for mean C (clustering) across all fNIRS 
channels for six periods of the task (N=36) 
In order to understand the patterns of functional connectivity observed in the graph 
theoretic analyses, data from the binary adjacent matrices were combined into a 
visualisation based on the arc diagram (Figure 8.8). The purpose of this visualisation was 
to indicate the relative frequency of individual connections across the participant group 
as a whole; specificially, it is to identify which connections and patterns of connections 
were most prominent across the six periods of the task. In these figures, the colour code 
represent the number of participants for whom a particular connection passed the 
threshold of partial r=0.28. A red connection denotes a connection that was observed in 
22 of our participants or more, the orange lines indicate the presence of a connection for 
17 to 21 of our participants, the green for 13-16 participants and the blue for less than 12 
participants. Hence, colours do not correspond to the strength of each connection but 
rather the relative frequency of that connection within our participant group. 
When describing the observed patterns within each period of the task, it focuses on those 
connections that were most prominent for the group, i.e. red and orange lines. The first 
period of watchkeeping (w1) indicates a high frequency of local clustering (i.e. red/orange 
lines between adjacent sites) with a smaller proportion of bilateral connections. This 
pattern of local clustering persisted into the second period (w2) but the relative frequency 
of bilateral connections was observed to increase. During w3, the number of adjacent and 
bilateral connections was observed to decline, particularly with respect to the former. The 
fourth spell of watchkeeping (w4) represented the period when participants spotted 
another vessel in the distance; this episode was characterized by an increased frequency 
of bilateral connections. During the first period of the decision-making phase of the task 
(d1), a general decrease of frequent connections is observed; there is local clustering at 
the lateral areas of the frontal cortex on both left (F5/F7-AF7/F5, F6/F8-AF8/F8) and in 
the fronto-central as well as a small number of bilateral connections (AF7/AF3-AF4/AF8). 




performance of an evasive manoeuvre. During this period, the most frequent connections 
within the group were clustered around the fronto-central region (Fz, F1, F2, F3, F4) with 
a small number of bilateral connections at the left/right edges of the montage, e.g. AF7, 
F7, AF8, F8. 
(a) Watch 1 
 





(c) Watch 3 
 





(e) Decision 1 
 






Figure 8.8 Data visualisation showing relative frequency of significant connections observed in the 
adjacency matrices across all six task periods (N=36). Labels correspond to 10-20 locations of the fNIRS 
channels. Colour key indicates the number of participants who exhibited a significant partial correlation 
coefficient for this connection, i.e. red = 22 participants or more, orange = 17-21 participants etc 
8.4.3 Relationship between functional connectivity and 
behaviours 
A regression analysis was conducted to explore whether behavioural data could be 
predicted on the basis of functional connectivity metrics, e.g. density, clustering.  
Behavioural data were obtained from two period of the task: w4 (i.e. distance at which 
target vessel was spotted) and d2 (i.e. distance from the target vessel when course was 
changed). Two linear regression models were created, one for w4 and another for d2, each 





The regression analysis conducted on data from w4 revealed a R2 of 0.29 (Adj R2 = 0.25), 
which was a significant model [F(2,34)=6.79, p<.01]. Detailed inspection of the model 
(Table 8.1) revealed that increased density and clustering were both associated with the 
target vessel being spotted at greater distance from participant’s ship. From the model, it 
appeared that density was the stronger predictor of distance relative to clustering (Table 
8.1). The same model was applied to equivalent data from d2; this model also reached 
statistical significance [F(2,34)=8.07,p<.01] with a R2 value of 0.33 (Adj R2 = 0.29). The 
model revealed an inverse relationship between density and distance to the target vessel 
(Table 8.1). 
Table 8.1 Results of the linear regression models with distance to Target Vessel as the dependent variable 
 Watch 4 (w4) model Decision 2 (d2) model 
t Std. ß partial r Sig t Std. ß partial r Sig 
Density 3.56 0.54 0.53 <.01 -3.47 -0.50 -0.52 <.01 
Clustering 1.94 0.30 0.32 .06 1.37 0.20 0.23 0.18 
8.5 Discussion 
This chapter was done with simulated watchkeeping tasks in a maritime bridge simulator 
and fNIRS technology to measure neurophysiological activation. Besides the mental 
workload analyses in Chapter 7, this chapter further conducts the functional connectivity 
analysis for seafarers using bridge simulation.  
Density falls at d1 (task period 5) when participants are preparing to make the manoeuvre. 
As the density is the ratio of actual connections to possible connections, hence the 
network seems to focus communication between a smaller group of nodes during d1 than 




decision-making. There is an interaction between distraction and task period. It indicates 
increase of density during the fourth period of watchkeeping (w4) for those participants 
in the no-distraction group compared to the distraction group.  
For local clustering, there is a decrease of clustering (which refers to connections between 
neighbouring nodes) during w4 compared to w1, which may indicate boredom. This is 
followed by a sudden increase from w4 to d1 when cognitive decision making begins. 
There is also an interaction between distraction and period. It indicates that the pattern 
described before only occurs for non-distracted participants; distracted participants do not 
show a decline of clustering from w1 to w4, possibly because they are alerted by the 
distraction task. They also do not show a substantial increase at d1, possibly because they 
are distracted from decision-making by the other task. 
With respect to the patterns of functional connectivity observed in Figures 8.4 and 8.6, 
the main distinction between w4 and d1 was an observable decrease in the overall 
frequency of connections, i.e. fewer orange and red connections appear in d1 and d2 
compared to w1-4 (Figure 8.8). This decline was particularly pronounced for bilateral 
connections as participants transitioned from w4 to d1 (Figure 8.8). Close inspection of 
Figure 8.8 indicated that the process of action selection in d1 and d2 was associated with 
a small number of frequent localized connections at left lateral channels, e.g. F5/F7-
AF7/F5 (BA46, BA47), right lateral channels, e.g. AF8/F6-AF4/AF8 (BA46, BA45), and 
fronto-central channels, e.g. Fz/F1-Fz/AFz (BA8, BA9). In addition, a small number of 
bilateral connections were frequently present during d1 and d2, e.g. AF7/AF3-AF4/AF8 
(BA9-BA9), F5/F7-F6/F8 (BA46-BA46). This pattern of bilateral activation at BA46 has 
been associated with Episodic control over action selection. The pattern of persistent 
connectivity and increased activity in the DLPFC may represent a trade-off between 
exploitation of previous experience and exploration of the immediate context as 
participants assessed the approach of a target vessel and formulated an evasive manoeuvre. 




of functional connectivity and behavioural outcomes measured during the task simulation. 
Two linear regression models were constructed to predict distance from the target vessel 
when it was (1) spotted and (2) when participants performed an evasive manoeuvre (Table 
8.1). Both models were statistically significant as functional connectivity metrics 
accounted for approximately a third of variance observed in the performance data, a figure 
that was substantially higher than anticipated. The w4 model revealed that density and 
local clustering were both positively associated with distance to target vessel when 
spotted; however, this relationship was strongest for connection density (Table 8.1). By 
contrast, there was an inverse relationship between connection density and the safety 
margin in the d2 model (Table 8.1), i.e. reduced density was associated with greater 
distance to target vessel when the evasive manoeuvre was performed. The clustering 
coefficient measure did not make a significant relationship to the d2 model. Both models 
reinforce the trends that were observed in Figure 8.4 of increased connection density 
during vigilance and a significant decline of density during the process of action selection. 
The regression models confirm an association between measures of functional 
connectivity in the PFC and performance outcomes in an applied, safety-critical scenario. 
To conclude, the current study measured neurovascular activation and functional 
connectivity in the context of ship bridge operations. Increased activation of the right 
DLPFC, reduced connection density and a higher level of local clustering across a frontal 
montage of 15 channels was associated with action selection in comparison to the earlier 
watchkeeping period of vigilant attention. Activity in the right DLPFC and the level of 
local clustering declined across the watchkeeping period for participants. It also 
demonstrated a significant association between metrics of frontal connectivity (i.e. 
connection density) and behavioural responses to a safety-critical scenario. 
8.6 Ethics statement 




Moores University with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave 
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol 
was approved by Liverpool John Moores University. See appendix A, B. 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
The following are the most significant remarks comprised in the chapter, and emphasised 
in the form of bullet points for the reader’s ease: 
 Density falls at d1 (task period 5) when participants are preparing to make the 
manoeuvre. It indicates increase of density during the fourth period of watchkeeping 
(w4) for those participants in the no-distraction group  
 There is a decrease of clustering during w4 compared to w1, followed by a sudden 
increase from w4 to d1 when cognitive decision making begins. It indicates that the 
pattern only occurs for non-distracted participants. 
 The main distinction between w4 and d1 was an observable decrease in the overall 
frequency of connections. This decline was particularly pronounced for bilateral 
connections as participants transitioned from w4 to d1.  
 The pattern of persistent connectivity and increased activity in the DLPFC may 
represent a trade-off between exploitation of previous experience and exploration of 
the immediate context as participants assessed the approach of a target vessel and 
formulated an evasive manoeuvre. 
 Two regression models confirm an association between measures of functional 






Chapter 9 Discussion and conclusion 
9.1 Contributions to the field 
The human reliability methodology has been developed as a quantification tool for human 
factors in maritime transportation accidents while neurophysiological methodology has 
been put forward as an experimental indicator for seafarers on board. Moreover, it has 
been documented that the abovementioned methodology maintains a systematic 
framework, which continues to develop and improve by wide application in the maritime 
field. Moreover, the methodology derived from the road traffic and aviation fields, 
although it has not been used in maritime scenarios, is evident to be one of the promising 
directions of multi-discipline research related to human factors.  
Human factors in maritime safety comprise several aspects such as procedure factors, 
individual factors, vessel factors, environmental factors, and regulation and management 
factors, which are common factors contributing to human errors in maritime accidents. 
Compared to previous studies in the relevant literature, it reveals new primary data 
directly derived from maritime accident records in two major databanks MAIB and TSB, 
and quantification of the extent to which different combinations of the factors influence 
each accident type.  
The network modelling the interdependency among the risk factors is constructed by 
using NBN, which demonstrates general risk factors in maritime accidents. Scenario 
analyses are conducted to predict the occurrence likelihood of different types of accidents 
under various situations, which provides transport authorities and ship owners with useful 
insights for maritime accident prevention. Its novelties consist of manual collection and 
analysis of the primary data representing frequencies of risk factors directly derived from 
maritime accident reports, causational risk analyses with respect to different maritime 




new insights on critical factors contributing to different types of accidents.  
The modelling of the interdependency among the risk influencing factors is structured by 
TAN, and validated by sensitivity analyses. The findings reveal that the critical risk 
factors for all accident types are ship age, ship operation, voyage segment, information, 
and vessel condition. More importantly, the findings also present the differentiation 
among the vital human factors against different types of accidents. It also provides a 
specific scenario in which the beliefs are upheld, observing the most probable 
configuration. The work pioneers the analyses of various impacts of human factors on 
different maritime accident types, which helps provide specific recommendations for the 
prevention of a particular type of accidents involving human errors. 
The advantages of the above research are revealed. However, there is a gap for reflecting 
mental workload associated with tasks on board. The fNIRS experimental study 
investigates the role of the prefrontal cortex in watchkeeping and decision-making mental 
workload analysis of deck officers on a ship bridge using fNIRS, which fills the blank 
space of application of the fNIRS technique in maritime transportation. Behavioural data 
indicated that experienced deck officers made the decision to successfully change course 
(to avoid collision) at a greater distance from the potential hazard compared to 
inexperienced officers. It illustrates that participants under distraction were considered to 
require more temporal demand than participants without distraction. Also, it demonstrates 
that the developed scenarios distracted the ship officers by reporting vessel position at 
certain points, which is the common task requiring temporal mental workload in the real 
world. In this way, it helps the maritime organisations to understand the workload faced 
by seafarers of different qualification levels, as well as better guidelines to improve 
seafarers’ certificate training.  
Moreover, in terms of fNIRS data, the right ROI showed increased oxygenation during 
the decision phase of the task, due to greater mental workload/decision-making. There is 




boredom. Greater oxygenation is found during decision time for participants with 
distraction, because of higher workload when simultaneously performing the distraction 
task and making the decision to change course. Higher oxygenation at right DLPFC is 
observed for experienced participants, but only when the ship was spotted due to 
considerably more attention being focused on the decision - which may have contributed 
to superior performance. Concerning this, it benefits maritime authorities to conduct 
scientific training so as to lead to the superior performance of seafarers.  
With respect to functional connectivity, reduced connection density and a higher level of 
local clustering across a frontal montage of 15 channels was associated with action 
selection in comparison to the earlier watchkeeping period of vigilant attention. Density 
and local clustering were both positively associated with distance to target vessel when 
spotted; however, this relationship was strongest for connection density. By contrast, 
reduced density was associated with greater distance to target vessel when the evasive 
manoeuvre was performed. The regression models confirm an association between 
measures of functional connectivity in the PFC and performance outcomes in an applied, 
safety-critical scenario. 
From the perspective of scenarios designed in the bridge simulator, complicated or 
combined tasks such as introducing weather forecast or communication during watch-
keeping could be used to manipulate mental workload in a naturalistic navigation task. 
There is a diverse database for the scenarios to be manipulated. It provides a clue to 
allocate a sufficient or adequate group to deal with different situations. Also, the 
development of the ergonomic design of the ship bridge would help the designer construct 
a better workplace for seafarers, so as to generate the workload appropriate to them. 
It is also relevant to note that fNIRS utilises changes of haemoglobin concentrations to 
illustrate neurophysiological activations to describe the mental workload of seafarers, as 
directly as the NASA-TLX questionnaire does. Underlining the already emphasised 




implementation of fNIRS could be considered as a potential aid for mental workload and 
performance predictors. The fNIRS technique could serve to monitor and report human 
performance with a widely accepted methodology during the maritime transportation, 
capable of consistent application across not only shipping divisions, but additionally 
across industry sectors as a standard performance metric. 
9.2 Research objectives achieved 
The primary purposes of this research are to investigate how human factors combined 
with common risk factors affect the safety of maritime transportation, and how individual 
physiological factor - mental workload - influences neurophysiological activation, and 
decision making of experienced and inexperienced seafarers.  
In order to achieve the research aims, the objectives addressed are fulfilled as follows. 
 To obtain the primary data representing frequencies of risk factors directly derived 
from maritime accident reports. 
Manual case by case analysis of recorded maritime accidents from MAIB and TSB 
that occurred from 2012 to 2017 is undertaken to develop a primary database to 
support this study. Accidents related to human errors in the process of navigation and 
sailing, integrated with literature, are analysed to identify risk factors in maritime 
accidents from different views. It provides a general demonstration of maritime 
accidents and rational classification of related risk factors as procedure factors, 
individual factors, vessel factors, environmental factors, regulation and management 
factors. 
 To analyse the risk factors in maritime accidents. 
This work proposes a Bayesian Network-based risk analysis approach to analyse the 




including new primary data derived from maritime accident records; also, the 
quantification of the extent to which different combinations of the factors influence 
each accident type. The network modelling the interdependency among the risk 
factors is constructed by using NBN and validated by sensitivity analysis. Scenario 
analyses are conducted to predict the occurrence likelihood of different types of 
accidents under various situations.  
 To incorporate human factors into causational analyses to maritime accident types. 
In order to include more human factors into the model, another data-driven Bayesian 
Network is used to investigate the effect of human factors on marine safety in 
maritime accident analyses. It incorporate human factors into causational analysis 
concerning different maritime accident types and generates new insights on critical 
human factors contributing to different types of accidents. The modelling of the 
interdependency among the risk influencing factors is structured by TAN and 
validated by sensitivity analysis. More importantly, the findings present the 
differentiation among the vital human factors against different types of accidents. 
MPE is used to provide a specific scenario in which the beliefs are upheld, observing 
the most probable configuration. 
 To develop a historical accident data-driven approach to train prior probabilities in 
the risk-based BN. 
After manual collection of the raw data derived from maritime accident reports, the 
network modelling the interdependency among the risk factors is constructed by data-
driven approaches, NBN and TAN, respectively. Both of them train prior 
probabilities in the risk-based BN and are validated by sensitivity analysis. 
 To conduct an empirical study to provide insights for the prevention of a particular 




Sensitivity analysis helps provide patterns of influencing risk factors. And an 
empirical study is conducted by scenario analysis and MPE to predict the occurrence 
likelihood of different types of accidents under various situations, or a specific 
scenario in which the beliefs are upheld observing the most probable configuration. 
In this way, it provides insights for the accident prevention involving human errors. 
 To design and conduct the experimental study aiming to study the mental workload 
of seafarers and the behavioural performance using fNIRS technology. 
It is done with simulated watchkeeping tasks in the maritime bridge simulator, and 
using fNIRS technology to measure neurophysiological activation. The developed 
scenarios distract the ship officers by reporting vessel position and answering 
questions at specific points, which is the common task requiring temporal mental 
workload in the real world. The results show that experienced participants were 
considered to believe they have better performance than inexperienced people. It also 
illustrates better performance for experienced seafarers because they made decisions 
earlier, which leads to successful collision avoidance. Participants under distraction 
were considered to require more temporal demand than those without distraction. In 
terms of fNIRS data, it shows significant differences in the right DLPFC of the brain.  
 To explore the patterns of functional connectivity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) of experienced and inexperienced seafarers. 
It is done further with functional connectivity analyses for seafarers with bridge 
simulation. The current study measures neurovascular activation and functional 
connectivity in the context of ship bridge operations. Increased activation of the right 
DLPFC, reduced connection density and a higher level of local clustering across a 
frontal montage of 15 channels is associated with action selection in comparison to 
the earlier watchkeeping period of vigilant attention. Activity in the right DLPFC and 




There is a significant association between metrics of frontal connectivity (i.e. 
connection density) and behavioural responses to a safety-critical scenario. 
9.3 Recommendations for future research 
9.3.1 Inclusion of a wide range of human factors  
The TAN modelling chapters brought forward some issues that are worthy of note for 
further lines of investigation. For example, the TAN model accounts for the limited 
number of risk factors according to the frequencies of factors, especially for individual 
factors. It is rational but could be considered further, as some factors have relatively low 
frequencies of being blamed but actually take primary responsibility. That is to say, even 
factors with low frequencies are significant factors for the maritime accidents. This 
research only accounts for the frequency rather than severity. It would be interesting to 
gather more data concerning the severity of maritime accidents, as well as related risk 
factors, to conduct the analyses for the risk of certain accident types.  
Moreover, future work could encompass more maritime accident reports with the original 
description of the process of accidents to enrich the data source to this research. It will 
illustrate the features of modern maritime accidents, and fulfil the database of human 
factors which could be further served by other researchers and transport authorities for 
better improvement of management.  
Also, while out of the scope of the work herein, it would be interesting to integrate the 
human reliability research with an experimental neurophysiological study. For example, 
the findings of the fNIRS experimental study illustrate some patterns of human 
performance with perspectives of mental workload. However, some clues can also be 
found in BN modelling obtained from the maritime accident reports. There is a possibility 
to integrate them from both subjective and objective views. This type of retrofit could 




which was previously not demonstrated in the maritime accident reports. It will introduce 
a novel way of human factors’ study in the maritime field. 
9.3.2 Insights for human factors in ship autonomy  
There are plenty of projects or research related to ship autonomy from various countries, 
e.g. MUNIN project in EU (Man et al., 2014), AAWA project in Finland (Wahlstrom et 
al., 2015), small military boats unmanned solutions in U.S. Navy, Supporting Voice 
Communication in the UK (Brodje et al., 2015). Another future work could be surrounded 
by human factors with ship autonomy. 
The first impression of human factors in USV could be based on autopilot and shore-
based pilot. It could be demonstrated that the idea of unmanned ship operation derives 
from shore-based pilotage. Shore-based pilotage is defined by the European Maritime 
Pilots Association (EMPA), and the International Maritime Pilot’s Association (IMPA) as 
‘an act of pilotage carried out in a designated area by a pilot licensed for that area from a 
position other than aboard the vessel concerned, to conduct the safe navigation of that 
vessel’. Since COST301 (1987–91), there has been considerable interest in remote 
pilotage in the EU, and this has benefited and promoted the TAIE project (1991–4). 
TAIE’s objectives include determining the suitability of VTS for remote pilotage. In 
addition, pilotage organisations were pressured to provide remote pilotage to a port or 
face elimination of these pilotage services in Germany and the Netherlands (Hadley, 
1999). The most prominent concern of remote pilotage is the importance the pilots 
attribute to establishing good contact with the regular crew of the ship (Bruno and 
Lutzhoft, 2009). The costs and benefits of remote pilotage (Hadley, 1999) are: (i) Well 
planned and smoothly implemented vessel movements in all weathers; (ii) Perceived 
efficiency in a competing port; (iii) Savings to ship owners, charterers and receivers from 
reduced time wastage; (iv) Enhanced safety of navigation, reducing risks.  




emerges. E-Navigation Test Bed of ACCessibility for Shipping, Efficiency Advantages 
and Sustainability (ACCSEAS) in EU implement and demonstrate e-Navigation systems 
to alleviate North Sea Region navigation risks (Bransby et al., 2012). Also, ‘route 
suggestions’ has also been developed for shore stations, such as VTS, to transmit route 
segments from several areas of responsibility to individual vessels (Brodje et al., 2015). 
It served as a graphical means of supporting service within voice communication between 
navigator and VTS Operator. With the research trends on unmanned surface vehicles, 
unmanned ships projects become an essential aspect for four reasons. These are working 
environment and larbour shortage aboard, reducing cost on waterborne transportation, 
reducing emissions of vessels, and increasing safety in shipping (Porathe et al., 2014).  
It seems that the human factor emerging in unmanned ships is quite different from in 
traditional ships. The EU project Maritime Unmanned Ship through Intelligence in 
Networks (MUNIN) provides the context to conduct the human factors research by the 
interview of experienced participants (Man et al., 2014). However, the unmanned ship 
does not indicate there is no crew manoeuvring the ship. Contrary to its name, it is 
impossible that nobody is responsible for the ships. Humans will still work on monitoring, 
remote control, and maintenance, especially on the high seas unmanned ships where it 
has to coexist with manned ship systems (Porathe et al., 2014).  
Several generations of vessels have been launched since World War II. These advances in 
automation and reallocation of crew responsibility, as well as shore-based equipment and 
onboard devices, have permitted reductions in crew size (Council, 1990). In the late 1980s, 
European and Japanese governments supported even greater automation, centralizing 
navigation, engine control, communications, and administrative functions on the bridge 
to build the ‘ship operation centre’, as well as throughout the vessel. From this perspective, 
the fast pace of innovation and development in shipping is continuing worldwide. 
Unmanned ships allow fewer crew on board. Meanwhile, several parts of the crews or 




semi-autonomy is highly typical of unmanned vehicles, and in the past, this has been 
favoured over full autonomy due to the diverse shifts of missions (Campbell et al., 2012).  
Obviously, it is demonstrated that the human is still one of the most important 
contributions to shipping. In addition, the feasibility of unmanned, autonomous merchant 
vessels is investigated by the EU project MUNIN (Porathe et al., 2014). In the study, the 
ships are manned while departing and entering port and unmanned during the voyage. 
When on ocean-passage, it is controlled by an automatic system within on-board sensors 
allowing the ship to make collision avoidance manoeuvres according to international 
regulation. It is also continuously monitored by a remote shore centre able to take remote 
control should the automatic systems break.  
It can be seen that if decisions from the operator on board, where stress, mental workload 
and fatigue play a vital role, are moved to a less dominant work environment, some safety 
benefits might be achieved.  
The unmanned ship does not mean the resolution of all the problems from human errors; 
on the contrary, it brings more challenges related to human factors in the Shore Control 
Centre (SCC) (Man et al., 2014). People need to be able to take full control over the ship 
at any time or several ships simultaneously. Without ship sense or situation awareness 
from the feeling of the ship’s movement and navigation environment, operators do not 
find it easy to manoeuvre ships remotely. There will be no physical connection between 
the people and the vessel environment. Specifically, the visual and vestibular sense of the 
environment, a tactile sense in ship handling for bridge officers, will be missing.  
With this background, human factors ashore may encounter different issues compared to 
human factors on board. Firstly, there will be no physical connection between the human 
and the ship, and no directly perceived information from the ship’s environment. Secondly, 
the traditional methods used to prioritise information for humans do not generate 




Thirdly, situation awareness is an accumulated factor continually developing with a high 
risk of information overloading. Maintaining situation awareness becomes more 
challenging than creating situation awareness to keep track of the dynamic situation.  
Although unmanned commercial shipping does not exist yet, it is worth considering these 
prominent issues (Wahlstrom et al., 2015). Without the bridge and the systems supporting 
the crew, the ships could be lighter and carry more cargo – this would increase revenues 
and fuel efficiency. The most well known problem of automation is to retain adequate 
situation awareness through remote sensing (Porathe et al., 2014). Man invited ten master 
mariner program students with experience at sea to participate in the focus group 
interview (Man et al., 2014), discussing the different actions taken on board and ashore. 
The results highlight ship sense and situation awareness existed ashore. In addition, 
compensating and mimicking ship sense by the simulator as the human-machine interface 
is the purpose of obtaining situation awareness.  
The most considerable issues also include information overload, boredom, mishaps 
during changeovers and handoffs, lack of feel of the vessel, constant reorientation to new 
tasks, delays in control and monitoring, and the need for human understanding in local 
knowledge and object differentiation (e.g., in differentiating between help-seekers and 
pirates) (Wahlstrom et al., 2015). It is shown that positive aspects include lack of 
seasickness and physical damage to the crew in harsh weather conditions. This implies 
that the unmanned ships should be designed with agile command and control, considering 
human-machine interaction and to communicate with the manned vessels and the 
authorities proactively. 
With greater emphasis being placed on the use of automatic devices and displays, it 
requires training of simulators to use a two-dimensional screen instead of using their 
standard three-dimensional view. This is likely to add to the cost of unmanned ship’s 
training service. However, it should be stated that, with technological development, an 




himself an expert in use. Hansen integrated a system within a 40-foot laboratory boat, 
advanced onboard control, sensing, data fusion, physical plant and payload monitoring 
and management to replace traditional human crew functions (Hansen et al., 2006). It 
discussed a path proposed during Intelligent Autonomy (IA) NIST workshops to specify 
a quantifiable measure of full USV autonomy equipped with skills. Moreover, the USV 
Skill Set Architecture (SSA) is proposed. 
Man redefined the crew structure in the SCC, operator, supervisor, captain, engineer; 5 
scenarios in the two-day period were conducted (Man et al., 2015) to explain the situation 
awareness in unmanned ships. It was demonstrated that the onboard thresholds of the 
alarms are not necessarily suitable for the situation of remote monitoring. The alarm shall 
be related to the “tendency” of the event to facilitate the operator’s SA efficiently. More 
types of information (e.g. visual/audio) should be available in the SCC to actively support 
people for decision-making. From this point of view, the design of the SCC shall not be 
a mimic of the bridge design. Redefining the human factors and human errors contributing 
to maritime accidents is necessary, especially for situation awareness. Porathe et al. (2014) 
stated that human errors will continue to be the biggest challenge and must be addressed 
carefully and meticulously. 
9.4 Concluding remarks 
The work presented herein has initially documented a literature review underlining 
human reliability and risk assessment in the maritime system, specifically emphasising 
human factors in maritime accidents through accident investigation reports. Additionally, 
the application of functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy was demonstrated to imply how 
it can be utilised for the maritime transportation field.   
More importantly, research challenges on the evaluation of common factors contributing 
to human errors in the maritime industry, and how to control measures of human errors 




research is expected to be extended and explored by redefining risk factors, incorporating 
quantitative methods into human errors assessment and integrating neurophysiological 
methods, in order to improve the safety level of maritime transportation and mitigate the 
risk for seafarers on board.  
Human reliability methods are applied for the identification of risk factors contributing 
to human errors in maritime accidents. Combined with Bayesian networks, contributory 
factors and the inter-relations among them can be modelled to illustrate causations and 
quantitative analyses among risk factors. Moreover, the application of the fNIRS 
technique and NASA-TLX derived from the neuroscience field is the supplement of 
multi-discipline knowledge. It explores the role of the prefrontal cortex in watchkeeping 
and decision-making mental workload analysis of deck officers on a ship bridge, and 
proposes an effective experimental method to understand the functional connectivity of 
brains, as well as the differences of decision-making by experienced and inexperienced 
officers.  
The above modelling and experimental study are intended to recommend the possible 
countermeasures for mitigating human errors to reduce the risks of accidents, and 
demonstrate the patterns of seafarers’ decision-making which is beneficial for better 
performance of seafarers and provides new insights for the training of ship officers and 
seafarers’ certification.  
Finally, the inclusion of a broader range of human factors in maritime transportation and 
the experimental neurophysiological methods would be future explored for the potential 
human reliability research. Moreover, the remote human-centred design of novel vessels 
and the development of unmanned ships navigating with traditional ships introduces new 
scenarios for the human factors’ research in the maritime field, which shows promise by 
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Appendix A NASA-TLX Questionnaire 
NASA-TLX 
Number:          Age:         Gender:            Experience/qualification: 
Please rate the MENTAL DEMAND of the task:  How much mental and perceptual activity was 
required 
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
Enter a number between 1 and 10 here for MENTAL DEMAND        
Please rate the PHYSICAL DEMAND of the task:  How much physical activity was required?  
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enter a number between 1 and 10 here for PHYSICAL DEMAND        
Please rate the TEMPORAL DEMAND of the task:  How much time pressure did you feel due to 
the pace at which task elements occurred?         
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




Please rate your own PERFORMANCE:  How successful do you think you were in completing the 
goals of the task?           
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enter a number between 1 and 10 here for PERFORMANCE         
Please rate your EFFORT:  How hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to 
accomplish your level of performance?           
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enter a number between 1 and 10 here for EFFORT           
Please rate your FRUSTRATION:  How discouraged, irritated, stressed and annoyed did you feel 
during the task?           
Low         High 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Enter a number between 1 and 10 here for FRUSTRATION      
I have read the information sheet provided and I am happy to participate. I understand 
that by completing and returning this questionnaire I am consenting to be part of the research 





Appendix B Participant Information 
Sheet  
LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY 
Participant Information Sheet 
LJMU’s Research Ethics Committee Approval Reference:  
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET  
Title of Study: Human error assessment for seafarers in ship bridge: an experimental 
study 
School/Faculty: School of Maritime and Mechanical Engineering 
Name and Contact Details and status of the Principal Investigator:  
Shiqi Fan, S.Fan@2017.ljmu.ac.uk, PhD student 
Name and Contact Details of the Investigators:  
Dr Eduardo Blanco Davis, E.E.BlancoDavis@ljmu.ac.uk 
Prof Stephen Fairclough, S.Fairclough@ljmu.ac.uk  
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the study us being done and what participation will involve.  
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
1. What is the purpose of the study? 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the root causes that contribute to human error 
within the bridge room of a vessel. Statistics indicates that 75% -96% of water traffic 
accidents are caused by the human and organisational factors. This study will give us in 
depth knowledge of the risks associated with the bridge room of a vessel and in turn 
allow us to implement further risk control options or training for seafarers. 
2. Why have I been invited to participate?  
You have been invited because you are aged 18 years old or older. In addition, you are 
qualified experienced or novice seafarers, or have education experience in navigation 
technology. 
The exclusion / inclusion criteria are head injury conditions or suffering with high blood 
pressure, since this may affect the results from experiment equipment - fNIRS. Blood 
pressure data will be collected prior to testing. Any person suffering from anxiety 




3. Do I have to take part?  
No. It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.  
You can discontinue the study for any reason without any explanation 
and  without  it  affecting  your  rights/any  future treatment/service you receive. And the data 
will not be withdrawn as it will be unidentifiable. 
4. What will happen to me if I take part?  
We will talk you through the study procedures and give you the chance to ask any 
questions. The experiment will take place at bridge simulator in ground floor at James 
Parsons Building, Byrom Street, L3 3AF, Liverpool. Participants will undergo the following 
process in ship bridge simulator. 
Firstly, we will ask you to take a blood pressure test to confirm that you do not have high 
blood pressure which is not suitable for the experiment. However we are not qualified 
to make judgements on participants’ health, you would be advised to visit your GP for 
your blood pressure. After reading this information and giving your written consent you 
will be asked to partake in some basic training in the bridge simulator. This will involve 
familiarising you with the simulator software, how certain selected systems work and 
how you can change systems to solve problems. The training exercise will last average 
30 minutes for subjects. Participants will be allocated into experienced group and 
inexperienced group, depending on whether you complete a number of hours in the 
bridge simulator as part of your existing training, e.g. a specific course NAEST in LJMU. 
Once training is completed you will be placed with a skull cap containing 8 sensors and 
8 detectors required to measure the blood flow in your pre-frontal cortex via the use of 
infra-red light, seen as below.  
 
Then you will be asked to complete a task in bridge simulator. Your task will be a Collision 
Regulation exercise set in open water, and you need to alter the course under the Rules 
to avoid a collision with other ships, as you are in real life. The tasks on average will take 
around 20 minutes. After tasks, the participant is supposed to finish the questionnaire 




5. Will I be recorded and how will the recorded media be used? 
No, your action will not be recorded. Age, gender, maritime experience/qualification of 
you made during this study will be used only for data analysis and result illustration.  No 
other use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside 
the project will be allowed access to the original data.  
6. What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks involved with this study. You may feel a slight discomfort 
from wearing the head cap for the duration of the test and in the rare case that the 
discomfort gets too much then you can stop the task as anytime and re-adjust the head 
cap or discontinue the study. You will be asked if you are experiencing any nausea during 
the training session and will be withdrawn if nausea is an issue for you in the simulator. 
Some of the tasks, with them being time dependant may cause varying degrees of stress 
and mental fatigue. 
7. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The benefits of taking part are useful learning experience for bridge simulator. Whilst 
will be £10 voucher to you for taking part in the study, it is hoped that this work will 
enhance your professional. 
8. What will happen to the data provided and how will my taking part in this project 
be kept confidential? 
The information you provide as part of the study is the research study data.  Any 
research study data from which you can be identified (e.g. audio and/or video 
recordings), is known as personal data.  
Personal data does not include data that cannot be identified to an individual (e.g. data 
collected anonymously or where identifiers have been removed). 
If necessary, personal data will be stored confidentially for 5 years after the study has 
finished. Personal data will be accessible to the research team. Personal identifiable 
data/information/tissue will not be transferred outside of the European Economic Area. 
You will not be identifiable in any ensuing reports or publications. Anonymous 
information which is not identifiable will be stored in locked cabinets and only the 
researcher and supervisor will have access to the data. fNIRS devices will be only 
accessible to the researchers, and the data/information be deleted from the device once 




Anonymised data might be used for additional or subsequent research studies and we 
might share anonymised data with other investigators (e.g. in online databases).  All 
personal information that could identify you will be removed or changed before 
information is shared with other researchers or results are made public. The data 
provided will not be withdrawn as it will be unidentifiable. 
9. What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The investigator intends to complete a dissertation to satisfy their degree programme, 
publish the results in a PhD thesis, journal articles, or conference papers.  
10. Who is organising and funding/commissioning the study? 
This study is organised by Liverpool John Moores University and has no conflict of 
interest. 
11. Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Liverpool 
John Moores University Research Ethics Committee (Reference number: 18/ERI/021). 
12. What if something goes wrong? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, please contact the relevant 
investigator who will do their best to answer your query. The researcher should 
acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of how 
they intend to deal with it. If you wish to make a complaint, please contact the chair of 
the Liverpool John Moores University Research Ethics Committee 
(researchethics@ljmu.ac.uk) and your communication will be re-directed to an 
independent person as appropriate. 
13. Data Protection Notice 
The data controller for this study will be Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU). The 
LJMU Data Protection Office provides oversight of LJMU activities involving the 
processing of personal data, and can be contacted at secretariat@ljmu.ac.uk. This means 
that we are responsible for looking after your information and using it properly. LJMU’s 
Data Protection Officer can also be contacted at secretariat@ljmu.ac.uk. The University 
will process your personal data for the purpose of research.  Research is a task that we 
perform in the public interest. 
Your rights to access, change or move your information are limited, as we need to 




accurate. If you withdraw from the study, we will keep the information about you that 
we have already obtained.  
You can find out more about how we use your information by contacting 
secretariat@ljmu.ac.uk. 
If you are concerned about how your personal data is being processed, please contact 
LJMU in the first instance at secretariat@ljmu.ac.uk. If you remain unsatisfied, you may 
wish to contact the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Contact details, and details 
of data subject rights, are available on the ICO website at: https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/data-protection-reform/overview-of-the-gdpr/individuals-rights/  
16.   Contact for further information 
Shiqi Fan, 1st Floor research suite, GERI building, S.Fan@2017.ljmu.ac.uk 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering to take part in this 
study.  
Note: A copy of the participant information sheet should be retained by the participant 
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